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Preface
The present thesis is based on four articles in the areas of labor economics, regional science
and international trade. Thanks to the availability of detailed panel data and matched
employer-employee data, these fields have progressed rapidly over the last 20 years. I
make use of different micro-level data sets to evaluate reasons for performance disparities
between firms and between workers and evaluate the interrelation of these disparities with
characteristics of local labor markets. Another advantage of the improved data quality
is that individual performances may be accurately measured and that even unobservable
productivity differences may be quantified.
The following two examples are intended to illustrate the utilization and the significance
of performance measures in economic literature. First, Syverson (2011: 327,358) argues in
his survey on the determinants of firms’ total factor productivities (TFP) that
"[t]he discovery of ubiquitous, large, and persistent productivity differences
has shaped research agendas in a number of fields. [...] Research that ties
observable attributes of the industry’s technology or demand structure to the
quantitative importance of productivity-influencing factors would be an incred-
ible advance in our ability to explain productivity growth".
Chapter 1 of this thesis provides such a discrimination between the effects of several ag-
glomeration externalities on firms’ TFP. Second, it has been observed across countries
that the recent rise in wage inequality in the labor market is inadequately explained by
differences in workers’ education and experience (Acemoglu and Autor 2011). Technolog-
ical change and the entailed international fragmentation of production line are identified
as two of the main drivers of this development. Both have heterogeneous effects on the
demand for and productivity of labor that go beyond the classical dichotomy of high- and
low-skilled workers but are more adequately described by their inherent skills, occupations
and job tasks. These three characteristics of workers are the focus of chapters 2, 3 and 4,
respectively.
Every chapter is published as a separate article. Each contributes to the state of the art
research and each has its own methodological improvement on preceding studies. Chapter
2 and 4 analyze a single mechanism that affects the performance of workers and firms,
whereas chapter 1 and 3 discriminate and compare several theories. Figure 1 illustrates by
means of keywords the main topic of the four chapters of this thesis, as well as their overlaps
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and linkages, which are discussed in the remainder of this preface. The detailed approaches
and connections to the previous literature are located in the respective chapters.
Figure 1: Keyword cloud
The pervasive concentration of economic activity across counties, regions and cities reflects
the existence of agglomeration advantages and increasing returns to scale (Krugman 1993).
Sveikauskas (1975) aims to prove that localization advantages become manifest in higher
productivity of firms and higher wages of workers. He estimates city-specific production
functions and finds that a doubling of city size is associated with a 6% increase in labor pro-
ductivity and a 5% increase in wages. A closer look at possible transmission mechanisms of
those agglomeration advantages was not possible at that time. On the theoretical side, the
design of monopolistic competition in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) enabled the formalization
of models with increasing returns to scale that brought firms to the center of attention.
Krugman (1991) demonstrates the positive effect of market size and Abdel-Rahman and
Fujita (1990) formalize the advantages of linkages to intermediate goods suppliers in a gen-
eral equilibrium framework with cities. Theoretical underpinnings of the other Marshallian
agglomeration economies, namely knowledge spillovers and labor market pooling, were suc-
cessively developed as well, see Duranton and Puga (2004a) for a survey. On the empirical
side, Henderson (2003) is the first test of agglomeration economies with the help of panel
data and a firm-specific measure for TFP. However, he does not analyze single mecha-
nisms, but general advantages of concentration and diversity. The merit of TFP compared
to general concentration measures, which is already acknowledged in Sveikauskas (1975),
is that TFP provides a direct evidence of the existence of agglomeration externalities. To
date, some studies of single agglomeration mechanisms exist, but a discrimination is rarely
tackled.
In the first chapter of this thesis, I use proxies for knowledge spillovers, supplier linkages and
labor market pooling to test their effect on plant-specific TFP. Furthermore, I delimit these
detailed channels from the possible general advantages of density, diversity and industrial
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specialization of the region. However, the identification of TFP is not trivial and deserves
some attention. I show that its accurate estimation is important for the identification of
agglomeration advantages, which is usually biased due to unobserved output prices and
the endogeneity of agglomeration economies. It turns out that labor market pooling is the
quantitatively most important agglomeration mechanism. It is captured by the correlation
of the occupational composition between one county-industry and the rest of the county.
The intuition behind it is that a plant readily finds suitable staff if sectors, which employ
similar workers, have a large extent in the same region. Labor market pooling is still the
dominant agglomeration force if the spatial boundaries of regions are changed. In general,
the data demonstrate that the strength of agglomeration economies varies largely between
sectors. Only for a subset of industries, some positive evidence is detected for knowledge
spillovers.
The second chapter analyzes labor market pooling in greater detail, but with a slightly
different modeling than in chapter 1. In a pooled labor market, a firm does not need to
incur high search costs in case it aims to recruit, e.g., an engineer if many engineers are
employed in other sectors. The same argument applies to the workers. In case of a job
loss, a worker readily finds a new employer in the same or in a related industry. Unlike
in chapter 1, the central aspect of labor market pooling is based on the quality of workers
and firms. Of course, some people are more productive in their current job than others,
just as pronounced TFP differences between firms exist. Leading companies do not aim to
employ just any engineer, but rather the best they can procure. Becker (1973) derives that
positive assortative matching arises if the qualities of workers and firms are complements in
the production function. That is, in a frictionless labor market, the best firm employs the
best worker, the second best firm employs the second best worker and so on. The quality
of a match thus depends on the degree of similarity of both partners. In the presence
of search costs, the observed matching pattern is still positive assortative, but deviations
around the perfect match exist in equilibrium (Shimer and Smith 2000). Once more, labor
market pooling arises because large markets offer lower search costs, cf. Wheeler (2001).
In this case, the advantage is that firms expect to find workers with a quality close to
their own. As a result of the complementarity in the production function, production is
more efficient and wages are higher in large markets. To test labor market pooling and
assortative matching, one has to figure out how to measure the quality of agents.
Some 30 years ago, Rosen (1986) and Willis (1986) lamented in the Handbook of Labor
Economics that the relation between jobs and wages, sorting and assignment of workers to
firms could not be evaluated due to the lack of matched employer-employee data records.
As in the case of TFP, studies on these topics skyrocketed after suitable data was accessible
in the end of the 1990s, see the survey of Abowd and Kramarz (1999). Although to date
numerous studies on matching exist, very few evaluate differences in regional labor markets.
Furthermore, I enhance preceding studies by using more detailed quality measures. To
this end, I estimate the TFP for firms and use the labor market valuation of unobservable
adherent skills of workers. Since the TFP (and thus the production function) is already
exploited to identify the quality of matches, it is not possible to estimate the effects of
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matching or labor market pooling on the TFP, as in chapter 1. Nevertheless, it is possible
to infer the existence of complementarities in the production function from the observed
matching pattern. Moreover, wage gains from suitable matches may be identified from
the deviations around the perfect match. This relation is estimated within education and
occupation groups in order to make the quality level of all workers comparable to each
other. The approach conforms to the theoretical considerations and the matching model
in Eeckhout and Kircher (2011). Finally, I examine if the average quality of matches has
a systematic relation to the local employment density. The existence of agglomeration
economies and the multitude of reasons for higher wages in dense regions is a challenge in
the identification of the matching pattern because matching may be confounded with the
co-location of highly productive agents. The data confirms that TFP, wages, skills and price
levels are generally higher in denser regions. As expected, controlling for the co-location of
productive agents significantly reduces the strength of the matching pattern. Either way,
the observed matching between workers and firms is positive assortative. The estimated
wage curve suggests that every worker may earn as much as 2% more by choosing a firm
the corresponds to her own productivity level. Without controlling for the co-location of
productive agents, this gain is estimated to be twice as high. I also find that the strength
of the matching pattern exhibits neither a robust link to the density of the region, nor to
the local unemployment rate. Finally, chapter 2 confirms that the use of firm fixed effects
as a quality measure, as is frequently done after the seminal paper by Abowd et al. (1999)
was published, may lead to distorted results if the extent of the sample is not large enough.
In chapter 3, I analyze several wage determinants side-by-side. In addition to agglomeration
economies and matching, personal productive abilities, sectoral differences, the local price
level and diverging returns to skill in regions of different size are considered. Unlike in
chapter 2, matching effects do not only indicate how much a specific worker may gain
through the choice of a suitable employer, but this time, an overall employer size wage
effect captures a variety of different reasons why large firms pay more than small firms.
In addition to the average skill level of workers, those reasons range from rent sharing,
organizational, institutional or working conditions to a complementary between skilled
workers and capital assets (Brown and Medoff 1989; Troske 1999). Further determinants
which are not directly related to the worker’s own productivity also play a role in the
explanation of wage levels, such as union membership or the local cost of living. On the
basis of the wage regression I apply decomposition methods by building on Morduch and
Sicular (2002) and Juhn et al. (1993) to evaluate and compare the impact of those wage
determinants on the aggregate inequality level and on the distribution of wages. The
approach enables the disentanglement of changes of single wage determinants’ impacts
into changes in the composition and the returns to these wage determinants. The sizes
of those effects on the entire wage distribution particularly yield some valuable insights
into relevant developments on the labor market. Moreover, I distinguish wage disparities
between and within regions. These topics are highly relevant given that Germany, as well
as many other nations, has experienced a marked rise in wage inequality over the past 30
years which can be explained to an ever smaller extent by obvious differences in education
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and experience, see Van Reenen (2011) for an international survey. This development of
the unexplained part of the wage is mainly attributed to the skill biased technical change,
as argued previously. In fact, I observe that between 1995 and 2007 individuals at the
bottom of the distribution have real wage losses of up to 15%, while workers at the top
earn up to 20% more.
Consistent with the two preceding chapters, I observe that regional productivity and cost of
living differences have a positive impact on the wage rate, but relative to the total dispersion
of wages, their share is small and declining. The positive firm size premium, however, has
a large and increasing significance in the explanation of wage inequality. On the one hand,
high-wage workers are on average employed in much larger companies. On the other hand,
the changed firm size premium makes both ends of the wage distribution drift apart. More
precisely, it contributes -4 percentage points at the left end and up to +2% of the total
change at the right end of the wage distribution. Certainly, the wage distribution mirrors
the skill distribution, and hence the finding reveals another kind of assortative matching.
The difference is that in chapter 2 only relative skill/quality differences are considered
because the wage gains are estimated within occupation and education groups. Chapter
2 demonstrates that not only workers with the highest skills in absolute terms sort into
highly productive firms, but also the comparatively best workers. It also reveals that TFP
and firm size simultaneously have a positive correlation with the wages which confirms
that the employer size premium reflects a multitude of factors.
In chapter 3, the largest wage changes of individual characteristics are related to age and
unemployment records prior to the current job. Their averages in the wage distribution
are skewed, similarly to the average employer size. Both changes in the composition and
in the return to age and an unemployment record increase wage inequality. The latter
decreases the wage by up to 3% and workers’ age accounts for another 10% of the change
in the wage gap between both ends of the distribution. Negative changes at the bottom
of the wage distribution are also related to the development of payments in occupations in
the construction, service and logistics sectors. In general, the heterogeneous development
of occupations accounts for the largest share of the rise in wage inequality. Workers in
technical, managerial and administrative occupations receive higher payments. According
to Spitz-Oener (2006), these jobs involve especially analytical and interactive tasks. This
development is in line with the skill biased technical change (SBTC) hypothesis of Au-
tor et al. (2008, 2003), according to which information technology and computerization
complement analytical and interactive tasks, but substitute routine tasks. In contrast to
prior studies, my findings provide support for this hypothesis which is not based on the
development of residual wages. The fact that interactive and service jobs at the bottom of
the distribution do not gain may be explained by the marked supply shock of low-skilled
workers through the German reunification and migration, cf. Dustmann et al. (2009); Glitz
(2012). This seems to be a main reason why Germany does not experience a polarization
of wages similar to the US.1
Another interesting finding in chapter 3 is that the wage dispersion between regions is
1 A comparison of wage developments in Germany and in the US is provided in Antonczyk et al. (2010).
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nearly constant, despite the sharp increase in the overall wage inequality. While regional
wage disparities account for about 20% of the total dispersion in the year 1995, the share
drops to 14% in 2007. The reason is that neither the regional sorting of workers and
firms intensifies, nor are the characteristics that experience the largest changes unequally
distributed between regions. All in all, the results demonstrate that the rise in wage
inequality has many facets. There are certainly other significant wage determinants that
could not be included due to data constraints. For example, offshoring has negative wage
effects for workers that conduct easily tradable routine tasks, while it positively affects
analytical and interactive tasks, as is the case through SBTC (Baumgarten et al. 2013;
Ebenstein et al. 2014). Goos et al. (2014) provide an attempt to disentangle the effects
of offshoring and SBTC. They find that, for a number of European countries, SBTC has
much larger effects on employment and presumably also on wages. Both offshoring and
the task trade are scrutinized in the last chapter, but with regard to Brazilian data.
The majority of papers on offshoring are concerned with wage and employment effects
in industrialized countries. Because direct statements of managers on relocations hardly
exist in representative data sets, intermediate goods imports are usually used as offshoring
measure.2 In an early contribution, Feenstra and Hanson (1999) use imported interme-
diate inputs and investment in computer technology at the industry level and find that
offshoring explains 15% of the development of relative wages in the US. Their study also
reveals that the usage of computer technology has a much larger wage effect. Recent
matched firm-level trade data allows the evaluation of direct consequences of intermediate
imports on firms. The downside is that general equilibrium effects are not captured by this
approach. Corresponding empirical findings largely confirm the theoretical predictions:
easily offshorable routine tasks are traded, the offshoring firm conducts more interactive
and non-routine tasks, cf. Becker et al. (2013), and the overall employment effect on the
firm is positive due to productivity increases (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2008; Moser
et al. 2010). Hummels et al. (2014) confirm the related inverse wage effects. Those wage
and employment effects are reflected in the entire economy since the fragmentation of the
production chain is steadily progressing (Baumgarten et al. 2013; Firpo et al. 2011). This
shows that although technological change may be more important, offshoring is by now a
relevant phenomenon, as conjectured by Krugman (2008).
Initially, my idea behind the paper in chapter 4 was to verify some of these predictions and
findings with Brazilian data. Brazil is a middle-income country with a large endowment
of low-skilled labor but, its wage level and its share of high-skilled labor is still higher
than in India or China, for example. Although, according to De Negri (2005a), Brazil
hosts some highly innovative and productive international firms, at second glance it is not
obvious what intermediate imports to Brazil represent. Intermediate imports may either
be tasks that were offshored to low-wage countries or onshored production stages from
high-wage countries. So, the novelty here is that we are potentially looking at offshoring
2 It is also possible to use FDI as offshoring measure. However, FDI only reflect those relocations that
occur within the boundaries of the firm. Another disadvantage is the challenge in distinguishing between
horizontal and vertical FDI.
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from two perspectives. Therefore, it is desirable to use firm-level data to identify direct
effects and to focus on employment because, as demonstrated in chapter 3, there are a
variety of components that influence wages. To pave the way for the understanding of
task trade in middle-income countries and to identify clean effects, I apply Propensity
Score Matching. For the same reason, I motivate the analysis with a simple extension of
the model in Feenstra and Hanson (1996) to a three-country framework. The prediction
of this Heckscher-Ohlin Model with a continuum of intermediate inputs is that Brazil
performs medium-complex routine manual intensive tasks. This results can come about
either by onshoring these type of tasks or by offshoring even less complex routine tasks.
The advantage of Propensity Score Matching is that not all of the firms in the sample
are used to identify the effects, but only firms that the comparable to each other. The
comparison of matched firms suggests that the increase in intermediate imports implies an
employment growth by about 12 employees. Importing firms also conduct more routine
manual tasks and increase the share of exported intermediate inputs. All of the three
findings point to the fact that Brazilian firms are mainly onshoring. A comparison of
created and destructed jobs in plants with an increase in intermediate imports reveals that
all industries and all occupation groups have overall employment gains. I also distinguish
between the origin of imports to see if the type and the purpose of traded tasks are
different, but this is hardly the case. Apparently, even intermediate products from China
are processes with routine manual labor input and are then re-exported. These findings are
consistent with the three-country model and with the existence of two different production
modes: sequential and independent production lines.3
As all of the chapters are independent contributions, they have their own introduction and
conclusion. Footnotes, equations and appendices are numbered independently to facilitate
the reading of each chapter. Appendices contain some additional information on the data
used and, if necessary, details of econometric methods. The entire list of references is
located at the end of this thesis.
3 See Baldwin and Venables (2013) for a theoretical comparison of the resulting trade patterns from
these two production modes.
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1.1 Introduction
Despite higher factor prices for land and labor economic activity is spatially concentrated.1
However, what exactly makes agglomerations more attractive than sparsely populated re-
gions? Over one hundred years ago, Alfred Marshall (1890) described three motives for
firms to locate close to each other: the proximity to their suppliers, the existence of a
specialized local labor market and the presence of knowledge spillovers. Different mi-
croeconomic foundations for Marshall’s anecdotal evidence have been developed2, yet, re-
garding empirical evidence, Glaeser and Gottlieb (2009: 985) note that "the field has still
not reached a consensus on the relative importance of different sources of agglomeration
economies". The few studies concerned with the assessment of such sources’ relative im-
portance differ largely in the dependent variable that they use. Puga (2010: 204) argues
that productivity is the "most direct approach" to capturing agglomeration economies.
In fact, employment growth and concentration are observed consequences, whereas higher
total factor productivity (TFP) is a concrete, measurable benefit for firms.3
The present study sets itself apart from the preceding literature along three dimensions.
First, no other study has quantified the relative importance of different microeconomic ag-
glomeration mechanisms according to their impact on TFP. To this end, TFP is estimated
from sector-specific plant-level production functions, and proxies for labor pooling, input
relations and knowledge spillovers are constructed, following closely the predictions from
theoretical models. Additional controls for the size, industrial diversity and specialization
of a region are included. The present paper thus also contributes to the ongoing debate
on whether specialization or urbanization economies are beneficial to firms (Beaudry and
Schiffauerova 2009). Second, I discuss, how different estimation strategies for TFP influ-
ence the resulting agglomeration economies. Third, I show how the range of industries
and the modifiable areal unit problem (MAUP) affect the findings. The MAUP refers to
the predicament that aggregate values in any spatial analysis can be artifacts from the
accidental delineation of its boundaries.
Discriminating between different forces is complicated due to their ’Marshallian equiva-
lence’ (Duranton and Puga 2004b). That is, most theoretical models on agglomeration
mechanisms share the prediction that the benefits grow in the number of workers or firms.
Indeed, earlier contributions have used the size (Sveikauskas 1975) or density of areas (Ci-
ccone and Hall 1996) as proxies, leaving open how the agglomeration benefits are actually
transmitted to firms. For this reason, I collect unique features in micro-founded models
and combine several data sets to construct proxy variables at the county level.
As argued above, TFP is a direct and telling indicator for measuring agglomeration advan-
tages at the firm level. Presumably due to data constraints, only a small fraction of studies
1 For evidence from elaborated concentration indices, see Duranton and Overman (2005) for the UK
and Koh and Riedel (forthcoming) for Germany.
2 Duranton and Puga (2004b) provide a comprehensive survey of this literature.
3 In this context Cingano and Schivardi (2004) compare regressions with TFP growth and employment
growth as the dependent variable. They find positive coefficients for the size and specialization of a region
in TFP growth regressions but the opposite result with employment growth.
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draw inferences from TFP.4 In addition, its estimation is quite complex, as is documented
in the sizable literature on this topic; see, e.g., Ackerberg et al. (2007). The reason why
this paper also focuses on TFP is twofold. Given that different productivity measures are
used in the literature, a comparison provides a notion of agglomeration economies’ sensi-
tivity to the dependent variable. We moreover find out if the effort of a refined estimation
is worthwhile and provides more reliable results. I account for the correlation of input
choices with current productivity levels using the Olley and Pakes (1996) (OP henceforth)
procedure.5 Furthermore, I correct for unobserved output prices as proposed in Klette and
Griliches (1996), which allows one to separate true productivity from demand-side effects.
It will be shown that the estimation technique has an effect on the significance level and
magnitude of agglomeration mechanisms found. So far, only De Loecker (2011), Del Gatto
et al. (2008) and Muendler (2007) have corrected jointly for the simultaneity bias and the
omitted price bias, but none of them has taken the TFP estimates into a regional analysis.
To this end, the procedure is modified to accommodate the influence of agglomeration
variables on TFP and an additional exit selection bias, as originally proposed by OP.
The present paper thus combines thorough TFP estimation with the discrimination of
microeconomic agglomeration mechanisms. The main finding from German establishment
and employment-level data from 2000 to 2007 is clear-cut and robust: labor market pool-
ing, captured through the correlation of the occupational composition between one county-
industry and the rest of the county, has the highest impact in all specifications. Knowledge
spillovers, the overall employment size and industrial diversity are merely significant in
univariate regressions. For example, the data show that average productivity increases by
approximately 0.6%, when the employment size of a county is increased by 10%. This
magnitude is similar to those of previous studies conducted on other countries. Discrimi-
nation of the agglomeration forces in multivariate regressions shows that only labor market
pooling remains significant. Still, knowledge spillovers and diversity are significant for a
subset of industries. Regarding diversity, the outcome is sensitive to the construction of the
diversity index. Overall, the agglomeration economies differ considerably between indus-
tries. When the spatial unit of the entire analysis is changed from counties to larger labor
market regions, the magnitude of labor market pooling declines, but its significance and
dominance over the other agglomeration forces remain robust. In contrast, input linkages
only appear to be important on the greater geographic scale. Finally, when the omitted
price and simultaneity bias are not considered, all type of agglomeration economies are
underestimated. On the one hand, this result confirms the theoretical (Melitz 2003) and
empirical (Foster et al. 2008) finding that highly productive establishments set lower prices.
On the other hand, this result stresses the importance of separating price effects from true
productivity.
To observe the context of the integration of the present paper in the literature, existing
studies on agglomeration economies may be classified in two categories: those that analyze
4 See Rosenthal and Strange (2004), Puga (2010) and Glaeser and Gottlieb (2009) for surveys on the
empirics of agglomeration economies.
5 Due to this simultaneity the plant’s TFP affects the input choice, which translates into biased coeffi-
cients and a biased TFP estimate.
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TFP and those that aim at the discrimination between agglomeration forces. Most in the
first category examine measures of concentration and urbanization economies but not dis-
tinct agglomeration mechanisms. My findings are in line with Combes et al. (2010), who
report average productivity gains of about 0.4%, when the employment density of a county
is increased by 10%. Various instruments undermine their initial OLS estimation. Hender-
son (2003) finds urbanization economies in the machinery industry. For another high-tech
industry, he obtains the opposite finding, analogous to the differing results across industries
here. According to the meta study from Beaudry and Schiffauerova (2009) but contrary
to my findings, more support is found for specialization economies than for diversity, for
example in Cingano and Schivardi (2004) who study TFP growth. Another study similar
to this one is Martin et al. (2011). In their estimation, own-industry employment has a
positive sign, whereas size and diversity of the region are insignificant. The authors addi-
tionally include plant fixed effects and instrument the agglomeration variables with lagged
values. Nonetheless, Martin et al. (2011: 189) note that their result is "very close to the
estimates in the existing literature". Repeating the approach at a finer geographical level,
surprisingly, yields smaller and less significant coefficients. Therefore, the outcome of their
MAUP examination is contrary to the one in this paper.
There is one exception that relates several agglomeration mechanisms to TFP. Green-
stone et al. (2010) provide evidence that labor market pooling and knowledge spillovers
separately generate externalities, but fail to do so in a multivariate setting. Of course,
only in the latter case are we able to compare their relevance. Ellison et al. (2010) study
the co-agglomeration of similar industries and reveal that all three Marshallian forces exert
positive influence, with input-output relations being the most important, followed by labor
pooling. More comparable are those of Baldwin et al. (2010) and Rigby and Essletzbichler
(2002), even though they use the less precise labor productivity. Because labor produc-
tivity embodies much more variation, the 𝑅2 of approximately 0.4 and the agglomeration
economies’ significances are much higher. Unsurprisingly, Rigby and Essletzbichler (2002)
find that all three Marshallian forces simultaneously have a positive effect on labor produc-
tivity without comparing their magnitude. Consistent with the present results, Baldwin
et al. (2010) identify labor market pooling to be more important than input-output rela-
tions. In both studies, these two proxies are similar to mine. Because most of these papers
include either some proxies for specific agglomeration mechanisms or traditional measures
for urbanization and specialization, the present study is more complete. The common
denominator of this literature is that labor market pooling is significant in the presence of
more or less additional controls. My contribution adds another piece of robust evidence.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section outlines the TFP
estimation strategy. Section 3 describes the data and the construction of the agglomeration
variables. Section 4 presents the results, section 5 provides robustness checks and section
6 concludes the paper.
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1.2 TFP estimation
This section discusses the difficulties inherent in the estimation of production functions and
presents a strategy for overcoming some of these biases to derive a consistent TFP measure.
De Loecker (2011), Del Gatto et al. (2008) and Muendler (2007) have already applied this
estimation procedure. A novelty here is its application to regional data, consequently
allowing the productivity to be influenced by the Marshallian agglomeration variables 𝐺𝑐.
The conventional starting point is the Cobb-Douglas technology in logarithmic form
𝑦𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝜔𝑗𝑡(𝐺
𝑐
𝑡) + 𝛼𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑡 + 𝜁𝑧𝑗𝑡 + 𝑢
𝑝
𝑗𝑡 (1)
where 𝑦𝑗𝑡 is the output of firm
6 𝑗 in period 𝑡; 𝛼𝑥 with 𝑥 = {𝑘, 𝑙,𝑚} is the production
elasticity of capital, labor and intermediate inputs; and 𝑢𝑝𝑗𝑡 is an unobserved i.i.d. shock to
production. The term 𝑧𝑗𝑡 represents controls in the production function; these constitute
a dummy variable for firms located in West Germany and the firm’s share of high-skilled
workers. 𝜔𝑗𝑡 is the firm-specific part of TFP unobserved by the researcher but known to
the firm.
Two well-known problems plague the estimation of production functions: the transmission
bias and the omitted price bias. The latter arises from the fact that, in theory, the LHS
variable in the production function is output measured in quantities. Unfortunately, firms
usually report their output in monetary units, which means that the firm’s log price 𝑝𝑗𝑡
must be added to both sides of eq. (1). Prior studies have typically proxied 𝑝𝑗𝑡 by an
industry-level deflator or have completely ignored the problem. If firm prices were to depart
systematically from the average price level of the industry, regression coefficients and the
TFP estimate would suffer from omitted variable bias. According to theoretical models
with firm heterogeneity, like Melitz (2003), a downward bias is likely because the most
productive firms set below-average prices, sell above-average quantities and, consequently,
use more of the production factors.7
To replace unobserved firm-level prices 𝑝𝑗𝑡 in the production function, I rely on the CES
demand function from the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) framework8, whose logarithmic form
is
𝑞𝑗𝑡 = −𝜎 (𝑝𝑗𝑡 − 𝑝𝐼𝑡) + 𝑞𝐼𝑡 + 𝑢𝑑𝑗𝑡 (2)
where firm-level demand 𝑞𝑗𝑡 depends negatively on the firm’s own price and positively
on an aggregate demand shifter 𝑞𝐼𝑡 and an aggregate price index 𝑝𝐼𝑡. 𝜎 is the constant
elasticity of demand, and 𝑢𝑑𝑗𝑡 are demand shocks. Two arguments suggest that the industry
is the most suitable approximation for the corresponding market to 𝑞𝐼𝑡, 𝑝𝐼𝑡.
9 (1) Given
6 Even though the study is based on establishment specific data I use the term ’firm’ interchangeably
in this section.
7 Klette and Griliches (1996) also discuss other influence channels that lead to a systematic negative
relation between prices and input factors.
8 Despite its well-known restrictiveness, the CES demand is popular and easily combined with the
Cobb-Douglas production function. Klette and Griliches (1996) and the above-cited studies also used the
CES demand function.
9 Observe that the assumption of a national price index does not conflict with regional productivity
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that the majority of exporting firms generate only a small percentage of their revenues
abroad (Fryges and Wagner 2010), for most firms the national market is more relevant.
(2) Economic conditions on input and sales markets in each sector implausibly follow the
same development over time. Taking a national price index and demand shifter seems a
rather crude proxy. Combining demand-side information from eq. (2) with the production
function using 𝑞𝐼𝑡 = 𝑟𝐼𝑡 − 𝑝𝐼𝑡 yields
̃︀𝑟𝑗𝑡 ≡ 𝑦𝑗𝑡 + 𝑝𝑗𝑡 − 𝑝𝐼𝑡 =
=
(︂
𝜎 − 1
𝜎
)︂
(𝛽0 + 𝜔𝑗𝑡(𝐺
𝑐
𝑡) + 𝛼𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑡 + 𝜁𝑧𝑗𝑡) +
1
𝜎
(𝑟𝐼𝑡 − 𝑝𝐼𝑡) + 𝑢𝑗𝑡 (3)
Both shocks 𝑢𝑑𝑗𝑡 and 𝑢
𝑝
𝑗𝑡 are combined in 𝑢𝑗𝑡. Estimating this production function with
deflated revenues as the dependent variable circumvents the omitted price bias but also
provides an estimate for the industry’s demand elasticity as a byproduct. Note that pro-
ductivity ̃︀𝑎𝑗𝑡 ≡ ̃︀𝛽0 + ̃︀𝜔𝑗𝑡 = (𝜎−1𝜎 )(𝛽0 + 𝜔𝑗𝑡) and the input elasticities ̃︀𝛼𝑥 ≡ (𝜎−1𝜎 )𝛼𝑥 with
𝑥 = {𝐾,𝐿,𝑀} are reduced form parameters, when estimated without adjustment for the
omitted price bias.
𝜔𝑗𝑡 is now the only remaining unobserved factor hindering the consistent estimation of
the production function because there is a positive relation between the current produc-
tivity and optimal input usage.10 Olley and Pakes (1996) replace productivity in the
estimation equation by the plant’s investments. Therefore, they introduce a model of firm
behavior that yields an investment demand equation 𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑖𝑡(𝑘𝑗𝑡, 𝜔𝑗𝑡(𝐺
𝑐
𝑡)). Given that
𝑖𝑗𝑡 is monotonic in 𝜔𝑗𝑡 and that the regional factors are known exogenous state variables,
inversion yields 𝜔𝑗𝑡 = ℎ𝑡(𝑘𝑗𝑡, 𝑖𝑗𝑡, 𝐺
𝑐
𝑡). The upper panel in figure A.1 in the Appendix con-
firms the former assumption graphically. The control function ℎ𝑡(·) is then approximated
by a second-order polynomial in the variables 𝑘𝑗𝑡, 𝑖𝑗𝑡, 𝐺
𝑐
𝑡 , where 𝐺
𝑐
𝑡 consists of the three
Marshallian variables described above.11 With this procedure the production function co-
efficients are estimated without the transmission bias. Because the estimation is slightly
more complicated but widely applied, I relegate further details to Appendix A.1.
The combination of the two adjustments should yield a more accurately estimated TFP,
even though some threats to identification remain. The assumption about sectoral demand
elasticities is problematic once plants’ markups differ across local markets, cf. Melitz and
Ottaviano (2008).12 Demand shocks 𝑢𝑑𝑗𝑡 might not be i.i.d. A possible bias is mitigated
differences. Clearly, firms’ output prices vary according to the regional productivity differences. Given that
transport costs inside the country are not substantial and that they thus do not translate into consumer
price differences, a unique (sector-specific) price index exists. This set-up is, e.g., consistent with the model
of Abdel-Rahman and Fujita (1990), that is introduced later in section 1.3.2 to motive input linkages, if
their traded goods sector was monopolistically competitive.
10 Deriving optimal input demand functions from eq. (1) shows their dependence on productivity. Klette
and Griliches (1996) prove that the direction of the transmission bias is strictly positive.
11 Labor market pooling, knowledge spillovers and input linkages are the most interesting variables in
this study. It would have been possible to include all six agglomeration variables in 𝐺𝑐𝑡 , but each variable is
interacted with itself, 𝑘𝑗𝑡, 𝑖𝑗𝑡 and the other variables in 𝐺
𝑐
𝑡 , making the polynomial disproportionally large.
Furthermore, the correlations among the three Marshallian proxies are much lower than the correlation for
the traditional agglomeration measures, cf. table A.2. Therefore, many of the interaction terms would be
superfluous.
12 Another potential problem is that intermediate inputs are also reported in monetary instead of physical
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through the control function ℎ𝑡(·). Any year, state and sectoral-specific demand shocks are
eliminated by the use of fixed effects later on. The inverted demand from eq. (2) shows that
only demand shocks remain in the residual when the price index and the demand shifter
are controlled for. Therefore, the introduction of the demand structure unambiguously
reduces the number and amount of possible biases. Even if it is not possible to tackle all
issues of TFP estimation with the present data, this procedure represents a step in the
right direction. Eventually, comparisons between TFP measures in section 1.4 will show
whether the adjustments are empirically relevant.
1.3 Data and construction of variables
1.3.1 Plant and industry-level data
For the estimation of the production functions, the IAB Establishment Panel (IABB) is
used from 2000 to 2007. Approximately 15,000 establishments are interviewed per year.
The sample size is reduced, because all observations with any missing information necessary
to estimate the production function are dropped. To make the sample representative, I
weight the regional estimations by the time average of the total employment in a county-
industry in the population divided by the employment sum in a county-industry in the
sample. A detailed description of the IABB is given in Fischer et al. (2009) and Appendix
A.2 contains more on the construction of the panel and summary statistics. The main
advantage of this panel is that the location of a plant at NUTS 3 level (counties) and
the industry classification are available. The IABB provides information on revenues,
intermediate inputs, investments, and the number and qualification level of all workers,
among others. Capital input has to be constructed from plant investment behavior via
the perpetual inventory method, as is commonly done with this data set, cf. Addison
et al. (2006), Müller (2008). The necessary data for the demand side on industry-specific
revenues and price indices are taken from the Federal Statistical Office (FSO).
1.3.2 Regional data
Agglomeration economies result from some type of transport cost saving (Ellison et al.
2010), thus we would expect their strength to decay with distance. Therefore, I opted to
take counties (the NUTS 3 level), i.e., the finest spatial units available in the data. To
investigate the spatial decay and whether the choice of spatial units is decisive for the
results, in the robustness checks section, the analysis is repeated at the level of larger labor
market regions. The following describes the underlying theory and the construction of the
measures used to detect agglomeration economies. For further details about the regional
data, see Appendix A.2.3.
units and input quality can differ. If intermediate inputs were cheaper in dense large areas, then 𝑚 would
be lower, leading TFP to be spuriously higher.
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Urbanization and localization
Industrial 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is captured through the log employment of sector 𝑠 in county
𝑐 (𝐸𝑐𝑠) relative to the total employment in county 𝑐 (𝐸
𝑐), as in Combes (2000). The
urbanization hypothesis, often associated with the work of Jacobs (1969), predicts that a
diverse industrial environment will foster the productivity of all firms in that region. The
construction of a diversity measure is not straightforward because various measures appear
in the literature. Henderson (2003) used a comparison between the industrial structure of
a county 𝑐 and the entire country13
𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 =
∑︁
𝑠
⃒⃒⃒⃒
𝐸𝑐𝑠
𝐸𝑐
− 𝐸𝑠
𝐸
⃒⃒⃒⃒
where 𝐸𝑠 is total employment in industry 𝑠 and 𝐸 =
∑︀
𝐸𝑠 is the total of workers in
Germany.14 If the employment shares of all industries 𝑠 in a county mirror the national
employment shares, this measure takes on the value of zero. In this case, county 𝑐 pos-
sesses the maximum diversity. In fact, the 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 index measures the lack of diversity;
therefore the urbanization hypothesis predicts a negative coefficient. Finally, the log em-
ployment size of a county is also employed in the productivity analysis. It is called the
𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 measure because inter-industrial spillovers are assumed, too. Its inclusion is
useful for the comparison with prior studies and necessary for the correct interpretation
of the specialization variable (Combes 2000). Even though all of these regional variables
capture agglomeration economies, they do not provide us with a notion of how produc-
tivity benefits are actually transmitted to plants. Duranton and Puga (2004b) survey a
wide range of models that provide different microeconomic foundations of agglomeration
economics. All of them share the same prediction: large locations are beneficial to plants.
The current challenge for empirical work is to discriminate between them. Because most
of the models are based on two types of labor and only one or two sectors, some interpre-
tation is necessary for the empirical implementation. Yet, I tried to align the variables’
construction as closely as possible to the underlying theory. In the center of attention of
this investigation are the following microeconomic mechanisms, classified according to the
famous three Marshallian labels.
Input linkages
In models with an intermediate goods sector, e.g., Abdel-Rahman and Fujita (1990), the
production function of firms in the final goods sector exhibits external returns to scale in the
number of intermediate goods producers. The rationale for the productivity enhancement
13 Following the suggestion of a referee, I use the absolute values of 𝐸𝑐𝑠/𝐸
𝑐−𝐸𝑠/𝐸 to make the index less
vulnerable to outliers. Alternatively, I used the squared values of the summands and obtained qualitatively
very similar results but only at the 10% level. A Herfindahl index as a third measure for industrial diversity
was found to be insignificant. This finding demonstrates that diversity is a vague concept and unfounded
agglomeration force; therefore this result should be interpreted with caution.
14 Note that all terms in the construction of 𝑗𝑎𝑐𝑜𝑏𝑠 vary by time but are not explicitly denoted by
a subscript 𝑡 to save on notation. This treatment is also applied to the construction of the following
agglomeration variables.
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is that larger markets host more firms and offer a larger variety of specialized inputs. In
contrast to many other studies, output flows are not considered here because, according
to the theory, it is irrelevant for its own productivity how much a firm sells to whichever
industry. I assume that the demand for local intermediate goods is larger because the
awareness of their products is higher and because it is easier to conduct business. In turn,
local suppliers contribute more to the productivity of their local customers. For simplicity,
this investigation focuses only on the own county.
Instead of the plain number of intermediate goods producers, the measure should reflect the
actual dependency between industries. As in Ellison et al. (2010), the strength of supplier
relations in sector 𝑠 is the amount of goods that sector 𝑠 purchases from sector 𝑢 relative to
all sector 𝑠’ inputs. These numbers are provided by the FSO in the national input-output-
matrix. Regarding supplier relations within an industry, basic metals (0.64), chemical
industry (0.57) and motor vehicles (0.48) are the highest ranked. Between industries, the
highest share of input usage is observed for sales from transportation/communication to
wholesale/retail trade (0.33). Then, the linkage strength between sector 𝑠 and all other
sectors 𝑢 (𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑢) is related to the industrial structure in each region as follows
input-linkage𝑐𝑠 =
∑︁
𝑢
(︂
𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑢 · 𝐸
𝑐
𝑢
𝐸𝑐
)︂
According to the theory outlined above, the measure for input-externalities is large when
important supplying sectors are more present than industries with low linkages in this
county.15 The same variable is used in Peri and Cuñat (2001), who study the effect of
agglomeration economies on job creation.
Labor market pooling
Coles and Smith (1998) provide a microeconomic foundation for labor market pooling.
Their model is based on a frictionless labor market, where firms post their vacancies and
unmatched workers apply for all of these posts. This framework generates a matching
function with increasing returns to scale in both the number of firms and workers. A
larger market provides more opportunities to find suitable matches and thus expected
productivity is higher. For the empirical realization, I compute the correlation between
the number of workers in each of the 282 occupations in the industry under scrutiny and all
remaining occupations in this county.16 The closer the industry profile is to the composition
of the local labor market, the less effort firms from that industry have in finding suitable
employees. In this manner, the variable is close to the model and the original writing of
Marshall (1890: 271): "a localized industry gains great advantage from the fact that it
15 Instead of the relative industry size, the linkage variable could have been constructed with the absolute
value 𝐸𝑐𝑢. However, in that case, one might worry that the driving force of 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 − 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘𝑎𝑔𝑒 measure is
rather the size of a county because it is correlated with TFP for a number of different reasons, anyway.
16 Conceptually similar variables are used in Ellison et al. (2010), Baldwin et al. (2010), Rigby and
Essletzbichler (2002) and Peri and Cuñat (2001), but these variables lack location-specific information on
the distribution of occupations, as is the case here. This construction presumes that all firms from the
same county-industry have a common composition of staff.
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offers a constant market for skill. Employers are apt to resort to any place where they
are likely to find a good choice of workers with special skill which they require". There
is no occupation-specific information provided in the IABB data set. The information
on worker’s occupations is provided in the BA Employment Panel (BAP), which is a 2%
random sample of all employees subject to social security in Germany. For this reason, the
occupation correlation is a county-industry-specific rather than a plant-specific measure.
At first sight, this appears to be a second-best variable; however, its construction has a
substantial advantage regarding endogeneity, cf. section 1.3.3.
Knowledge spillovers
Constructing a measure of knowledge spillovers according to a theoretical model is not
trivial: First, because there are few contributions that explicitly model a microeconomic
channel, and second, because it is challenging to detect knowledge spillovers in a dataset.17
Something that is empirically traceable is job changes. There is crucial and unpatentable
knowledge within firms that is inextricably linked to workers. Therefore, the new employer
might benefit from the experience or from new ideas that job changers bring into the plant.
Combes and Duranton (2006) base an agglomeration model on this motivation. Fosfuri
and Rønde (2004) provide another theoretical underpinning for the prediction that labor
turnover is high, when the agglomeration of plants is driven by spillovers. In particular,
movements of skilled workers diffuse knowledge. Therefore, I take the number of job
changes per year of all workers with either a university degree or a finished vocational
training currently employed in that county from the BAP data. Table 1.1 presents summary
statistics for all the agglomeration variables described above.
Table 1.1: Summary statistics of agglomeration variables
unweighted weighted
proxy mean std. dev. mean std. dev.
occupation correlation 0.233 0.199 0.291 0.201
job changes 0.044 0.008 0.044 0.008
input-linkage 1.495 3.737 0.668 1.685
diversity 0.435 0.127 0.423 0.128
specialization -2.529 1.163 -1.841 0.892
urbanization 10.542 0.982 10.519 0.844
Notes: The number of observations is 20800 for all variables. The last
two columns are weighted by the employment sum of the county-sector in
the population relative to its value in the sample.
1.3.3 Endogeneity
In theory an explicit link from the agglomeration variables to TFP has been identified.
Nonetheless, high-TFP firms might be different in their behavior on the labor market, etc.,
17 Other approaches are, for example, Peri and Cuñat (2001), who use information about a technological
input-output relations or Baldwin et al. (2010), who simply use the number of plants in each location.
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so reverse causality may be an issue here. Some differences between these variables in the
likelihood of being endogenous exist.
On the one hand, the construction of the Marshallian proxies may be improved with plant-
specific information. On the other hand, the use of population-representative BAP data or
the population itself mitigates the concern that the values of these independent variables
are largely influenced by the choices of single plants in the sample. Even if some highly
productive plants are able to adjust their labor mix or material inputs according to the
supply in local labor, the effect on the entire county-industry remains negligible. Whereas
the same is true for the third agglomeration variable, Alda et al. (2009) observe for Germany
that high-TFP plants do not record more job changes. In accord with assortative matching
theories, combinations between high-skilled workers and high-quality firms are more likely
to hold; see also Topel and Ward (1992). The specialization and size of a region may clearly
be endogenous, because productive places are attractive and induce growth. This is less
of a problem for the diversity measure, as the location decision of any firm, depending on
its industry, may affect the level of diversity up or down. In other words, the retention of
great diversity in an attractive high-TFP region is rather a coincidence.
Another recent doubt is whether the observed correlation between TFP and employment
concentration is truly caused by agglomeration advantages or instead by the selection of the
most productive firms due to fiercer competition. A first discrimination between the two
mechanisms in Combes et al. (2012) offers unambiguous evidence in favor of agglomeration
economies. Moreover, official population data are less likely to exhibit measurement error,
degrading attenuation bias. To reduce a possible omitted variable bias of other important
productivity determinants, I control for state, industry and time effects in the following
regressions. Finally, in studies where instruments for similar agglomeration proxies are
applied, initial OLS results prove to be fairly stable; see Ellison et al. (2010), Combes
et al. (2010) and Ciccone and Hall (1996). In sum, there are good reasons to be carefully
optimistic that endogeneity does not drive the results here.
1.4 Results
1.4.1 Production function results
The total factor productivity is estimated from plant production functions under four
specifications: a simple OLS regression of eq. (1), the KG procedure in eq. (3), only the
OP estimation and, finally, the combined OP/KG adjustment from eq. (4) and eq. (8), the
preferred specification. Controls for the share of high-skilled workers and a west-dummy
are included in all production functions.18 The production function is estimated from a
pooled cross section while allowing sector-specific coefficients. Due to space constraints,
18 Adding more controls such as a workers’ council dummy and the legal form left the results in the
following analysis unchanged. However, if these variables are themselves outcomes of the plant’s TFP
rather than determinants, the production function estimation is distorted. Because those variables are
neither decisive nor part of the research question, I opted to omit them.
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only the result from the preferred OP/KG estimation is shown in table 1.2. Recall that
through the combination of production and demand side, these original coefficients are
reduced-form parameters. Therefore, they must be rescaled by the markup 𝜎/(𝜎 − 1),
which is also reported in the table.
Table 1.2: Basic production function coefficients from OP/KG estimation
MACHI. VEHIC. ELECT. OPTIC. CHEML. MINRL.
materials 0.575*** 0.632*** 0.607*** 0.583*** 0.671*** 0.609***
(0.010) (0.035) (0.017) (0.018) (0.014) (0.019)
labor 0.397*** 0.401*** 0.343*** 0.468*** 0.251*** 0.353***
(0.015) (0.058) (0.023) (0.022) (0.018) (0.020)
capital 0.060*** 0.021*** 0.061*** 0.049*** 0.039*** 0.061***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002)
west 0.140*** 0.014 0.141*** 0.113*** 0.106*** 0.050*
(0.014) (0.064) (0.018) (0.041) (0.020) (0.030)
HS-share 0.137*** 0.145 0.223*** 0.318*** 0.111*** 0.088*
(0.037) (0.094) (0.051) (0.060) (0.034) (0.053)
1/𝜎 0.147*** 0.087 0.105*** 0.086** 0.033 -0.027
(0.037) (0.076) (0.039) (0.043) (0.040) (0.050)
markup 𝜎/(𝜎 − 1) 1.173 1.095 1.117 1.094 1.035 0.973
BA.MTL. FA.MTL. TEXTL. WOOD CONST. HOTEL. TRADE
materials 0.581*** 0.562*** 0.573*** 0.597*** 0.544*** 0.530*** 0.751***
(0.021) (0.013) (0.021) (0.013) (0.010) (0.025) (0.008)
labor 0.430*** 0.423*** 0.377*** 0.398*** 0.453*** 0.488*** 0.228***
(0.036) (0.018) (0.025) (0.018) (0.013) (0.035) (0.011)
capital 0.023*** 0.036*** 0.064*** 0.050*** 0.052*** 0.068*** 0.039***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.013) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001)
west 0.064 0.087*** 0.170*** 0.146*** 0.130*** 0.135*** 0.029**
(0.039) (0.017) (0.036) (0.020) (0.012) (0.033) (0.014)
HS-share 0.076 0.093*** -0.006 0.141*** 0.281*** 0.183*** 0.093***
(0.073) (0.036) (0.070) (0.040) (0.031) (0.058) (0.025)
1/𝜎 0.099** 0.119*** 0.143*** 0.116*** 0.133*** 0.196*** 0.421***
(0.048) (0.040) (0.052) (0.042) (0.031) (0.062) (0.050)
markup 𝜎/(𝜎 − 1) 1.110 1.135 1.167 1.131 1.154 1.243 1.728
Notes: The dependent variable is the deflated log revenue: 𝑦𝑗𝑡+𝑝𝑗𝑡−𝑝𝐼𝑡. All coefficients are industry
specific, where the abbreviations are given in table A.1. Bootstrapped cluster-robust standard errors
at the plant level are given in parentheses.
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
All scale elasticities ̃︀𝛼𝑘, ̃︀𝛼𝑙, ̃︀𝛼𝑚 have the expected magnitude and are significant below the
1% level. Apart from one sector, the sum of scale elasticities is above unity even before
rescaling by the markup. This finding concords with monopolistic competition assumed in
the demand function in eq. (2). Although the west-dummy is not significant in every sector,
it indicates that establishments in West Germany generate around 10% higher revenues
with the same number of inputs. Considering that demand elasticities are estimated at
the plant level, their range appears reasonable where they are estimated significantly. For
the textile industry, I obtain 6.9, which is consistent with the findings of De Loecker
(2011). The author even had segment-specific physical output quantities available and
finds demand elasticities for subsectors of the textile industry between 2.8 and 6.2 in a
similar setting.19
19 Also based on a CES utility function, Hanson (2005) estimates market potential functions from
county-specific data for the US. He obtains demand elasticities in a range of 5 to 7.5.
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More important, when the transmission bias is eliminated, the coefficients change in the
direction predicted by theory. The results are rather mixed for capital and labor inputs, but
lower elasticities ̃︀𝛼𝑚 are observed except for two industries. The reason for this discrepancy
is that firms are most flexible in changing intermediate inputs, so this production factor is
most likely to be affected by current productivity shocks. The same observation regarding̃︀𝛼𝑚 arises when the price bias is accounted for. Peri and Urban (2006) estimate firm-level
production functions across several industries with German data. Their OLS estimates
for labor input are lower, whereas the coefficient for material is higher, confirming the
arguments above. Despite having balance sheet information on fixed assets available, their
capital coefficient of 0.07 is only slightly higher than the average in table 1.2.
1.4.2 Agglomeration mechanisms results
In this section, the six proxies for agglomeration economies are regressed on each of the four
TFP measures in a pooled cross section. These and all following estimations control for
year, state and industry fixed effects, which alleviate a possible omitted variable bias. All
agglomeration variables are standardized to have a zero mean and a standard deviation of
one to provide direct comparability of their relative impact. Standard errors are clustered
at the county level. Note that the accurate choice of the level of clustering is decisive in
this kind of analysis, as will be shown below.
Columns 1 and 2 in table 1.3 result from univariate regressions on TFP from the usual
OLS and on TFP from my preferred OP/KG estimation. Labor market pooling generates
relatively higher effects on TFP compared with knowledge spillovers, whereas the supplier
linkages have no measurable effect. In addition, regional diversity and size play an im-
portant role. The interpretation of these coefficients is that an increase by one standard
deviation would raise the average TFP in a certain county by 2-7 percentage points. For ex-
ample, the elasticity of employment size is 0.058. Before going deeper into interpretations,
we wish to inspect multivariate regressions because they provide more reliable insights
about the relative importance and magnitude of microeconomic agglomeration channels.
It is well known that standard errors are biased downward in regressions with micro-level
data and aggregated regressors (Moulton 1986). The accurate choice of cluster level is
less obvious, though. Bertrand et al. (2004) show that clustering should occur at the
level at which persistent shocks arrive and that lower levels of clustering are unwarranted.
Even though regressors are county-industry-year specific here, this is not the right level of
clustering, as a comparison of the standard errors reveals. While the difference between
standard errors clustered at the county and at the county-industry-year level is very low
for the univariate regressions, it is substantial in the multivariate case, where the increase
amounts up to 72%, cf. table A.3 in the Appendix.20,21 Unfortunately, the variation in
20 Cameron et al. (2011) propose a multi-way clustering of standard errors for the case of non-nested
clusters. Their method did not work here due the large number of negative elements in the variance-
covariance matrix and because the estimator requires a large number of dimensions for each cluster, which
is not satisfied for industries. The inclusion of fixed effects at least eliminates the time-invariant error
correlation within industries.
21 There is almost no difference between the clustering at the county-industry and at the county level
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the data does not allow to identify any significant result in multivariate regressions with
all six dependent variables with county-level clustering. For the subsequent county-specific
analysis, I keep the three Marshallian proxies since the main interest is in these detailed
agglomeration mechanisms. The specialization measure may be discarded without regret
because it is already insignificant in the univariate case. By contrast, diversity seems to
be important and continues in the analysis. Finally, urbanization is the most general and
least telling variable and thus also eliminated.
Table 1.3: Agglomeration mechanisms regressed on different TFP measures
univariate multivariate
OLS OP/KG OLS OP KG OP/KG
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
occ-corr. 0.0371** 0.0753*** 0.0267* 0.0263 0.0331* 0.0601**
(0.0164) (0.0279) (0.0161) (0.0169) (0.0182) (0.0281)
job-changes 0.0231** 0.0327* 0.0166 0.0154 0.0180 0.0204
(0.0107) (0.0181) (0.0113) (0.0119) (0.0131) (0.0197)
input-linkage 0.0002 0.0082 −0.0017 −0.0048 0.0097 0.0056
(0.0067) (0.0092) (0.0067) (0.0077) (0.0095) (0.0091)
diversity −0.0318** −0.0526* −0.0254* −0.0274* −0.0283 −0.0408
(0.0154) (0.0270) (0.0152) (0.0163) (0.0179) (0.0268)
specialization 0.0221 0.0391
(0.0273) (0.0442)
urbanization 0.0303* 0.0581**
(0.0155) (0.0239)
𝑅2 0.0343 0.0411 0.0405 0.0433
F 4.85 7.03 6.41 7.77
N 20800 20800 20800 20800 20800 20800
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses are computed at the county level. Year, state
and industry fixed effects are included in all estimations. Regressions are weighted by the employ-
ment sum of the county-sector in the population relative to its value in the sample. Covariates are
standardized to have a zero mean and a standard deviation of one. The coefficients in the first two
columns result from regressions on each of the agglomeration proxies separately. There, the 𝑅2 is
between 0.0237 and 0.0374.
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Focus first on the preferred specification (column 6): In comparison to the univariate case,
the coefficients are generally lower but only the labor market pooling measure remains
significant. More precisely, plants benefit most from a local labor market with an occupa-
tional structure similar to their own industry. Correlation coefficients between job changes
and the other agglomeration variables, displayed in table A.2 in the Appendix, are below
0.15. In fact, the agglomeration mechanisms seem quite distinct. Variance inflation fac-
tors also show that the estimations are not influenced by multicolinearity. So far, only
labor market pooling is a convincing micro-founded agglomeration force, once the other
Marshallian forces and diversity of a region are controlled for.
Regarding the differences between the TFP estimates, we observe the following pattern in
for the four county-industry-year-specific regressors. However, the standard errors of the diversity and the
urbanization variable still show a slight increase when clustering is at the county level. Therefore, this
more conservative variant avoids a downward bias for all of the regressors.
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table 1.3: if the endogeneity bias and the omitted price bias are not accounted for, the
magnitude of the effects is underestimated. In fact, the TFP measure from the OP/KG
regression yields 60-130% higher estimates than the OLS-TFP. The OLS-TFP measures in
column indicates that diversity positively affects the average productivity of plants, whereas
labor pooling does not. Therefore, in comparison to our preferred OP/KG-measure, the
biased TFP estimates alter the relative order and the existence of agglomeration economies.
A new insight into the context of agglomeration economies arises from the direct compari-
son of the results between column 1 and 2, column 3 and 5 or between column 4 and 6. The
former TFP estimates suffer from price bias, whereas it has been accounted for in the latter.
Without the correction, plant-level price variation remains in the residual term; i.e., it is
mixed with the TFP estimate. Under these specifications, we observe lower coefficients for
the agglomeration mechanisms in table 1.3. The explanation is that unobserved plant-level
prices are negatively correlated with TFP, as predicted by theory (Melitz 2003). The price-
biased measure makes high-TFP firms appear less productive and vice versa, which is why
the agglomeration externalities are underestimated. This underestimation of productivity
effects generalizes to any other case where TFP is estimated.
1.4.3 Industry-specific results
Another interesting question is whether these agglomeration mechanisms differ between
industries. Due to the demanding data requirements of this investigation, the number of
observations is quite low in some of the 17 industries. Therefore, I combined industries
according to their R&D intensity into four groups (see table A.1). Table 1.4 contains the
results from the regression of the previous four agglomeration proxies against the preferred
OP/KG productivity. The findings appear quite reasonable. The high-tech sector benefits
from knowledge spillovers and diversity. For medium-tech industries (such as chemical
and metal processing), well-suited staff generate productivity advantages. In the German
low-tech industries (wood and textile), ideas matter most. One explanation for this rather
surprising finding could be that even though their R&D investments are relatively low,
these industries compete for the leadership in technology and design. Finally, the service-
oriented non-manufacturing industries benefit from labor pooling. Altogether, there is
significant evidence for three types of agglomeration economies, which appear in different
combinations of one or two per industry group.
1.5 Robustness checks
The following section presents a change in the spatial level of aggregation and additional
controls for the type of county in which a plant resides. I find that the key insights
presented so far are fairly robust to these variations.
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Table 1.4: Agglomeration mechanisms for industry groups
high-tech medium-tech low-tech non-manufacturing
[1] [2] [3] [4]
occ-corr. 0.0053 0.0224* −0.0013 0.0668**
(0.0190) (0.0130) (0.0323) (0.0330)
job-changes 0.0358* −0.0123 0.0577** 0.0203
(0.0196) (0.0184) (0.0282) (0.0209)
input-linkage 0.0246 0.0104 −0.0041 0.1657
(0.0256) (0.0126) (0.0068) (0.2011)
diversity −0.0352* 0.0051 −0.0531 −0.0426
(0.0191) (0.0132) (0.0377) (0.0304)
𝑅2 0.0556 0.0526 0.2011 0.0476
F 4.17 2.81 8.78 74.99
N 3960 4220 1495 11125
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses are computed at the county level.
Year, state and industry fixed effects are included in all estimations. Regressions
are weighted by the employment sum of the county-sector in the population relative
to its value in the sample. Covariates are standardized to have a zero mean and
a standard deviation of one. The dependent variable is plant-level TFP from the
OP/KG estimation.
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
1.5.1 Control for county types
As a first robustness check, additional controls for the nature of the county are included. In
Germany, some counties are made up just of one large city, others are sparsely populated
but vast in space. For instance, because it is less likely for large cities than for rural areas to
reach a certain degree of specialization, it might be inappropriate to pool all county types.22
A dummy that indicates whether the county is a large city is added to the estimation of
agglomeration economies. Alternatively, nine different county-type dummies, classified
according to the size and density of a region, are added to the standard regression.23
Columns 1 and 2 demonstrate that the city dummy is insignificant and the coefficient for
labor pooling and its significance decrease. Apart from this, the prior findings are largely
unchanged: Labor market pooling positively affect a plant’s TFP.
1.5.2 Aggregation to labor market regions
Another interesting exercise is to vary the boundaries of the spatial units. This is a
neglected topic in economics, as observed by Martin (1999: 77): "The fundamental and
complex question how ’regional’ and ’local’ economies can be meaningful conceptualized,
and how such conceptions can be translated into empirical terms, is not considered at all".
Because gains from agglomeration reside in the proximity of agents, it is natural to presume
that lower agglomeration externalities are observed in larger spatial entities. Therefore, a
22 I thank Georg Hirthe for bringing this issue up.
23 The data are taken from the Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial
Development (BBSR). It is responsible for the delineation of spatial units and classifies nine different
county types ranging from "core cities" to "rural counties with low density".
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Table 1.5: Robustness checks
county specific LMR aggregation
OP/KG OP/KG OLS OP/KG OP/KG
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
occ-corr. 0.0602** 0.0480* 0.0099 0.0377* 0.0384*
(0.0281) (0.0278) (0.0162) (0.0212) (0.0210)
job-changes 0.0173 0.0216 0.0103 0.0150 0.0150
(0.0188) (0.0161) (0.0102) (0.0140) (0.0139)
input-linkage 0.0026 0.0019 0.0192* 0.0282** 0.0277**
(0.0098) (0.0098) (0.0116) (0.0140) (0.0136)
diversity −0.0403 −0.0292 −0.0254* −0.0292 −0.0274
(0.0270) (0.0206) (0.0147) (0.0190) (0.0200)
specialization 0.0293 0.0423 0.0424
(0.0253) (0.0318) (0.0317)
urbanization −0.0060 −0.0125 −0.0148
(0.0157) (0.0203) (0.0198)
city dummy 0.0503 0.0409
(0.0426) (0.0398)
county type dummies 7 3 7 7 7
𝑅2 0.0446 0.0551 0.0361 0.0370 0.0382
F 8.10 5.64 2.70 5.20 4.95
N 20800 20800 20455 20455 20455
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses are computed at the county and the LMR
level in columns 1-2 and 3-5, respectively. Year, state and industry fixed effects are included
in all estimations. Regressions are weighted by the employment sum of the county-sector (or
LMR-sector) in the population relative to its value in the sample. All agglomeration covariates
are standardized to have a zero mean and a standard deviation of one. In columns 3-5 all
covariates but the city-county dummy are LMR and time-specific.
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
retest for agglomeration economies on different levels of spatial aggregation examines the
externalities’ scope. Furthermore, this extension evaluates the sensitivity of the results to
the modifiable areal unit problem. Briant et al. (2010) provide an empirical demonstration
and a theoretical discussion on whether and why a different delineation of spatial units
alters regression results. The MAUP is less likely to be a cause of bias if (1) the independent
variables are exogenous, (2) the regression is well specified and (3) variables on both sides of
the regression are aggregated (which is not the case here). Altogether a clear-cut prediction
is difficult to make, and as arguments (1) and (2) suggest, this exercise is a well-suited
robustness check. Following Eckey et al. (2006), I aggregate one or several counties to labor
market regions (LMR). To implement the robustness check, all agglomeration variables
are reconstructed on the level of LMRs, and the production functions are estimated again,
containing LMR-specific variables 𝐺𝑙𝑚𝑟𝑡 . Production function coefficients are similar to the
county case and are omitted for brevity.
Again, the comparison with the OLS-TFP estimates shows that agglomeration economies
are underestimated without adjustment for price bias. The significance and relative order
of the effects are also different, cf. columns 3 and 4 in table 1.5. From the corrected
OP/KG-TFP, the following picture emerges: labor market pooling continues to offer the
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largest benefit for firms. As expected, its magnitude is lower than at the county level.
The specialization and urbanization variable still play no significant role which confirms
the prior decision to exclude these two variables. However, the input linkage now exerts
a positive and significant impact on plants’ TFP in the LMR. In addition, controlling
for city counties results only in marginal changes. This finding points to the following
conclusions: according to the theoretical predictions in Briant et al. (2010), the labor
market pooling variable is exogenous and its specification is correct. The finer county level
is more appropriate for the investigation of agglomeration economies. Only in the case
of supplier linkages does the relevant market appear to be larger than the own county.
Similarly, Rosenthal and Strange (2001) observe that input linkages are a more significant
explanation for the spatial concentration of industries at the state level, whereas knowledge
spillovers are more important at the zip code level.
1.6 Conclusion
The present investigation demonstrates that it is possible to account for unobserved out-
put prices and the endogeneity of input choices in the production function. The resulting
unbiased TFP measure is applied for the first time in a spatial analysis. Comparisons show
that the usual OLS-TFP estimate points to false conclusions regarding the presence and
relative importance of agglomeration economies. In addition, the magnitude of produc-
tivity effects is underestimated when firm-level price variation is not separated from pure
TFP. This general insight is in accordance with heterogeneous-firm models in that high
productivity firms quote lower prices.
The main contribution of the paper is in examining the relative strength of microeconomic
agglomeration channels on plants’ true TFP. The most important impact on plants’ pro-
ductivity was found to be transmitted via the labor market. As predicted by matching
models, plants that have a similar occupational structure to the remainder plants in that
county easily find suitable workers and are thus on average more productive. Examining
larger spatial units verifies that the scope of this externality declines. However, similar co-
efficients suggest that the specification is correct and the variable is exogenous. Apart from
that, the data revealed that input linkages appear to be relevant on a larger geographical
scale. Diversity, urbanization and knowledge spillovers are merely detected in univariate
regressions or for a subset of industries. However, regarding diversity, this finding is sensi-
tive to the construction of the diversity index. In general, I found that industries rely on
different combinations of agglomeration advantages, which may partly explain the different
results in the literature. By no means is this investigation exhaustive in the way agglom-
eration economies might be transmitted to firms. Different and more refined proxies can
surely be constructed in richer datasets. Paying more attention to sectoral characteristics
is also likely to disclose more about the nature of agglomeration economies.
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Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Details on the Olley and Pakes (1996) estimation proce-
dure
Following Olley and Pakes (1996), I introduce a model of firm behavior, which builds on
the following assumptions.1 Firm-specific productivity follows an exogenous first order
Markov process
𝜔𝑗𝑡 = 𝐸[𝜔𝑗𝑡|I𝑡−1] + 𝜉𝑗𝑡 = 𝑓(𝜔𝑗𝑡−1) + 𝜉𝑗𝑡 (1)
where I𝑡−1 is the information set in period 𝑡−1, 𝑓 is a function that describes the conditional
expectation of 𝜔𝑗𝑡, and 𝜉𝑗𝑡 is the innovation shock in the Markov process. Furthermore,
there is a certain timing in the choice of input factors. Labor and material are non-dynamic
inputs; i.e., they are chosen in the beginning of the actual period. Capital evolves according
to the investments 𝐼𝑗𝑡−12 taken in the preceding period and the existing capital stock in
𝑡− 1 less of depreciation
𝐾𝑗𝑡 = (1− 𝛿𝑗𝑡−1)𝐾𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑗𝑡−1 (2)
where 𝛿𝑗𝑡−1 is the firm-specific depreciation rate. Next, a Bellman function can be set up
and solved, cf. Olley and Pakes (1996). This treatment yields two important equations.
The first is an exit rule predicting that a firm will continue its operation (𝜒𝑗𝑡 = 1) if the
current productivity is above a certain threshold.
𝜒𝑗𝑡 =
{︃
1 if 𝜔𝑗𝑡(𝐺
𝑐
𝑡) ≥ ?¯?𝑡(𝑘𝑗𝑡, 𝐺𝑐𝑡)
0 otherwise
(3)
Given that the profit function is increasing in capital, this firm-specific threshold ?¯?𝑡(𝑘𝑗𝑡, 𝐺
𝑐
𝑡)
is negatively correlated with capital. In other words, between two firms that face the
same productivity shock 𝜔𝑗𝑡, the one with the greater capital stock is less likely to be
forced out of the market.3 From now on, productivity and the productivity threshold
are allowed to be influenced by the Marshallian agglomeration economies in region 𝑐,
summarized in 𝐺𝑐𝑡 . In doing so, I depart from the original OP framework because the
main point of the present paper is to investigate the regional drivers of productivity. The
consequences for the inversion of the control function and the survival probability used
to control the selection bias are presented below. Second an investment demand equation
𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑖𝑡(𝑘𝑗𝑡, 𝜔𝑗𝑡(𝐺
𝑐
𝑡)) is derived from the solution of the Markov perfect Nash equilibrium
of the underlying OP model, as stated in the main text. Given that investment demand is
monotonic in 𝜔𝑗𝑡 and the regional factors are known exogenous state variables, inversion
yields 𝜔𝑗𝑡 = ℎ𝑡(𝑘𝑗𝑡, 𝑖𝑗𝑡, 𝐺
𝑐
𝑡).
1 The exhibition here also draws on Ackerberg et al. (2007).
2 Note that upper-case letters denote variables in levels and lower-case letters always denote log variables
here, e.g., 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐼𝑗𝑡) = 𝑖𝑗𝑡.
3 The dataset lends support to this assumption. When the sample is split into firms that survive and
those that exit the market, the latter group has on average a lower capital stock both in time average and
especially in the last period prior to exit. However, exiting firms compose only approximately 4% of all
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Figure A.1: Visualization of the invertability condition
Notes: The graph results from regression plant’s log investments against a third order polynomial in
log capital stock and log OP/KG productivity.
The upper panel in figure A.1 provides a graphical assessment for the latter assumption.
The figure plots investments against a third-order polynomial in 𝑘𝑗𝑡 and TFP (from the
preferred OP/KG estimation). The surface is increasing in the productivity axis and only
slightly decreasing at the upper left corner, suggesting that the invertability condition is
likely to be satisfied. This function ℎ𝑡(𝑘𝑗𝑡, 𝑖𝑗𝑡, 𝐺
𝑐
𝑡) is finally the control function that will
be used to replace unobserved productivity in the production function.
̃︀𝑟𝑗𝑡 = ̃︀𝛽0 + ̃︀ℎ𝑡(𝑘𝑗𝑡, 𝑖𝑗𝑡, 𝐺𝑐𝑡) + ̃︀𝛼𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑡 + ̃︀𝛼𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑡 + ̃︀𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑡 + 1𝜎 (𝑟𝐼𝑡 − 𝑝𝐼𝑡) + ̃︀𝜁𝑧𝑗𝑡 + 𝑢𝑗𝑡
Due to multicolinearity problems with this polynomial, ̃︀𝛽0 and ̃︀𝛼𝑘 cannot be identified.4
Estimation of the production function is therefore divided into two stages.
̃︀𝑟𝑗𝑡 = ̃︀𝛽0 + ̃︀𝛼𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑡 + ̃︀𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑡 + 1
𝜎
(𝑟𝐼𝑡 − 𝑝𝐼𝑡) + 𝜑𝑡(𝑘𝑗𝑡, 𝑖𝑗𝑡, 𝐺𝑐𝑡) + ̃︀𝜁𝑧𝑗𝑡 + 𝑢𝑗𝑡 (4)
This first-stage estimating equation yields ?ˆ?, ̃ˆ︀𝛼𝑙 and ̃ˆ︀𝛼𝑚. The unknown function 𝜑𝑡(𝑘𝑗𝑡, 𝑖𝑗𝑡, 𝐺𝑐𝑡) ≡̃︀𝛼𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑡 + ̃︀ℎ𝑡(𝑘𝑗𝑡, 𝑖𝑗𝑡, 𝐺𝑐𝑡) is approximated by a second-order polynomial in 𝑘𝑗𝑡, 𝑖𝑗𝑡, 𝐺𝑐𝑡 . With
the estimates ?ˆ?, ̃ˆ︀𝛼𝑙 and ̃ˆ︀𝛼𝑚 at hand, the production function may be rewritten as
̃︀𝑟*𝑗𝑡 ≡ ̃︀𝑟𝑗𝑡 − ̃ˆ︀𝛼𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑡 − ̃ˆ︀𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑡 − ˆ(︂ 1𝜎
)︂
(𝑟𝐼𝑡 − 𝑝𝐼𝑡)− 𝜁𝑧𝑗𝑡 = ̃︀𝛽0 + ̃︀𝛼𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑡 + ̃︀𝜔𝑗𝑡 + 𝑢𝑗𝑡 (5)
Two advantages of the first-stage estimation are now visible: (1) we already have consistent
estimates of ̃︀𝛼𝑙 and ̃︀𝛼𝑚, since 𝜔𝑗𝑡 was completely proxied by 𝜑𝑡. (2) From the first stage,
we now have an estimate for productivity ?ˆ?𝑗𝑡 = 𝜑𝑗𝑡 − ̃︀𝛼𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑡. This time, we avoid the
firms, which is why the selection bias will presumably be small.
4 Note that the polynomial ̃︀ℎ𝑡 also contains a constant, and 𝑘𝑗𝑡 appears twice, linear from the original
production function and in ̃︀ℎ𝑡. Therefore, 𝑘𝑗𝑡 is combined with ̃︀ℎ𝑡 into 𝜑𝑡(·).
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multicolinearity concerning 𝑘𝑗𝑡 by use of eq. (1) in eq. (5)
̃︀𝑟*𝑗𝑡 = ̃︀𝛽0 + ̃︀𝛼𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑡 + ̃︀𝑓(𝜔𝑗𝑡−1(·)) + 𝜉𝑗𝑡 + 𝑢𝑗𝑡 (6)
Because firms have knowledge about 𝜔𝑗𝑡−1 but do not expect the innovation shock 𝜉𝑗𝑡,
the choice of 𝑘𝑗𝑡, which is completely determined in 𝑡 − 1, cannot be correlated with the
unobserved 𝜉𝑗𝑡. That is, the following moment condition holds: 𝐸[𝜉𝑗𝑡|𝑘𝑗𝑡] = 0.
However, a third problem troubles the consistent identification of the capital coefficient, as
the inspection of eq. (3) makes clear. We argued above that the productivity threshold ?¯?𝑡
is falling in 𝑘𝑗𝑡. In unbalanced panel data sets, selection will therefore lead to a negative
correlation between productivity and the capital stock of firms remaining in the panel.
This exit selection bias may be controlled for, by taking the conditional expectation of the
production function in eq. (6) on being in the market in period 𝑡 and the information firms
have in 𝑡− 1
𝐸[̃︀𝑟*𝑗𝑡|I𝑡−1, 𝜒𝑗𝑡 = 1] = ̃︀𝛽0 + ̃︀𝛼𝑘𝑗𝑡 + 𝐸[̃︀𝜔𝑗𝑡|I𝑡−1, 𝜒𝑗𝑡 = 1]
= ̃︀𝛽0 + ̃︀𝛼𝑘𝑗𝑡 + 𝐸[̃︀𝜔𝑗𝑡|I𝑡−1, 𝜔𝑗𝑡 ≥ ?¯?𝑡(𝑘𝑗𝑡, 𝐺𝑐𝑡)]
= ̃︀𝛽0 + ̃︀𝛼𝑘𝑗𝑡 + ̃︀𝑔(𝜔𝑗𝑡−1, ?¯?𝑡(𝑘𝑗𝑡, 𝐺𝑐𝑡))
In the second line, the exit condition from eq. (3) is made explicit, and the third line
follows from the law of motion of 𝜔𝑗𝑡 and the definition of conditional expectation for a
continuous variable. The survival probability 𝑃𝑟𝑗𝑡 = Pr(𝜒𝑗𝑡 = 1|I𝑡−1) can be written as
𝑃𝑟𝑗𝑡 = Pr(𝜔𝑗𝑡−1(𝑖𝑗𝑡−1, 𝑘𝑗𝑡−1, 𝐺𝑐𝑡−1), ?¯?𝑡(𝑘𝑗𝑡, 𝐺
𝑐
𝑡)|I𝑡−1)
= ̃︀𝜙𝑡(𝜔𝑗𝑡−1(·), ?¯?𝑡) = 𝜙𝑡(𝑖𝑗𝑡−1, 𝑘𝑗𝑡−1, 𝐺𝑐𝑡−1) (7)
This transformation uses eq. (2), but it also implies that the regional characteristics 𝐺𝑐𝑡
are temporally autocorrelated. 𝑃𝑟𝑗𝑡 is estimated in a separate Probit Model, where the
unknown function 𝜙𝑡 is approximated by a second-order polynomial in its arguments.
The inversion of eq. (7) gives ?¯?𝑡 = ̃︀𝜙−1 (𝜔𝑗𝑡−1, 𝑃 𝑟𝑗𝑡), provided that the density of 𝜔𝑗𝑡
conditional on I𝑡−1 is positive around the value ?¯?𝑡. This inverted function is used in the
modified productivity process in eq. (1), which now respects market selection
𝜔𝑗𝑡 = 𝐸[𝜔𝑗𝑡|𝐼𝑡−1, 𝜒𝑗𝑡 = 1] + 𝜉𝑗𝑡 = ̃︀𝑓(𝜔𝑗𝑡−1, 𝑃 𝑟𝑗𝑡) + 𝜉𝑗𝑡
The identification of 𝑘𝑗𝑡 is based on the moment condition 𝐸[𝜉𝑗𝑡|𝑘𝑗𝑡] = 0 derived above.
The consequence of controlling for selection is that candidate values for 𝜉𝑗𝑡 are taken from
the non-parametrical regression of 𝜔𝑗𝑡(̃︀𝛼𝑘) on 𝜔𝑗𝑡−1(̃︀𝛼𝑘) and 𝑃𝑟𝑗𝑡, where the estimates
?ˆ?𝑗𝑡(̃︀𝛼𝑘) = 𝜑𝑗𝑡−1 − ̃︀𝛼𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑡−1 are available from the first-stage estimation. Although the
derivation is cumbersome, the intuition behind the adjustment for the selection bias is
quite clear: to control for the endogenous market selection of firms with low capital stock,
the survival probability has to enter the identification equation. Essentially, the second
Appendix to chapter 1 29
stage is the minimization of the sample analog to the above population moment
1
𝑇
1
𝑁
∑︁
𝑡
∑︁
𝑗
𝜉𝑗𝑡(̃︀𝛼𝑘) · 𝑘𝑗𝑡 (8)
which finally allows the residual computation of the log composite TFP ?ˆ?𝑗𝑡.
A.2 Data and panel construction
A.2.1 Establishment data
The IAB Establishment Panel is a sample from the population of German plants with
at least one employee liable to social security. Approximately 15,000 establishments per
year are drawn according to the principle of optimum stratification along a division into
17 industries, the 16 federal states and 10 plant size classes (Fischer et al. 2009). The
sample is made representative of the total employment in each county-industry through
the use of weights. Table A.1 confirms that the distribution of employment across sec-
tors in the weighted sample is close to the population, in comparison to the unweighted
selection of establishments. In personal interviews, plant managers are questioned about
the employment structure, revenues, investments and the organizational structure. The
following information is extracted from the IABB. Intermediate inputs comprise all ma-
terials, intermediate goods and services purchased from other plants. Labor input is the
number of all workers on June 30th in each period. From information about their qualifi-
cation level, I construct the share of skilled workers as a control for the quality of the labor
input. Skilled workers span candidates for civil service, working proprietors and employees
who have completed an apprenticeship or hold a university degree. Another control in all
production functions is a dummy indicating whether an establishment is located in West
Germany. The literature agrees that up to the present day, East and West German firms
are considerably different from each other, e.g., Temouri et al. (2008).
Unfortunately, no balance sheet information on the value of capital is reported in the IABB.
Therefore, the capital variable is constructed from plant investment behavior employing
the perpetual inventory method (PIM), as is common with this data set, cf. Addison
et al. (2006). A modified PIM is applied according to Müller (2008). His approach differs
from the usual PIM in the construction of the starting value. At first, one must calculate
the average economic lives of the industry-level capital stock from the national accounts.5
The modified PIM proceeds with two assumptions: (1) the depreciation rate 𝛿𝑡 is linear,
i.e., it is equal to the reciprocal of the average economic live of the capital stock. (2)
All plants within an industry share the same depreciation rate. The latter assumption is
necessary, because the observation period of plants in the IABB is not long enough to derive
reasonable depreciation rates from their reported investment behavior. Another reason is
that the type but not the amount for each type of investment is reported. A starting value
5 The values for average economic lives of the equipment (12 years) and buildings (58 years) are adopted
from Wagner (2010).
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for the modified PIM is approximated by the time-mean of replacement investments over
the industry-specific depreciation rate. In all subsequent periods, the usual PIM is applied
according to eq. (2) assumed in the Olley and Pakes (1996) model. The only difference lies
in the industry-specific depreciation rate 𝛿𝑡.
Difficulties in the application of the PIM arise when changes in plant size occur. The IABB
questionnaire asks whether the plant integrated new parts or whether it has sold, spun off
or shut down some parts. Clearly, these changes have implications for the plant’s capital
stock. For some plant that has just sold some of its assets, the PIM will overstate its
capital value in the following periods. Therefore, whenever such change has occurred, the
plant is treated as a new plant that has just entered the panel, and the PIM is restarted.6
To ensure that the observation periods do not become very short, all plants with two or
more organizational changes are excluded from the sample. For the proper application of
the PIM, establishments with fewer than three valid observations are dropped as well.
Furthermore, all establishments with any missing information are dropped from the sample.
As the data requirement for the estimation of the production function is quite high, the
sample size is significantly reduced. The number of observations in each period from
2000 to 2007 before and after the selection of the sample is stable. Table A.1 provides
the number of observations and a comparison in employment and average county size
across sectors between the final sample with and without weights and population data.
The distribution of employment in the population is much closer to the weighted than to
the unweighted sample. The same picture emerges when employment is aggregated over
states instead of industries. Note that because the analysis pools all plant observations
between 2000 and 2007, the employment sum of the weighted sample corresponds to these
years. For the population, time averages are displayed in the last panel of the table, where
the employment sum is approximately 9.1 million employees. A serious rearrangement
in the year 2000 limits longitudinal comparisons across industries (Fischer et al. 2009).
Correct industrial classification is required for four reasons: (1) to serve as a control in
the production function, (2) to construct the agglomeration variables, (3) to distinguish
the agglomeration effects across industry groups, and (4) to enrich the plant-level data
with external industry-specific information, as explained momentarily. To avoid any errors
through the imputation in the sector variable, the present study is restricted to observations
since 2000.
A.2.2 Industry data
Unfortunately, the Federal Statistical Office (FSO) did not collect aggregate revenues in
most of the service industries before the year 2005. Because this external information
is crucial for the TFP estimation procedure, no use of such industries could be made. In
three of the 17 industries displayed in table A.1, no information on total sales was available.
In these cases, sales are projected from the IABB sample.7 The German FSO calculates
6 In this adjustment I depart from the modified PIM outlined in Müller (2008).
7 The IABB sample provides cross-sectional and longitudinal weighting factors for all plants with
valid observations. These weighting factors are computed in a manner that allows an inference to the
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producer price indices according to the Laspeyres formula, which is the sum of product
prices weighted by their share of total domestic revenue. This approach accords well with
the assumption on the relevant market. The weighting scheme is not adjusted every year to
separate price changes from quantity effects. The current base year is 2005, indicating that
all price indices were normalized to 100 in 2005. In the non-manufacturing sectors ’hotels
and restaurants’ and ’wholesale and retail trade’, the FSO has begun to collect service
prices from the suppliers only since 2007. For these industries consumer price indices are
used instead.
A.2.3 Regional data
In 2007, Germany was divided into 423 counties. All districts that have undergone changes
between 2000 and 2007 are aggregated, so that the area is consistent throughout these
years. This is the case for districts in Saxony, the city of Hannover and Berlin. Due to a
county structure reform in Saxony-Anhalt, 24 counties are discarded. To implement the
robustness check one or several counties are aggregated to labor market regions (LMR),
which cover the entire German territory. The aggregation is performed as described in
Eckey et al. (2006). Their delineation is based on a factor analysis of commuting patterns
between counties, subject to two restrictions: the LMR has a population of at least 50,000,
and commuting time must not exceed 60 min. Again, five out of 150 LMR in Saxony
are excluded. When information to construct agglomeration variables is taken from other
data sources, it is then matched into the IABB via the industry and county identifiers.
Unfortunately, consistent information was available only for the period 2000-2007 and for
17 out of 41 sectors, most of which are in manufacturing. Table A.1 lists the 17 sectors
and the respective number of observations. Based on the following data, the urbanization
and localization variables are constructed as described in section 1.3.2. The FSO provides
the number of employees per industry and the square footage for each county. Due to data
privacy protection the information for a country-industry is censored if fewer than three
establishments are present there. Furthermore, the total employment level in each county
is taken from the Federal Employment Agency.
A.3 Supplementary tables
population. Projections are valid in the three dimensions of the stratification matrix: industries, federal
states and classes of plant size (Fischer et al. 2009). Luckily, the three industries without total sales accord
with the industries in the stratification matrix. Only for the construction industry was this not exactly
the case. In the questionnaire construction is partitioned into main construction trade and construction
installation. For main construction trade, aggregate information on total sales is given so that revenue in
the construction installation is residually computed.
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Table A.1: Overview of industries
m
a
ch
in
er
y
a
n
d
eq
u
ip
m
en
t
m
o
to
r
v
eh
ic
le
s
el
ec
tr
ic
a
l
m
a
ch
in
er
y
p
re
ci
si
o
n
a
n
d
o
p
ti
ca
l
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
ch
em
ic
a
l,
co
k
e
a
n
d
p
et
ro
le
u
m
p
ro
d
u
ct
s
ru
b
b
er
a
n
d
p
la
st
ic
p
ro
d
u
ct
s
n
o
n
-m
et
a
ll
ic
,
m
in
er
a
l
p
ro
d
u
ct
s
b
a
si
c
m
et
a
ls
fa
b
ri
ca
te
d
m
et
a
l
p
ro
d
u
ct
s
abb. MACHI. VEHIC. ELECT. OPTIC. CHEML. MINRL. BA.MTL. FA.MTL.
group high-tech [1] medium-tech [2]
unweighted sample
obs. 2359 246 871 484 659 831 728 503 1499
rel. obs. 11.3% 1.2% 4.2% 2.3% 3.2% 4.0% 3.5% 2.4% 7.2%
empl. sum 653988 143393 221478 41900 206923 176435 93836 205821 197945
empl. rel. 23.4% 5.1% 7.9% 1.5% 7.4% 6.3% 3.4% 7.4% 7.1%
av. cty. empl. 11.23 10.91 11.47 11.56 11.58 10.98 10.76 11.54 11.20
weighted sample
empl. sum 4364080 273021 1096887 317893 1032020 883673 455486 767482 1578712
empl. rel. 9.5% 0.6% 2.4% 0.7% 2.3% 1.9% 1.0% 1.7% 3.5%
av. cty. empl. 11.44 10.92 11.87 11.62 12.13 11.10 11.06 11.75 11.16
population
empl. sum 900090 91236 286601 106163 335263 295640 180787 149261 339601
empl. rel. 9.9% 1.0% 3.2% 1.2% 3.7% 3.2% 2.0% 1.6% 3.7%
av. cty. empl. 11.26 11.88 11.61 11.38 11.56 11.02 10.92 11.56 11.12
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abb. TEXTL. WOOD CONST. HOTEL TRADE total
group low-tech [3] non-manufacturing [4]
unweighted sample
obs. 261 506 428 300 2,035 2,394 1,162 5,534 20,800
rel. obs. 1.3% 2.4% 2.1% 1.4% 9.8% 11.5% 5.6% 26.6% 100.0%
empl. sum 38546 85257 33456 33926 144363 78320 48787 386772 2791146
empl. rel. 1.4% 3.1% 1.2% 1.2% 5.2% 2.8% 1.7% 13.9% 100.0%
av. cty. empl. 11.36 11.65 11.10 11.12 11.11 11.33 11.30 11.36 11.28
weighted sample
empl. sum 264034 702236 154504 281164 3010672 3806156 2571985 24100000 45700000
empl. rel. 0.6% 1.5% 0.3% 0.6% 6.6% 8.3% 5.6% 52.7% 100.0%
av. cty. empl. 11.40 12.05 11.29 10.99 11.22 11.33 11.29 11.20 11.25
population
empl. sum 67575 188362 71318 92067 763462 819143 688314 3721906 9096787
empl. rel. 0.7% 2.1% 0.8% 1.0% 8.4% 9.0% 7.6% 40.9% 100.0%
av. cty. empl. 11.03 11.56 10.99 11.00 11.08 11.23 11.36 11.37 11.32
Notes: This table provides an overview of the sectors covered in the investigation. The second row names the
abbreviation of the sector. Note that some sectors are combined only for the estimation of the production
function to obtain more precise and meaningful sector-specific coefficients. The third row shows the classifi-
cation of sectors into one of four different groups according to their R&D intensity. In the following rows, the
final sample is compared with the weighted sample and population data across the 17 sectors according to
their aggregate and relative employment and the average log employment size of these (weighted) observations.
The weights are the time average of the employment sum in a county-industry in the population relative to
its value in the sample.
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Table A.2: Correlation coefficients of agglomeration variables
occ-corr. job-changes input-link. div. spec. urbaniz. city
occ-corr. 1
job-changes 0.0638 1
input-linkage -0.1140 0.0093 1
diversity -0.2130 -0.1423 -0.0115 1
specialization 0.5132 0.0170 -0.5009 -0.0759 1
urbanization 0.3685 0.1023 0.1179 -0.2162 -0.1295 1
city-dummy 0.0782 0.1230 0.0706 -0.0576 0.0082 0.3949 1
Notes: The number of observations is 20800 for all variables. Correlations are weighted by the
employment sum of the county-sector in the population relative to its value in the sample.
Table A.3: Comparison of standard errors across cluster levels
county county-industry county-industry-year unclustered
OP/KG OP/KG OP/KG OP/KG
occ-corr. 0.0474 0.0474 0.0474** 0.0474**
(0.0324) (0.0323) (0.0232) (0.0230)
job-changes 0.0176 0.0176 0.0176 0.0176
(0.0187) (0.0184) (0.0180) (0.0178)
input-linkage 0.0104 0.0104 0.0104 0.0104
(0.0185) (0.0192) (0.0141) (0.0138)
diversity −0.0393 −0.0393 −0.0393** −0.0393**
(0.0273) (0.0263) (0.0187) (0.0184)
specialization 0.0233 0.0233 0.0233 0.0233
(0.0563) (0.0566) (0.0415) (0.0411)
urbanization 0.0303 0.0303 0.0303** 0.0303**
(0.0250) (0.0208) (0.0145) (0.0139)
𝑅2 0.0443 0.0443 0.0443 0.0443
F 19.12 4.10 6.47 5.18
N 20800 20800 20800 20800
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses are computed at the county level
in column 1, at the county-industry level in column 2 and at the county-industry-year
level in column 3. Year, state and industry fixed effects are included in all estimations.
Regressions are weighted by the employment sum of the county-sector in the population
relative to its value in the sample. Covariates are standardized to have a zero mean and
a standard deviation of one.
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
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2.1 Introduction
Workers have heterogeneous skills and firms have different requirements. This obvious fact
has been incorporated in many papers on labor market matching, cf. the survey by Postel-
Vinay and Robin (2006). Its way of modeling goes back to the seminal paper by Becker
(1973). His insights on the theory of marriage are directly transferable to the matching
between employer and employees. The main result is well-known: If complementarities
between the quality of workers and firms exist and the market is frictionless, the optimal
allocation corresponds to perfect positive assortative matching (PAM), i.e., the firm with
highest quality employs the most productive worker, the second best firm employs the
second best worker and so on. Due to the complementarity, the composition of matches
has implications for the efficiency of the economy. If qualities are substitutes or completely
unrelated, other matching patters arise. The actual allocation of workers to firms is ulti-
mately an empirical question from which the type of production function can be deduced.
In this regard, diverging assumptions can be found in the literature that, in turn, refer to
diverging empirical findings on the existence of PAM (Eeckhout and Kircher 2011).
The present paper provides a comprehensive analysis of matching in the Germany and
additionally considers its interdependencies with the employment density of regional labor
market. Analyzing matching from a regional perspective has two merits. Facilitated match-
ing is one possible formalization of the labor market pooling argument, e.g., in Wheeler
(2001). The setting allows for testing of whether this is one of the reasons why a massive
concentration of economic activity is observed in cities (Glaeser and Gottlieb 2009). Sec-
ond, the existence of other agglomeration economies and the sorting of the most productive
workers and firms to certain regions need to be controlled for, otherwise this co-location
confounds the matching pattern.1
Apart from the consideration of the regional dimension, this paper contributes to the
literature in two aspects. Before evaluating the implications of PAM, I devote attention to
the question of whether PAM actually exists and how the measurement of qualities affect
this assessment. This is the first attempt to capture matching with two direct quality
measures: firms’ total factor productivity (TFP) and worker fixed effects. As a second
innovation, the paper considers two distinct methods to detect the matching pattern. In
particular, I test the predicted wage curve from the matching model by Eeckhout and
Kircher (2011) that permits a sound conclusion about the matching pattern and the type
of underlying production function.
The innovations in my approach turn out to be relevant. I show that the frequently used
firm fixed effects can be a misleading quality measure and that the application of this
measure may explain prior dissenting findings.2 Using the direct quality measure TFP, I
find evidence for positive assortative matching. On the one hand, a positive correlation be-
tween the qualities of workers and firms is observed. On the other hand, the data suggests
1 By sorting, I mean that high-productivity agents are attracted to a specific region (for whatever
reason) without knowing their matching partner beforehand.
2 Even though this study is based on plant level data, for convenience and for simplified comparison to
other papers, I use the term ‘firm’interchangeably.
High-wage workers and high-productivity firms 36
that production efficiency and wages increase when the deviation of both quality levels is
smaller. Both findings are less strong, but still significant after controlling for agglomera-
tion economies and sorting. Finally, there is no convincing evidence that matching works
better in labor markets where employment density or unemployment rates are higher.
The theoretical background of this paper is based on Becker (1973). Workers and firms are
assumed to be heterogeneous in their qualities, both of which are comparable and have a
clearly defined ranking.3 If qualities are complementary, the equilibrium in a competitive
but frictionless labor market is such that matching partners have same rank, i.e., are
optimal. Shimer and Smith (2000) were the first to demonstrate that PAM still arises in
the presence of search costs. However, neither firms nor workers are now willing to remain
unmatched and search until the optimal matching partner is found, so that deviations
within a certain tolerance range around the optimal match arise. Wheeler (2001) extends
this basic setup by incorporating region-specific search costs in order to capture Alfred
Marshall’s idea of labor market pooling. According to Marshall (1890: 271), finding suitable
labor and employment is easier in large markets, thus search costs are assumed to decline
in the size of the region. This allows firms to choose more carefully, so that matching
improves. However, the final result in Wheeler’s model is ambiguous because the number
of potential partners also grows with region size.
Eeckhout and Kircher (2011) build on the same basic matching framework to elaborate how
assortative matching may be identified from wage data. Because data concerning qualities
or productivities are typically unavailable, many papers follow Abowd et al. (1999) and use
worker and firm fixed effect (FFE) estimates from a wage regression as proxies. Eeckhout
and Kircher (2011) highlight that once wages are bargained over and firms account for
their outside option of searching for a more accurate match, the wage is maximized when
both qualities are equal, but as soon as the employer’s quality dissents to either side, wages
decrease. That is, the wage curve for a given worker has a bell-shaped curvature in the
quality of her employer.4 Therefore, the firm-specific part of the wage is not related to
the quality of the firm, making FFE an uneligible proxy. Note that this critique does
not invalidate the worker fixed effect (FE) as a quality measure. The worker FE is equal
to the worker’s mean wage (after accounting for other observable control variables in the
regression) and thus reflects the labor market valuation of unobservable adherent skills.
Nevertheless, the bottom line is that "based on wage data alone, it is not possible to
determine whether sorting is positive or negative" (Eeckhout and Kircher 2011: 873). The
present paper circumvents these problems by using TFP as a direct measure for firm quality.
In sum, the theoretical considerations imply two different methods of detecting the match-
ing pattern and to obtain a conclusion regarding the type of underlying production func-
tion, given that reasonable quality measures are available. (1) Analyzing the correlation
3 Another class of models incorporates differences in skill and job requirements as addresses on a unit
circle, e.g., in Helsley and Strange (1990). Because it is not obvious how to assign productivity differences
and a ranking to points on a circle, these models are not covered by the assortative matching perused in
this paper.
4 The model in Shimer and Smith (2000) also incorporates wage bargaining and yields a convex wage
curve. In contrast, Wheeler (2001) assumes that the output of the match is divided into fixed shares,
where workers’ share is equal to their production elasticity.
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between worker and firm qualities in the market. (2) Estimating the shape of the wage
curve. The present data provide evidence for PAM with both approaches. Estimating a
wage regression on the deviation of the optimal match within occupation and education
groups confirms the bell-shaped relation. The significant second- and third-order terms
imply wage gains of as much as 4% when the optimal partner is found. Gautier and Teul-
ings (2006) derive a slightly different matching model and structurally estimate the implied
wage curve. They also find a convex curvature and provide an estimate for the amount
of search costs. Their worker quality measure does not contain unobservable skills, which,
however, typically account for more than 60% of the total wage dispersion (Combes et al.
2008; Ehrl 2014a). Moreover, a combination of industry and occupation dummies captures
the quality of the firm but the latter may as well be understood as a worker-specific char-
acteristic. Indeed, Ehrl (2014a) finds that occupation is the most important observable
wage determinant. Hence, my paper expands their approach with more accurate quality
measures.
Many other empirical papers on assortative matching rely on the correlation between
worker and firm FE. Abowd et al. (1999), Andersson et al. (2007) and Card et al. (2013)
report a positive correlation, whereas Andrews et al. (2008), Gruetter and Lalive (2009)
and Alda et al. (2009) obtain a large and highly significant negative correlation - all using
the same methodology. Based on the present data, a direct comparison between TFP and
the FFE estimates shows that both are quite unrelated. An inspection of the details in the
estimations suggest that the use of additional control variables and the size of the data set
substantially determine the value of FFE estimates.
To the best of my knowledge, only two papers examine matching in the regional dimension.
Both Mion and Naticchioni (2009) and Andersson et al. (2007) find that the most produc-
tive workers sort into densely populated regions. Furthermore, by being present in dense
regions, workers and firms absorb a multitude of possible externalities through learning,
sharing and matching, and therefore experience higher productivities and wages.5,6 High
price levels constitute another reason why wages are higher in agglomerations (Roback
1982). Figure 2.1 confirms the mentioned relations between TFP, wages, price levels and
employment density using the present data set. This co-location itself generates a positive
correlation between worker and firm quality. Mion and Naticchioni (2009) control for em-
ployment density but the correlation between firm size and a worker FE falls only slightly
from 0.35 to 0.34. When I control for the agglomeration economies and sorting, the cor-
relation between quality measures drops by about 2 percentage points, but the matching
advantage implied by the wage curve is reduced by half. However, both results remain
significant.
Finally, I find some evidence that the matching works best in medium-density counties, in
accordance with the opposing effects identified in Wheeler (2001). However these results are
5 See Duranton and Puga (2004a) for theoretical evidence, Puga (2010) for a survey of empirical findings
or Ehrl (2013) for evidence from Germany.
6 A general note on the term ‘matching’may be in order. Matching is understood as the assignment
of workers to firms. When the search, selection and assignment work better in dense regions, matching
transmits an agglomeration externality.
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Figure 2.1: Mean wages, TFP, employment density and the price index at the county level
Notes: Each circle and square in the graphs represents a county-mean computed from the observa-
tions in the present LIAB sample. Both scatter plots and linear fits are weighted by the number of
observations per county. The latter is represented by the size of the symbols in the graphs. In the first
graph, the coefficient on TFP is 0.029 with an 𝑅2 of 0.06 and the coefficient on wages is 0.055 with
𝑅2 = 0.16. Both estimations are significant at the 0.01 level. In the second graph, East and West
German counties show quite different coefficients (0.032 vs. 0.005) and 𝑅2 (0.33 vs. 0.05). Note that
the linear fit is shown separately for East and West Germany because without this differentiation, the
data indicates that a inverted U-shape generates a better fit (𝑅2 =0.40). See section 1.3 for a detailed
description of the variables.
not robust to different specifications. This ambiguity is in line with the opposed findings in
Andersson et al. (2007) and Mion and Naticchioni (2009). The differences in their analyses
are again my direct productivity measures and the estimation of a theoretically derived
wage function that identifies a pecuniary advantage of matching. Delacroix (2003) argues
that local differences in unemployment benefits may also generate labor market pooling.
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Thereby, higher unemployment rates express the greater selectivity of agents that lead to
better matches. Again, the present data does not support this prediction. Related studies
by Ellison et al. (2010), Baldwin et al. (2010) and Ehrl (2013) use other specifications of
labor market pooling (which are unrelated to the quality of agents) to show its positive
effect on the local concentration and performance of firms.
The organization of the paper is as follows. The next section describes the data used.
Section 3 discusses the identification of worker and firm qualities. Section 4 presents the
results and some robustness checks and section 5 concludes the paper.
2.2 Data
The data underlying this study is the linked employer-employee data set (LIAB) from 1999
to 2007 provided by the German Institute of Employment Research (IAB), cf. Alda et al.
(2005) for a detailed description of the LIAB. Its backbone is a survey of plants which
is representative regarding the employment size of cells of a defined stratification matrix.
This matrix is spanned by 10 establishment size classes, 20 sectors and the 16 Federal
States. Within the cells, the selection of the sample is random, see Fischer et al. (2009)
for details about the establishment panel. Only establishments with continuous responses
in 1999-2001 or in 2000-2002 are selected into the LIAB sample. The given establishment
information is detailed enough to estimate TFP from sector-specific plant-level production
functions according to Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). For the detailed estimation procedure,
see Appendix B.1.
For each of those plants, the LIAB contains information about all employees on 30 June
in each year. Because the worker data is extracted from social security agencies, to which
employers are obligated to report, the information about daily gross wages is highly reli-
able. However, around 12% of the observations exceed the social security contribution limit
and the wage is top-coded. A common imputation procedure proposed by Gartner (2005)
is therefore applied.7 These gross average daily wages are then deflated by the national
harmonized consumer price index. Another imputation rule is necessary for the education
variable, which is unfortunately less reliable than wages. Education is unknown for about
11% of all observations and a large fraction of individuals exhibit chronological inconsis-
tencies. Building on Fitzenberger et al. (2006), I remediate these entries relying on lagged
and lead values, additional information on the occupational position and on "consistently"
reporting employers. For the construction of my final sample, I exclude individuals with
missing information (except for education), mini-jobbers, second and part-time jobs and
7 Top coded wages are imputed using the predicted wage from a censored regression model plus an
error term that is drawn from a truncated normal distribution. The censored wage regression includes the
worker’s occupation category (at the 3 digit level), a full interaction of a gender and West Germany dummy
with six education categories, a dummy for German citizens, a quadratic in age and tenure, and dummies
regarding the prior employment status. Without the error term, the correlation between the imputed wages
and the covariates would be larger than the correlation between the latter and the uncensored wages. The
error term’s variance is equal to the variance of the wage estimates from the censored regression. Card
et al. (2013) also use a similar procedure to impute top coded German wages.
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establishments with poor matching quality.8 Individuals with less than two observation,
below the age of 19 or with more than 64 years are also dropped. The final sample contains
3,481 different plants, 529,422 individuals, or a total of 2,456,365 observations.
The spatial units in this investigation are counties (NUTS 3 level) and labor market re-
gions. In 2007, Germany is divided into 438 different counties that differ considerably in
their population density and size, cf. figure 2.1. Counties’ employment densities and the
unemployment rates will be used as controls and are taken from the Federal Statistical
Office. The sample is further enriched by official county-level price indices. From 2006
to 2008 the Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Development
(BBSR) gathered 7.3 million single prices of 205 different commodities in 57 commodity
groups, covering the entire territory.9 The computation is based on the same weighting
scheme as the nationwide basket of commodities (Kawka et al. 2009). An alternative spa-
tial delineation is used for two reasons. The number of plants per county-year is in some
cases quite low, so that aggregated matching performance indicators may not be very reli-
able. In general, it is not granted that counties are the most appropriate approximation of
local labor markets. Eckey et al. (2006) develop an aggregation of one or several counties
into labor market regions, based on a factor analysis of commuting patterns. Within each
of the resulting 150 labor market regions, the commuting time is below 60 minutes.
2.3 Identification of worker, firm and matching quality
The present paper focuses on labor market matching where agents are heterogeneous in
quality, in the spirit of Becker (1973). Qualities (or traits in his case) are directly com-
parable and have a well-defined ranking, which makes only models of this kind accessible
with the empirical test in this paper.10 Define workers’ productivity as 𝑥 ∈ [0; 1] and
firms’ productivity as 𝑦 ∈ [0; 1]. An assignment of a worker with quality equal to 𝑥 to a
firm of quality 𝑦 is denoted by 𝑎(𝑥) = 𝑦. A match yields an output with a labor market
value of 𝑓(𝑥, 𝑦). This production function 𝑓(𝑥, 𝑦) is twice continuously differentiable and
increasing in its arguments. When the cross-partial of the production function is positive
(𝑓𝑥,𝑦 > 0), qualities of workers and firms are complements in production and the function
is called supermodular. For frictionless labor markets Becker (1973) derives that output
is maximized when matching is perfectly positive assortative, i.e., when 𝑎(𝑥) = 𝑥. If the
production function is submodular (𝑓𝑥,𝑦 < 0) and qualities were substitutes in contrast,
negative assortative matching would be optimal, i.e., 𝑎(𝑥) = 1 − 𝑥. This demonstrates
8 The IAB recommends that establishments where the information on total employees from the estab-
lishment data set deviates by more than 30% from the actual number of matched employees be discarded.
I tighten this range to 10% for establishments with less than 50 employees. Additionally, I disregard ob-
servations with contradictory spatial information in both data sets. In total, this eliminates about 12% of
matched observations.
9 Aggregation of counties and weighting by the number of inhabitants makes it possible to use the price
index even in the State of Saxony-Anhalt, where a territorial reform has taken place.
10 The difference in the common framework based on the work by Diamond, Mortensen and Pissarides
is that in their framework agents are also heterogeneous but the heterogeneity is disguised in the aggregate
production function. Moreover, all matches have the same productivity and thus there is a unique wage
rate in the market Pissarides (2000).
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that the underlying production function determines the matching pattern. Vice versa, the
observed matching pattern provides an opportunity to draw conclusions about the actual
type of production function.
The following the argumentation is based on Eeckhout and Kircher (2011), who build on
this basic framework and elaborate on how the matching pattern may be identified from
wage data. An important assumption is wage bargaining between workers and firms, so
that profits are given by 𝜋(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑓(𝑥, 𝑦)− 𝑤(𝑥, 𝑦). Without a partner, the income of all
agents is equal to zero, and hence agents prefer to be matched. As soon as search costs
are introduced, a certain tolerance range around the optimal match arises, because in case
of applicants with a similar quality, it is not profitable to reject the current applicant,
pay the search cost and wait for a better applicant.11 Even though not every match is
optimal, PAM is still present in the labor market, as derived by Shimer and Smith (2000).
Search frictions make the model more realistic because each person has more than one
possible employer. A proposition in Eeckhout and Kircher (2011) that I will test in the
following is that from a given worker’s point of view, the wage follows an inverted U-
shape within the range of possible employers. Another important result is that the wage
is maximized in the optimal match. Deviations in firm quality to either side decrease the
wage, however. If a worker moves to a less productive firm, the output is lower and so
is the wage. Deviation to a higher quality firm is not optimal for the new employer. If
firms account for their outside option in the bargaining, they subtract the opportunity
cost of matching with a better worker from the remuneration of labor. It is interesting
to note that this argument does not depend on the type of the production function. For
every supermodular production function, there exists another submodular function that
induces an equal wage curve. Consequently, wage data alone does not allow us to draw
any conclusions regarding the production function or the matching pattern. Information
about firm qualities is necessary in order to judge whether the optimal match is given by
𝑎(𝑥) = 𝑥 or 𝑎(𝑥) = 1− 𝑥.
For an empirical investigation, measures for worker and firm quality are obviously an
essential requirement. Many preceding studies follow Abowd et al. (1999), who pioneered
the simultaneous estimation of worker and firm fixed effects in wage regressions. These
estimates were subsequently interpreted as quality measures. Consider the wage regression
𝑤 = 𝛽𝑧𝑍 + 𝜐(𝑥) + 𝛿(𝑦) + 𝜖 (1)
with the worker FE 𝜐(𝑥) and the FFE 𝛿(𝑦) to illustrate their identification and interpre-
tation. 𝜖 is the error term of the wage regression and 𝑍 represents additional observable
and time-variant worker- and firm-specific control variables. 𝜐(𝑥) absorbs workers’ average
wage after controlling for the observable differences in 𝑍. It represents the labor market
value of unobservable and adherent skills and is thus suitable as a quality measure. Ob-
vious observable quality measures only capture a small share of the variation in wages in
empirical studies, cf. Ehrl (2014a), and thus disregard important aspects of workers actual
11 Obviously, introducing search cost explicitly requires a dynamic framework. The matching process
considered here is sequential and excludes on-the-job search.
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skills. Given that 𝜐(𝑥) already captures the average wage, the remaining wage variation
oscillates around zero. Without movers, i.e., individuals who are employed for more than
one firm, no payment differences between firms could be identified. Exactly those payment
differences determine the value of the FFE. The crucial problem is that a given worker’s
wage difference in two distinct firms does not depend on the quality of the employer but
only on the deviation between 𝑥 and 𝑦, according to theory. If the quality of workers and
firms are equally distributed in the population, no systematic deviation to either side is
expected and thus "the only variation [in FFE] might arise from small sample properties
that introduce non-systematic noise" (Eeckhout and Kircher 2011: 886). Therefore, the
FFE is not an eligible quality measure.
There are two more effects that influence the value of the FFE estimates. In the real world,
wages may be determined by characteristics other than qualities. Gender is an obvious
example for a worker-specific attribute. Likewise, on the employer side, not all reasons for
payment differences are related to quality or productivity. Cornelißen and Hübler (2011)
find evidence that workers are compensated for lower job stability in high-wage firms.
Wage differences may also be due to the local price and amenity levels (Roback 1982). In
very beautiful places, a person might forgo some of her wage to enjoy living and working
in that place. Then again, profuse housing and living costs in the largest cities justify
wage premiums as compensation. Sectoral affiliation, firm size or coverage by a collective
agreement constitute other payment differentials, cf. Gibbons and Katz (1992). Even if
they are somehow related to the firm’s productivity, these factors can be separated from
the FFE if one is looking for an accurate quality estimate. It is important to keep in mind
that if factors summarized by 𝑍 are not controlled for, their induced payment differentials
are absorbed by the FFE estimate and thus 𝛿(𝑦) is not completely random, as conjectured
by the simplified matching model. A sorting of high-quality workers into large firms may
thus induce an upward-bias in the correlation between 𝜐(𝑥) and 𝛿(𝑦).
The second effect on the value of the FFE estimates is related to the number of movers
in the data set. Fixed effect estimates can in general only be interpreted relative to each
other. It is well known that in two-way FE models, the FFE may only be compared within
a group of firms which is connected by movers between them. Andrews et al. (2008) prove
that even within a mobility group, accurate estimation of FFE depends on the number
of movers in each firm. The fewer movers there are, the more biased downwards the
correlation between worker and firm FE will be. The authors show in simulations that this
so called "limited mobility bias" is large enough to turn a true positive correlation into
an observed negative one. In a follow-up paper, Andrews et al. (2012) vary the number of
movers in the sample to demonstrate their finding empirically.
The bottom line is that for both theoretical and practical reasons, the use of FFE is far
from optimal for testing assortative matching. At best, the FFE identify high-wage firms
which are not necessarily high-productivity firms. To verify this conclusion and to test
whether both measures imply a similar assortative matching pattern, I start by estimating
a two-way FE wage regression model. Building on eq. (1), my data permits the inclusion
of observable characteristics of employees, employers and regions. To make the distinction
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between these dimensions clear, I denote them by 𝑋𝑖, 𝑌𝑗 and 𝑅𝑘, respectively. As argued
above, the purpose for the inclusion of these control variables is that the higher the fit
of the wage regression, the more they are an accurate measure for the adherent quality
beyond the obvious payment differences. The regression is then given by
𝑤𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑥𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑦𝑌𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽𝑟𝑅𝑘𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜐𝑖 + 𝛿𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (2)
where the dependent variable is the log daily wage of individual 𝑖 in period 𝑡. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 includes
dummies for six education categories and dummies for five intervals of each tenure and
age. At the level of firm 𝑗, I control for five employment size classes, the average working
time, the share of high skilled personnel and whether the firm is covered by a company
agreement, is part of a industry wide collective agreement, or orients itself to one. 𝛾𝑡 are
time fixed effects and 𝑅𝑘𝑡 contains the county’s log employment density, unemployment
rate, local price index and a West dummy. Employment density in county 𝑘 eliminates
wage differences due to sorting, faster learning, etc. The unemployment rate accounts
for local supply-side differences. As demonstrated in figure 2.1, the local price index and
its square are also important wage determinants.12 Finally, the worker and firm FE are
denoted as in eq. (1).
In a second specification, I replace the FFE by firms’ TFP. The latter is estimated in a
sector-specific plant-level production function following Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), cf.
Appendix B.1. Estimation without FFE allows the inclusion of some more plant-specific
categorical variables with little or no temporal variation: legal form, hierarchical level,
industrial classification and a dummy for having a works council. These variables are
summarized by the augmented vector 𝑌 in the following regression.
𝑤𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑥𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑦𝑌𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽𝑝𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽𝑟𝑅𝑘𝑡 + 𝜐𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (3)
For the sake of better identification, eq. (2) and eq. (3) were estimated separately for males
and females in East and West Germany, respectively. Because the identification relies on
within-person variation and there are much less females than males in the data set, the fit of
these regressions deteriorated significantly. This means that the fixed effects have a higher
correlation with wages and that they absorb much more variation than in the pooled case.
Obviously, the results from eq. (2) were also worsened due to the lower number of movers
within the four separate estimations. Slight differences in coefficients are less decisive here
than reliable quality measures. For all that, the results in the paper remain qualitatively
unchanged when the estimation is performed separately for women and men in East and
West. Therefore, I prefer to present the pooled case and include controls for West and
gender in the following regressions.
12 Utilization of the price indices requires the assumption that these values are representative for all
years in the panel since they are only compiled and available for 2006 and 2007. Note however, that none
of the results is critical to the inclusion of the price index.
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2.4 Results
2.4.1 Quality estimates, correlations and sorting
Table 2.1 indicates that the size and significance of most coefficients are similar across the
two wage regressions. Almost all coefficients are significant below the 1% level and have
the expected sign. Age and tenure reveal a inverted U-shape curvature. Remuneration
increases monotonic with firm size and productivity, while the productivity effect is small
compared to the effect of firm size. The regional characteristics are significant wage de-
terminants only in the one-way fixed effects model.13 Workers in West Germany earn an
impressive 16% more than their East German counterparts. The coefficients of the price
index confirm the bell-shaped relation in figure 2.1. A possible explanation for this finding
are amenities. Counties with the highest living cost are expected to be the most beautiful
and attractive areas, in line with Roback (1982). People thus might forgo a part of their
wage to get a job in such a desired region.
Next, I perform a variance decomposition of the preferred specification (model 2 without
the FFE) similar to Abowd et al. (1999). Except for the original log wage and the residual,
each row in table 2.2 contains the effect of the components from the wage regression. The
component effects are computed as the value of the variable multiplied by its estimated
coefficient. Columns 1 and 2 show the variance of each component effect and its correlation
with the log wage. The share of the covariance in the total variance of individual wages
in column 3 states the importance of each effect. Note that the variance decomposition is
exactly additive, so all shares in column 3 add to one.
The positive and relatively important effect of firm size confirm the prior assessments.
However, the total share of the observable characteristics is small. For example, all observed
individual characteristics only explain 5.3% of the total wage variation, whereby education
already accounts for 4.9%. TheWest dummy (7.7%) and all employer attributes (3.3%) also
have little explanation power, compared to the overwhelming contribution of the worker
effects. This is the usual finding, e.g., in Abowd et al. (1999) or Combes et al. (2008).
The interest in this study lies in the correlations between the component effects in each
row and the worker FE, density and West dummy, respectively, as shown in columns 4-6.
From the correlation with 𝜐𝑖, we see that workers with favorable observable attributes also
have higher unobserved skills. Most important for this paper is the positive correlation
between 𝜐𝑖 and TFP. Although, the coefficient of 0.09 is small, the correlation is more
appropriately taken at the level of employer-employee pairs or at the firm-level, cf. table
2.3. Still, this result is a first sign that PAM is present in the German labor market. The
last two columns show that agglomeration economies or sorting of the largest and most
13 The reason for the low significance of regional characteristics in the two-way FE model is that their
identification is based on movers, as is the identification of the FFE. The coefficient of the West dummy
cannot be identified at all because there is no individual that moves between two firms in East and West
Germany. To maximize the number of movers in the two-way FE estimation, the sample is not based solely
on firms for which enough information is available to estimate TFP. On the other hand, firms are lost that
do not belong to the largest group of employers connected by movers, which explains the different number
of observations between the two models in table 2.1.
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Table 2.1: Wage regressions
model two-way FE only worker FE
2.education 0.0387 (0.0021)*** 0.0391 (0.0030)***
3.education -0.1537 (0.0161)*** -0.1484 (0.0239)***
4.education 0.0616 (0.0050)*** 0.0635 (0.0070)***
5.education 0.1765 (0.0075)*** 0.1680 (0.0093)***
6.education 0.2094 (0.0067)*** 0.1975 (0.0091)***
2.tenure 0.0368 (0.0003)*** 0.0360 (0.0004)***
3.tenure 0.0478 (0.0005)*** 0.0458 (0.0006)***
4.tenure 0.0441 (0.0006)*** 0.0369 (0.0008)***
5.tenure 0.0313 (0.0008)*** 0.0221 (0.0010)***
2.age 0.0431 (0.0007)*** 0.0441 (0.0009)***
3.age 0.0533 (0.0008)*** 0.0547 (0.0010)***
4.age 0.0439 (0.0009)*** 0.0456 (0.0011)***
5.age 0.0246 (0.0010)*** 0.0265 (0.0013)***
works council 0.0106 (0.0007)***
2.vertical type -0.0065 (0.0004)***
3.vertical type -0.0019 (0.0004)***
4.vertical type 0.0171 (0.0009)***
2.legal form 0.0154 (0.0028)***
3.legal form 0.0082 (0.0027)***
4.legal form 0.0150 (0.0029)***
5.legal form 0.0274 (0.0038)***
6.legal form 0.0117 (0.0038)***
2.size 0.0395 (0.0103)*** 0.0476 (0.0050)***
3.size 0.0604 (0.0105)*** 0.0752 (0.0052)***
4.size 0.0844 (0.0105)*** 0.1059 (0.0053)***
5.size 0.0987 (0.0105)*** 0.1333 (0.0054)***
TFP 0.0162 (0.0005)***
working hours. -0.0021 (0.0001)*** -0.0011 (0.0001)***
sector agreement 0.0113 (0.0007)*** 0.0126 (0.0007)***
sect. agrmnt. orient. 0.0114 (0.0006)*** 0.0102 (0.0006)***
company agreement 0.0078 (0.0007)*** 0.0031 (0.0007)***
HQ share 0.0068 (0.0005)*** 0.0171 (0.0006)***
log density -0.0003 (0.0007) 0.0089 (0.0013)***
price index 0.0042 (0.0249) 0.1040 (0.0262)***
(price index)2 0.0001 (0.0001) -0.0006 (0.0001)***
unemployment rate -0.0024 (0.0001)*** -0.0023 (0.0001)***
west 0.1655 (0.0255)***
constant 3.7014 - -0.6395 (1.2279)
worker FE 3 3
plant FE 3 7
sector FE 7 3
time FE 3 3
F 29.85 (0.00)*** 1046.91 (0.00)***
N 2,874,096 2,456,365
Notes: The first two columns report the results from estimation of eq. (2)
and the last two columns pertain to eq. (3). Robust standard errors are in
parentheses and significance levels of 0.01 are denoted by ***. Variables that
begin with a number denote one of the dummies of the respective categorical
variable. For example, 2.𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 shows the additional returns for workers
with the second lowest education category compared to workers in the omitted
category, namely the first and lowest. Tenure, age, and plant size are captured
by dummies for the following three intervals. Tenure (in days): [1000, 3000,
5000, 9000, 13000, 13000+], age [25, 35, 45, 55, 64], plant size [9, 49, 199, 999,
1000+];
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Table 2.2: Variance decomposition
var(·) corr(·, w) 𝑐𝑜𝑣(·, 𝑤)
𝑣𝑎𝑟(·, 𝑤)
corr(·, 𝜐𝑖) corr(·, dens.) corr(·, west)
wage 0.1317 1 1 0.9208 0.2207 0.3901
all worker
0.0027 0.3710 0.0533 0.3145 -0.0059 -0.1290
observables
education 0.0024 0.3640 0.0487 0.3165 -0.0046 -0.1178
tenure 0.0002 0.0377 0.0013 0.0204 -0.0139 -0.0837
age 0.0001 0.0968 0.0033 0.0623 0.0076 0.0052
all firm
0.0009 0.4170 0.0339 0.2958 0.3042 0.3521
observables
TFP 0.0000 0.0669 0.0009 0.0888 0.1337 0.0027
firm size 0.0006 0.3676 0.0247 0.2399 0.2642 0.3748
sector FE 0.0006 0.1602 0.0113 0.0314 -0.2726 0.1808
time FE 0.0004 0.0840 0.0046 0.0138 0.0052 0.0319
west 0.0052 0.3901 0.0774 0.1673 0.1625 1
density 0.0002 0.2207 0.0078 0.2068 1 0.1625
unempl. 0.0002 0.2735 0.0093 0.0994 -0.0368 0.7710
PI 0.0008 0.0555 0.0042 -0.0426 -0.2296 0.0032
𝜐𝑖 0.0860 0.9208 0.7440 1 0.2068 0.1673
residual 0.0072 0.2331 0.0544 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Notes: Variance decomposition after estimation of eq. (3). The number of observations is 2,456,365.
The rows refer to components or aggregates of components included in the wage regression. The
columns display the variance of these estimated components of the wage regression. Column 2
displays the components’ correlation with wages. Column 3 lists the quotient of covariance and
variance of the estimated components with wages. The correlation between component effects and
the effects of worker FE, employment density and the west dummy are listed in the last four columns,
respectively.
productive plants into West Germany and into dense counties are at work. The same is
true for the skilled workers, albeit only regarding their unobserved skills.14
After this closer look at the preferred specification, I compare the quality measures between
the two regression models. Table 2.3 shows that the two worker FE are considerably
different, given that they are supposed to reflect the same ranking of skills. As in a variety
of preceding papers, the two-way FE model is highly suggestive of negative assortative
matching. Warned by the theoretical considerations, I do not take this result at face value.
In fact, the data proves that FFE have little to do with total factor productivity. For the
remainder of the paper, I focus on TFP as the measure of firm quality.
By considering these findings, the theoretical considerations in section 2.3 and looking
more closely at the details of the different estimations, a certain pattern emerges that may
explain previous results. It seems that both the size of the data set and the type of firm-
specific control variables generate interfering effects. My two-way FE model with several
additional firm-specific controls suggests that matching is negative assortative. Andrews
et al. (2008) estimate a similar model with related German sample data and obtain a similar
result. In their follow-up paper Andrews et al. (2012) have access to data on the population
14 At this disaggregated level the strength of sorting is much higher than in Combes et al. (2008), who
obtain a correlation of 0.1 for their de-trended area-time fixed effects.
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Table 2.3: Correlation table - comparison of specifications
𝜐𝑖,𝐹𝐹𝐸 𝜐𝑖,𝑃𝐹𝐸 FFE TFP
𝜐𝑖,𝐹𝐹𝐸 1
𝜐𝑖,𝑃𝐹𝐸 0.7642 1
FFE -0.4176 0.1779 1
TFP 0.0312 0.0791 -0.0313 1
Notes: The cells display the correlations between the estimated worker FE 𝜐𝑖,𝐹𝐹𝐸 ,
the firm fixed effects, both from the two-way fixed effects model in eq. (2), the
TFP, and the worker FE 𝜐𝑖,𝑃𝐹𝐸 from the model in eq. (3) with personal fixed
effects only. The number of observations is 2,084,588.
and demonstrate the existence of the limited mobility bias directly. Varying the share of
movers in the data between 10% and the complete 100% increases the correlation between
worker and firm FE from -20% to +25%. Likewise, Andersson et al. (2007) and Card et al.
(2013) work with very large data sets and obtain a positive correlation. However, their
regressions do not include observable firm-level variables, so that positive effects of firm
size, etc. are still embodied in the FFE. This effect becomes obvious in the present study
and in Mion and Naticchioni (2009), who use firm size as the employer quality measure.
The latter’s correlation with the worker FE is 0.35, whereas I obtain a correlation of 0.24.
On the contrary, Alda et al. (2009) control for even more characteristics than in eq. (3),
some of which reduce the firm’s remuneration, and they obtain a less negative matching
pattern. This suggests that the observed matching pattern depends on how the qualities
are defined and estimated.
Having obtained estimates for both individual and firm quality, the sign and strength of
matching is captured in two different ways. (a) The traditional method employed so far
is to compute correlation coefficients between 𝜐𝑖 and TFP. In the following, I strengthen
the finding by varying the observation level and control for agglomeration economies and
spatial sorting. (b) I analyze the the deviation between both qualities in a match and its
relation to wages. This approach is detailed in the next subsection.
Tables 2.3 and 2.2 are already suggestive of positive assortative matching. In order to
avoid biases due to the differing number of observations per match in the unbalanced
panel, correlations are recalculated at the level of firms and employer-employee pairs in
table 2.4. In the latter consideration, every match has the same weight and long-lasting
employment relations do not enter with greater weight in the calculation of the correlation.
At the employer-employee-level the value increases slightly to 0.10 and the correlation of
a firm’s TFP and the average worker effect of its employees in a given year is 0.17.
The next exercise verifies whether the observed PAM is merely due to sorting or co-location
of productive firms and workers in certain areas. The positive correlations between TFP,
𝜐𝑖 and employment density observed in table 2.2 and figure 2.1 give reason to presume
that sorting plays a role. Sorting of workers to places with high amenity levels may also
be an issue. Moreover, agglomeration economies lead to higher productivity and wage
levels, cf. Puga (2010). These externalities can be best captured at large in a black-box
manner by the local employment density. Finally, Van den Berg and Van Vuuren (2010)
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are concerned that an observed matching pattern might not necessarily be caused by PAM
but by variations in search frictions across markets.15 At the same time, the authors note
that employment density may be regarded as a reasonable approximation for the degree
of local search frictions. Thus, controlling for density and the price index takes all of
those concerns into account. Table 2.4 shows that the strength of matching falls to 0.06
at the employer-employee level and to 0.14 at the establishment level, after controlling for
the regional employment density and the price level. On the one hand, this demonstrates
that the spatial structure is indeed important and partly explains the observed positive
correlation. On the other hand, these factors still do not eliminate the observed positive
and significant allocation of high-quality workers to high-quality firms, even though the
correlations are rather small.
Table 2.4: Correlations of TFP
employer-employee level firm-year level
𝜐𝑖 0.1037 0.0761 0.0591 0.1698 0.1522 0.1475
log density 0.1323 0.0013 0.0544 0.0348
price index 0.1497 0.0139
Notes: The cells display correlation coefficients between worker and firm
quality at different observation levels. Simple correlations are shown in
column 1 and 4. The second and the fifth columns show partial correlation
coefficients between TFP and either worker quality or density, where the
respective other variable is controlled for. The same applies in in columns 3
and 6, where the local price index is additionally controlled for. The worker
FE 𝜐𝑖 are taken from model 1. The number of observations is 551,047 for the
employer-employee pairs and 14,676 at the firm-year level. All correlations
are significant below the 1% level.
2.4.2 Deviations from the optimal match
So far, we have looked at simple correlations whose absolute value is not straightforward
to interpret. Nor do the correlations tell whether the matching quality has an effect on
production efficiency or workers’ wages. Therefore, I implement the structural test of the
wage curve derived by Eeckhout and Kircher (2011). Section 2.3 explained why a given
worker’s wage exhibits an inverted U-shape in firm quality, having its maximum at the
optimal match. Under supermodularity, for which we have seen some evidence so far, the
optimal match is given when both qualities are equal. Because both the mass of worker
and firm qualities are centered around zero in the data, the deviation from the optimal
match can be defined as 𝑘𝑖𝑗 ≡ 𝜐𝑖 − 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑗 .16 In a frictionless labor market, all realized
matches should theoretically be perfect, i.e., 𝑘𝑖𝑗 = 0. It is unquestionably more realistic
to assume the existence of search frictions, whereby deviations from the optimal match
are also a possible equilibrium outcome. For the empirical identification of the bell-shaped
relation between wages and 𝑘𝑖𝑗 , these deviations are an essential requirement (Eeckhout
and Kircher 2011). Gautier and Teulings (2006) also derive a matching model with the
15 I will investigate this regional pattern further in subsection 2.4.3.
16 Instead of the deviation in absolute terms, one may consider the difference between the ranks of both
qualities in their distributions. As noted further below, this yields the same result.
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same prediction and provide a consistent structural estimation of its wage curve. They
focus on the distinction between a frictionless world and a labor market with search cost.
Another difference is that their proxies for the agents’ qualities are less indicative and do
not go beyond observable characteristics. Gautier and Teulings (2006) find a concave wage
curve, which is interpreted as evidence in favor of search frictions.
At first sight, one is tempted to estimate the effect of (𝜐𝑖 − 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑗) on 𝑤𝑖𝑗 ; however, a
difficulty arises from this regression. Unlike in the model, firms actually require more than
one worker for production. In a country-wide comparison Lazear and Shaw (2009: 41) find
that "most firms do reflect a subsample of many of the jobs done in the economy" and that
the wage dispersion within firms is similar to that of the whole economy. The problem
is that wages and especially qualities are not yet comparable across workers. Consider
that workers with a high salary, on average, have a high estimated 𝜐𝑖.
17 Consequently,
when a high-TFP firm hires a blue collar worker this would generally seem like a bad
match, whereas hiring a PhD graduate appears to be a good match. This disregards the
fact that there are still adherent differences between each type of worker. For example,
some PhD graduates are more productive, while some are less productive in their current
job. Therefore, once we decide to estimate the equation across all workers, one needs
comparable wage levels and worker qualities.
Education and occupation are the most obvious and important wage determinants and
quality indicators, cf. Ehrl (2014a). To overcome the qualities’ apparent lack of unified
measurement, I test the matching hypothesis within education-occupation groups. The
worker FE and the wage without the worker FE part are regressed on 6 education dummies,
20 occupation segments18, and a West and a gender indicator variable. The residuals in
these regressions are defined as the adjusted wage ?˜?𝑖 and adjusted quality 𝜐𝑖 that are used
in the following. The results of these regressions are omitted for brevity, but all coefficients
are highly significant and these variables explain about 53% and 30% of the variation in the
wage and in 𝜐𝑖, respectively. Three more indicator numbers document the necessity and
success of the transformations for the proper calculation of deviations from the optimal
match. On the one hand, the correlation coefficient between the adjusted worker quality
𝜐𝑖 and TFP remains unchanged at 0.10 and the correlation between 𝜐𝑖 and 𝜐𝑖 is 0.83. On
the other hand, the strong relation between the adjusted wage and 𝜐𝑖 shrinks to 0.09 from
originally 0.92. Hence, the relative order of 𝜐𝑖 is left almost unchanged, while only their
levels are now comparable among each other.
Now, the requirements are made to compute the deviation from the optimal match as
𝑘𝑖𝑗 ≡ 𝜐𝑖 − ¯𝑇𝐹𝑃 𝑖∈𝑗 and estimate its effect on ?˜?𝑖𝑗 .19 The significant negative third-order
17 Recall that 𝜐𝑖 is defined as a worker’s mean wage less the fitted values from eq. (3) and compare the
strong correlation between 𝜐𝑖 and 𝑤𝑖𝑡 in table 2.2.
18 The delineation of occupations into "segments" is developed by Matthes et al. (2008) to increase the
similarity of tasks and skill requirements within segments compared to the official 2-digit occupational
classes.
19 Note that 𝜐𝑖 is time invariant and that an estimation in the worker-year panel would give those
matches a higher weight that have more observations. Only changes in the TFP (for whatever reason)
change the assessment of the match and introduce noise. I prefer to estimate at the employer-employee
level and use the mean values ¯𝑇𝐹𝑃 𝑖∈𝑗 , i.e., the mean TFP while individual 𝑖 was employed in firm 𝑗.
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terms of 𝑘𝑖𝑗 in columns 1 and 2 of table 2.5 confirm the expected bell-shaped relationship.
A male and a West dummy in column 3 neither show any significant effect nor change
the coefficients of 𝑘𝑖𝑗 much. By adding the regional log density, unemployment rate, price
index and its square to the regression in column 4, the fit of the regression is raised, the
result does not change.20 When the computation of the deviation from the optimal match
is based on the rankings of the two qualities instead of the values of 𝜐𝑖 and 𝑇𝐹𝑃 , repeating
the regression in table 2.5 confirms the highly significant inverted U-shaped relationship.
Table 2.5: Wages and the deviation from the optimal match
[1] [2] [3] [4]
𝑘𝑖𝑗 0.0224 0.0285 0.0224 0.0134
(0.0102)** (0.0127)** (0.0102)** (0.0046)***
𝑘2𝑖𝑗 -0.0278 -0.0280 -0.0281 -0.0212
(0.0084)*** (0.0083)*** (0.0088)*** (0.0055)***
𝑘3𝑖𝑗 -0.0124 -0.0260 -0.0125 -0.0085
(0.0043)*** (0.0099)*** (0.0044)*** (0.0020)***
𝑘4𝑖𝑗 -0.0043
(0.0022)*
west -0.0013 -0.0220
(0.0066) (0.0070)***
male -0.0011 -0.0032
(0.0021) (0.0013)**
regional controls 7 7 7 3
constant 4.3595 4.3596 4.3614 -1.3401
(0.0033)*** (0.0033)*** (0.0053)*** (0.4222)***
𝑅2 0.0258 0.0276 0.0259 0.3317
F 4.21 3.60 2.87 46.87
N 551047 551047 551047 551047
Notes: The dependent variable is the adjusted log wage rate, as described in the
main text. Cluster-robust standard errors at the firm-level are in parentheses and
significance levels of 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 are denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively.
The shape of the relationship from column 1 is displayed non-parametrically in figure 2.2.21
For the range between -0.8 and 1, where more than 90% of all observations are located,
the scatter plot accords well with the theoretical predictions. The inverted U-relation
peaks close to zero, where the worker quality is exactly equal to the firm quality. Thus,
following the idea of Eeckhout and Kircher (2011), the data reveals that the education-
and occupation-independent part of the wage increases with the matching quality. This
reveals the positive efficiency effect in the production function that causes PAM. To give a
rough interpretation in monetary terms, the difference between the lower right end (4.32)
and the peak amounts to 3.5e per day. Hence, the average income loss in bad matches
Notwithstanding, both possibilities essentially produce almost the same results.
20 Using a cluster bootstrap with 500 replications virtually yields almost the same standard errors as in
table 2.5.
21 Due to privacy protection requirements and for the ease of graphical representation, I divided the
matching quality distribution into 1000 equally spaced segments. In each of these segments the mean
wage is represented by a dot in the graph. Segments with less than 150 observations are omitted, which
eliminates outliers at the margins of the distribution.
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compared to good matches is 4% of wage income. When subject to the regional controls,
the predicted curve in column 4 is flatter. It implies that the maximum income gain is
reduced to 2%. Once more, without the regional controls, the positive assortative matching
does not vanish but would instead be overestimated.
Figure 2.2: Wages and the deviation from the optimal match
Notes: The graph shows the mean adjusted log wage of individuals in 1000 equally spaced segments
of the distribution of 𝑘𝑖𝑗 and a locally weighted polynomial fit. Both are weighted by the number of
individuals that each segment represents.
2.4.3 The spatial pattern of matching
The previous subsection demonstrates that accurate matches have a positive effect on
production efficiency and wages. The consecutive question for policy makers is how such
favorable matches may possibly be stimulated? To this end, I examine regional differences
in the matching pattern. Marshall (1890) already noted that a larger market size yields
better expected matches between workers and firms and makes a location seem more at-
tractive. Wheeler (2001) integrates Marshall’s idea of labor market pooling in a matching
model, which is close to the one described in section 2.3, by assuming that search costs
decline with the size of the local labor market. However, only under certain conditions
does Wheeler’s model predict that larger regions imply a smaller tolerance range of ac-
ceptable matches and thus more efficient production, because two countervailing forces
are at work. Lower search costs induce firms to remain unmatched for a longer time and
search more carefully for an employee with a quality close to their own. On the other side,
the pool of potential partners is larger, which makes the search more complex. Using a
similar framework, Delacroix (2003) argues that differences in unemployment benefits may
be responsible for labor market pooling. These benefits also reduce the cost of waiting
to be matched, cause an intensified search and lead to better matches. An unpleasant
side effect in these formalizations is that better matching comes along with higher unem-
ployment rates in agglomerations. Unemployment benefits or other possible reasons that
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induce workers to search more carefully are unobservable in my data. Therefore, the local
unemployment rate is used as a proxy for these mechanisms.
These predictions are jointly tested using both matching indicators derived above. To this
end, I compute (a) regional correlation coefficients between 𝜐𝑖 and TFP; and (b) the average
deviation between both quality measures in a county (German NUTS-3 regions). These
matching indicators are then regressed on the local unemployment rate, the employment
density and its square in order to account for the countervailing forces described previously.
The results are shown in table 2.6, where all estimations are weighted by the number of
employees in each county. Column one suggests that better matches are obtained where
the unemployment rate is high. However, this observation vanishes once general differences
between East and West German counties are controlled for. Both the unemployment rates
and employment densities are quite different between both parts of Germany, cf. the
last column in table 2.2. Instead, the data reveals that there is a slightly significant and
non-linear effect of density. In column three, the matching quality is computed with the
unadjusted worker fixed effect, but it essentially yields the same results. The significance
of employment density and its square suggest that matching works best in medium-dense
counties, because the peak of the implied matching quality curve lies roughly in the middle
of the density distribution, at about 148 employees per square kilometer.22 In line with
Wheeler (2001), it seems that it is difficult for firms to obtain the most suitable staff, once
the local labor market is too crowded and the choice becomes too complex. Up to a certain
point, however, the firms benefit from a larger pool of potential candidates.
In column four, where the matching quality is captured by the deviation from the optimal
match, I use the absolute value of 𝑘𝑖𝑗 as dependent variable. Because the best match
corresponds to 𝑘𝑖𝑗 = 0, no matter if the relation between 𝑘𝑖𝑗 and density is positive or
negative, the curve would be described by an implicit function.23 Estimation with
⃒⃒⃒
𝑘𝑖𝑗
⃒⃒⃒
,
the matching quality exhibits a U-shaped form in density, where the minimum is in the
middle of the density distribution. Moreover, the matching quality is unrelated to the
unemployment rate. It is thus reassuring that both matching indicators produce the same
finding.
A potential concern is that some values of the matching indicator may be based on few
firms.24 To check the robustness of the finding, I exclude county-years with less than 30 ob-
servations and obtain essentially the same result. Second, the spatial delineation of region
is based on arbitrary political boundaries and may generally distort the findings (Briant
et al. 2010). Therefore, the analysis is repeated with correlation coefficients computed at
the level of larger labor market regions. It turns out that the significance of the coefficients
in table 2.6 are not robust to a reconsideration at the labor market regions. In line, previ-
ous studies find diverging results as well. Andersson et al. (2007) show that the correlation
between worker and firm effects strictly increases in the region’s density. Contrary, Mion
22 Density is defined as the number of employees per square kilometer. Densities of German counties
varies between 7 in Mecklenburg-Strelitz and 2200 in Munich.
23 This can be easily seen by rotating figure 2.2 and substituting density for the wage on the axis.
24 Indeed, not all of the counties are included because the calculation of the correlation coefficients
requires two or more firms per county.
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and Naticchioni (2009) report for Italian provinces that the extent of matching decreases
in density. Summing up, the matching quality can only be predicted to a small extent by
the local employment and unemployment densities in Germany.
Table 2.6: The spatial pattern of matching
dependent variable 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟 (?˜?𝑖, 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑗𝑡)𝑘𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟 (𝑢𝑖, 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑗𝑡)𝑘𝑡
⃒⃒⃒(︁
𝑘𝑖𝑗
)︁
𝑘𝑡
⃒⃒⃒
log density 0.1364 0.1496 0.1846 -0.1415
(0.0910) (0.0863)* (0.0841)** (0.0643)**
(log density)2 -0.0137 -0.0147 -0.0177 0.0144
(0.0087) (0.0084)* (0.0081)** (0.0066)**
unemployment 0.0052 0.0016 0.0015 -0.0011
(0.0021)** (0.0042) (0.0041) (0.0018)
west -0.0551 -0.0586 -0.0359
(0.0527) (0.0510) (0.0207)*
constant -0.3155 -0.2708 -0.3607 0.6189
(0.2289) (0.2385) (0.2354) (0.1588)***
𝑅2 0.0186 0.0229 0.0269 0.0887
F 2.18 2.16 2.70 5.33
N 2244 2244 2244 3002
Notes: The aggregation level of all variables is county-years. The dependent variable in
column 1 is the correlation coefficient between the (unadjusted) worker quality and the
employer’s TFP in each county 𝑘. The dependent variable in columns 2 and 3 uses the
adjusted worker quality instead. In the last column, the dependent variable is computed as
the average deviation between workers’ and firms’ qualities in each county. Estimations are
weighted by the number of workers in 𝑘 and standard errors in parentheses are clustered
at the county-level. Significance levels of 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 are denoted by *, ** and ***,
respectively.
2.4.4 Robustness
Beyond the re-aggregation of spatial units from counties to labor market regions and the
disposition of two different matching measures, I provide four more robustness checks. One
potential concern may be that this study includes manufacturing and non-manufacturing
industries.25 In the latter sectors, the matching, wage setting and the production functions
and the productivities might be different and non-comparable. Recall that the production
function and hence also the TFP are already estimated sector-specifically due to this
concern. Nevertheless, I repeat the entire analysis with manufacturing industries only.
Another reason for caution are the traditionally quite powerful labor unions in Germany.
The industry-specific and nationwide valid agreements regulate, among others, the wage
and the right of cancellation. A possible consequence of the collective bargaining is that
workers’ remuneration may not accurately reflect their productivity and, in turn, their
quality. However, the collective agreement coverage only applies for union members and
upward deviations of the wage are allowed. Despite declining union membership rates
over the last few decades, coverage in the data set is still quite large. About 70% of
workers are employed in an establishment which is covered by an industry-wide collective
25 The non-manufacturing industries are the construction, trade and food-service industry.
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agreement. Another 9% work for an establishment which reports that it orients itself by
these agreements. It will thus be interesting to verify whether the participation of a firm
has implications for the calculation of the matching pattern and its strength. To this end, I
split the sample into plants with and without collective agreements or orientation on these
agreements. Finally, I repeat the entire analysis using a different imputation procedure to
recover top-coded wages, as described in footnote 7. To refine the procedure, I estimate
the censored regression for all different combinations of years, education groups, gender
and East/West separately. One the one hand, this potentially yields a better fit of the
predicted wages from the censored regression. On the other hand, it allows for different
variances in the 216 distinct groups.
The results of these four robustness checks are provided in tables 2.7 and 2.8. For the
sake of brevity, I will not include all repetitions of the prior results, but show only the
most important findings. The (partial) correlation coefficients in table 2.7 are positive
throughout and have a similar dimension to those before. At the level of employer-employee
pairs, some differences to the baseline result emerge for the splitted sample of firms with
and without collective agreements. However, the calculation of these correlations at the
firm level shows little deviation between the three samples and from the prior number.
Because the correlation in the sample of firms without collective agreements at the firm
level is higher and at the other observation level it is lower than in the remaining part of
the sample in panel 3, it is not possible to judge whether the coverage disguises workers’
true productivities or disturbs the matching mechanism.
Table 2.7: Correlations of TFP
employer-employee level firm-year level
panel 1: manufacturing industries only
𝜐𝑖 0.0965 0.0887 0.1559 0.1335
log density 0.0272 0.0341
panel 2: firms without collective agreements
𝜐𝑖 0.0409 0.0320 0.1857 0.1667
log density 0.0274 0.0326
panel 3: only firms with collective agreements
𝜐𝑖 0.1232 0.0973 0.1724 0.1561
log density 0.1351 0.0626
panel 4: different wage imputation
𝜐𝑖 0.099 0.0730 0.1699 0.1523
log density 0.1335 0.0544
Notes: The cells display (partial) correlation coefficients between
worker and firm quality at different observation levels, analog to
table 2.4. All correlations are significant below the 1% level.
Table 2.8 demonstrates that the wage curve still exhibits a bell-shape in the deviation of
the optimal match in all of the four subsamples due to the significant third order term of
𝑘𝑖𝑗 . In fact, the curvature of these estimated lines looks very similar to the one plotted in
figure 2.2. Both results point out that even establishments covered by collective agreements
are able to chose workers according to their own TFP and remunerate them according to
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each worker’s own productivity, as is the case in firms without collective agreements. The
type of wage imputation procedure is also not decisive for the results. Thus far, the
four modifications have corroborated the baseline results. The observed matching pattern
in Germany is positive assortative, and a higher concordance of employer and employee
quality in a match is accompanied by higher wages.
Table 2.8: Wages and the deviation from the optimal match
[1] [2] [3] [4]
𝑘𝑖𝑗 0.0165 0.0222 0.0101 0.0144
(0.0058)*** (0.0108)** (0.0034)*** (0.0047)***
𝑘2𝑖𝑗 -0.0182 -0.0137 -0.0229 -0.0216
(0.0067)*** (0.0103) (0.0055)*** (0.0056)***
𝑘3𝑖𝑗 -0.0096 -0.0110 -0.0083 -0.0087
(0.0047)** (0.0043)*** (0.0019)*** (0.0020)***
west -0.0212 -0.0214 -0.0278 -0.0274
(0.0072)*** (0.0123)* (0.0060)*** (0.0070)***
male -0.0021 -0.0010 -0.0035 -0.0027
(0.0013) (0.0024) (0.0013)*** (0.0013)**
regional controls 3 3 3 3
constant -1.4519 -2.1477 -0.9926 -0.6060
(0.5031)*** (0.5458)*** (0.3600)*** (0.4260)
𝑅2 0.2509 0.3297 0.3591 0.2578
F 49.88 53.27 48.74 35.45
N 386,378 163,996 469,498 551,047
Notes: The dependent variable is the adjusted log wage rate, as described in the main
text. The observation level is employer-employee pairs. Cluster-robust standard errors
at the firm-level are in parentheses and significance levels of 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 are
denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. The number of each column correspond to the
four robustness checks as defined in the four panels of table 2.7.
Finally, I re-estimate the regressions in table 2.6 to assess the spatial matching pattern in
the four subsamples. Like in subsection 2.4.3, the results do not prove robust. For both
matching indicators, the unemployment rate is insignificant and the coefficients indicate
that there is a non-linear relation in density, as before. However, only in four of the eight
regressions is the significance of the quadratic density term significant below the 10% level.
2.5 Conclusion
The present study provides robust evidence of positive assortative matching (PAM) in the
German labor market. The matching pattern is detected by two different methodologies.
On the one hand, the correlation between worker and firm quality is positive in the entire
economy. On the other hand, I follow the theoretical instructions in Eeckhout and Kircher
(2011) and consider the outcome of single matches. If qualities are complements in the
production function, the wage of a given workers exhibits an inverted U-shape in the
quality of the employer, having its maximum when both qualities are equal. Because the
wage level is not determined by the firm’s quality but by the quality of the match, the
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frequently used firm fixed effects are not a reliable quality measure. The present paper
circumvents this problem by using TFP as a direct measure for firm quality. Nevertheless,
worker fixed effects capture the labor market value of unobservable adherent skills. Using
these two quality measures, the observed wage curve provides a compelling case in favor of
PAM. This implies complementarities in the production function and efficiency gains when
quality levels are close to each other. A comparison shows that TFP is almost unrelated
to the value of firm fixed effects and that the latter depend mainly on the size of the data
set.
The paper also demonstrates that it is important to control for agglomeration economies
and sorting of skilled agents to densely populated regions. Both are present in the data
and without their consideration, the strength of matching is overestimated. The upper
bound of wage gains in matches where quality levels are equal is then estimated at 2%,
instead of 4%. Taking further advantage of the regional view, I examine if labor market
pooling improves the accuracy of matches. In addition to the higher employment density,
other possible reasons for lower search costs also imply an increasing local unemployment
rate. In the present data, however, both variables can only predict regional differences
in matching outcomes to a small extent. Both matching quality indicators show some
evidence that matching works best in medium-density counties and indicate no significant
relation to the local unemployment rate
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Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 TFP estimation
This section explains how total factor productivity (TFP), the preferred measure of firm
quality, is estimated. It is common to assume a Cobb-Douglas production technology
which, in its logarithmic form, reads
𝑦𝑗𝑡 = 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑡 + 𝜁𝑧𝑗𝑡 + 𝑢𝑗𝑡 (1)
where 𝑦𝑗𝑡 is the output of plant 𝑗 in period 𝑡, 𝛼𝑘, 𝛼𝑙, 𝛼𝑚 are its inputs of capital, labor and
material inputs, respectively. 𝑧𝑗𝑡 represents some additional controls and 𝑢𝑗𝑡 is the error
term. I control for the establishments share of high skilled workers, the number of hours
worked per week, year dummies, a dummy for plants in West Germany and whether it is
covered by a collective agreement. The empirical realization suffers from not having the
output, as in most data sets. It is usual to proxy output by the plant’s revenues, which
requires the assumption of isomorphic price setting behavior.1 Another problem is that
no information about the capital stock is given in the LIAB data. It is constructed by the
use of the perpetual inventory method from plants investments, prevalent with this data,
cf. Addison et al. (2006). A modified version of the standard perpetual inventory method
according to Müller (2008) is applied here.2 To overcome the endogeneity of the input
factors, Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) propose an estimation method, where the unobserved
productivity in eq. (1) is proxied by a polynomial in the intermediate input usage. The
idea is that as input use depends on the current productivity level and the capital stock,
the inversion of this function, 𝑚𝑗𝑡(𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑗𝑡, 𝑘𝑗𝑡), allows leaving the unobserved 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑗𝑡 and
thereby the endogeneity problem out of the equation. Because the polynomial generates
multicollinearity with the primary capital and intermediates input, their identification is
prevented in the first stage of the estimation. Consequently, 𝛼𝑘 and 𝛼𝑚 are identified
from the estimated polynomial in a second stage. The exact transformation and reasoning
is more complex and the reader is therefore referred to Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).
Estimation departs from the authors’ approach, in that all variables are interacted with
sector dummies. Consequently, the production function is sector-specific and thus far more
accurate than assuming a single production function for all establishments. Note that the
production function is estimated from all plants with complete information in the data
and not only those that are included in the LIAB sample. Furthermore, I use the weights
provided in the establishment panel to make the TFP estimates representative for the entire
population. The exact coefficient estimates are of minor importance here, but are available
upon request from the author. After obtaining all coefficients, TFP is residually computed
and normalized to have a mean of zero in each sector. That is, the TFP represents the
deviation from the average productive establishment in a sector.
1 See Ehrl (2013) for a data demanding but more accurate approach to remedy this possible price bias.
2 This method differs in the construction of the starting value for the perpetual inventory method.
The starting value is calculated as the time-mean of replacement investments divided by a sector-specific
depreciation rate.
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3.1 Introduction
A marked increase in wage inequality has been observed in Germany, the US and other
industrialized countries over the past 30 years, regardless of whether wage inequality is
measured as the dispersion of wages, the skill premium, etc. (Acemoglu and Autor 2011;
Berman et al. 1998; Dustmann et al. 2009; Juhn et al. 1993; Lindley and Machin 2013;
Van Reenen 2011). Three reasons for changes at the bottom of the wage distribution are
identified: positive supply shocks of low-skilled workers, a decrease of the minimum wage
and declines in unionization. However, most of the rising inequality could not be explained,
i.e., had to be attributed to the residual wage. The residual wage is defined as the wage
after controlling for the observable variables in the study, which typically do not go beyond
a subset of education, age, tenure, gender and industry-specific variables. All of the above
cited papers conclude that the large and increasing amount of residual wage inequality
is due to skill-biased technical change (SBTC). Lemieux (2006) criticizes this assessment
because residual wage growth may either be caused by returns to unobservable skills, their
composition in the labor force or measurement error. Above all, Lemieux (2006) finds
support that US wage inequality increased mainly due to changes in composition. Autor
et al. (2008) relativize his result by noting that aggregate inequality measures disguised
a polarization of the wage distribution. These gains in the upper and lower part of the
wage distribution relative to the middle are consistent with a "richer version" of SBTC.
The advancing information technology requires and complements abstract tasks, which are
found especially in high-wage occupations, whereas it substitutes routine tasks that are
more present in occupations in the middle of the wage distribution.
The present paper provides an overview and a distinction of the scope of several wage de-
terminants that are considered separately in other recent studies on inequality. In contrast
to prior studies, I additionally relate worker’s unobservable adherent skills to occupational
attributes which are useful in examining prior conclusions about SBTC more precisely.
Consequently, my definition of residual wages is much more narrow than in earlier studies,
so that explainable wage determinants instead of residual wages are in the center of at-
tention here. In addition, most of those papers concern US wages, so in a sense, I extend
the well-known study by Dustmann et al. (2009) to explain the rise in Germany’s wage
inequality between 1993 and 2010 using more wage determinants, more recent data that
covers East and West Germany.1 Aside from individual characteristics, I include diverging
returns in cities of different size (Baum-Snow and Pavan 2013), the regional price level
(Moretti 2013) and the matching between employer and employees (Card et al. 2013).2
1 Wage inequality is also an interesting object of study because Biewen and Juhasz (2012) show that
labor income is the main driver of the overall income inequality, leaving only a smaller role to changes in
household characteristics or in the tax and transfer system.
2 While the Stolper-Samuelson framework and its rigid distinction between high- and low-skilled workers
have received little support concerning the labor market trends over the past 20 years, more recent tests
of heterogeneous firm models and offshoring have. Helpman et al. (2014) structurally estimate a version of
Melitz (2003) with search frictions that provides a link between the residual wage between firms and firm
size, exporter status and assortative matching. Another trade related channel that recently received great
attention is import and export exposure. Autor et al. (2013) demonstrate that final goods imports from
China have adverse wage effects on workers in competing domestic industries. The analysis in Dauth et al.
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Building on Juhn et al. (1993) and Morduch and Sicular (2002), I apply regression-based
decompositions that allow side-by-side comparisons of the impact of the various wage
components. Both papers focus on percentile ratios and the variance, whereas I extend their
approach to the entire distribution of wages. The idea is very simple. I estimate a reduced
form wage regression that encompasses the wage determinants mentioned above. Due to
the additive linearity of the regression, aggregate inequality indices, as well as the entire
wage distribution, can be decomposed exactly into these different wage components. The
share that each component adds to the wage inequality measure is interpreted as its impact.
The approach is flexible enough to incorporate two more sub-decompositions: a distinction
of the wage dispersion between and within regions, and a distinction between changes in
the composition of wage determinants and changes in their returns. Yet, decomposition
methods generally fail to include any general equilibrium effects.
Figure 3.1 presents the core facts about the development of the German (inflation-adjusted)
wage distribution from two different points of view. Panel (a) shows the change in log wage
along its distribution, separately for the periods 1995–2001 and 2001–2007. Inequality
increases in both periods but the divergence of labor incomes within the period of 12 years
is impressive. Individuals at the bottom of the distribution lose up to 15%, while workers
at the top gain up to 20%. Panel (b) shows the development of the 80𝑡ℎ, 50𝑡ℎ and 20𝑡ℎ
percentile of the wage distribution within regions. The divergence of the mean of the
regions’ 80𝑡ℎ and 20𝑡ℎ percentiles reflect the increase in inequality. However, the spread of
the confidence intervals around these means is more or less constant. Both graphs already
preview some important results and indicate that the development of the German labor
market is essentially different from the one in the US. First, there is no wage polarization
in Germany because workers with the lowest wages do not gain with respect to workers
in the middle of the distribution. Second, the dispersion of wages between regions is quite
constant over time. Consequentially, the rise in inequality comes entirely from changes
within regions.
Another key result is that the wage determinants considered in this paper explain about
75% of the total wage change. This is remarkable given that most preceding studies con-
clude that the distribution of residual wages essentially resembles that of raw wages. These
observable factors include education, age, tenure, plant size, dummies for regions of differ-
ent size, the interaction of these agglomeration indicators with the former characteristics,
a regional price index, industrial affiliation and dummies for 341 different occupations. In
contrast to Lemieux (2006), I find that changes in the composition of these characteristics
play a minor role compared to changes in their returns. In the following, I discuss these
wage determinants separately and compare my findings to the previous literature.
The most important contribution to the development of wages comes from occupations.
Returns in technical and business jobs grow in particular, even though their supply in-
creases as well. These occupations involve a large amount of analytical and interactive
skills (Autor et al. 2003; Spitz-Oener 2006), which confirms that the rise in wage inequal-
(2014) suggests that once export opportunities are considered as well, these adverse effects may be offset.
Unfortunately, data constraints do not allow the inclusion trade related variables in a satisfactory way.
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Figure 3.1: The development of wage inequality in Germany
(a) Distribution of changes in log wages between
1995–2001 and between 2001–2007
(b) Wage percentiles in labor market regions
Notes: Both graphs are constructed using the SIAB data set and its imputed wages, as described in
section 3.2. The left graph displays the change in log wages in each percentile (between the 4𝑡ℎ and
the 96𝑡ℎ). The construction of the right graph uses the 80𝑡ℎ, 50𝑡ℎ and 20𝑡ℎ percentile in each labor
market region. These labor market regions are a combination of counties, as described in Eckey et al.
(2006). The solid lines show the mean of each of the three percentiles across all labor market regions
and the dashed lines mark confidence intervals around these mean values.
ity is indeed consistent with SBTC. The difference is, that this conclusion is no longer based
on unobserved factors. Notwithstanding, a nuanced view of SBTC – as articulated in Autor
et al. (2008) – is required because highly educated workers do not benefit across-the-board.
The fact that Germany does not experience a polarization of wages similar to the US rests
on several factors that depress wages in the bottom of the distribution. I identify that
these workers are on average younger, work in smaller firms and are more likely to have an
unemployment record. The returns to these characteristics fall over time. Furthermore,
low-wage workers in the service and construction sector continuously lose in real terms.3
Wage declines in the lower third of the German wage distribution over the 1990s are already
well documented in Dustmann et al. (2009). The sources identified in their paper, namely,
the increased supply of low-skilled workers and the decline in unionization, complement my
findings.4 However, they apply a different econometric approach where only one variable of
interest is changed to simulate counterfactual wage distributions. Moreover, only education
and age are controlled for, so that again the main part of the changes in the upper part of
the wage distribution is embodied in the residual wage.
The link between wage inequality and remuneration differences across employers and re-
gions have received much less attention. In my regression-based approach, I identify wage
premiums for observably equivalent workers in larger firms, in large cities, diverging returns
to observable characteristics across regions, and wage compensations due to cost of living
disparities. All of these spatial disparities account for only 13% of the wage dispersion
3 Another possible reason for the polarization of wages and employment is offshoring. Like SBTC, the
relocation of production particularly substitutes workers with routine tasks in manufacturing industries,
whereas the tasks of managers are more required (Acemoglu and Autor 2011). Empirical evidence for the
associated wage effects is found in the US by Ebenstein et al. (2014) as well as in Germany by Baumgarten
et al. (2013).
4 Glitz (2012) documents that after the fall of the Iron Curtain almost 3 million ethnic Germans
migrated to Germany.
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between regions and also add little explanation of wage changes. My approach reveals
that the effective wage compensations for higher costs of living are only 20%. Note the
conceptual difference to Moretti (2013) who deflates wages with a regional price index and
finds that the resulting differences in well-being are less pronounced than nominal wage
differences.5 Furthermore, even though productive workers and firms are sorted into large
regions and even though the share of skilled workers and their wage premium grows over
time, the growth of inequality is evenly spread across regions, as anticipated in figure 3.1.
That is, the degree of regional sorting does not intensify. In contrast, the employment
share and premium for high-skilled workers increase substantially between regions in the
US.6 The associated expansion of low-skilled (service) jobs in these regions also contributes
to the observed labor market polarization (Lindley and Machin 2014).
Regarding the matching pattern, I find that high-wage workers are employed in large firms.
At the same time, these plants pay a wage premium to all workers. The fact that this firm-
specific remuneration differential is growing significantly over time explains about 6% of
the change in the total wage gap and up to 7% of the total wage dispersion. Again, it
proves insightful to separate between the change in the allocation of workers to firms and
the change in the wage premium. It becomes apparent that the firm-specific part of the
increase in inequality is almost entirely due to changes in the return to firm size. It fits the
picture that the pattern of assortative matching has no particular relation to the size of
the region (Ehrl 2014b), whereas a positive relation is found in the US by Andersson et al.
(2007). Lehmer and Möller (2010) also stress the importance of the firm size premium in
explaining the rural-urban wage gap in Germany. Their approach involves following cohorts
of workers, but still unobservable differences account for more than one half of the wage
gap. Helpman et al. (2014) separate the industry and occupation specific part of the wage
dispersion from a firm-specific part. The former is about 30% and thus comparable to my
results, while the latter is about 3 times larger than what I capture by firm size. They then
show that a heterogeneous firm model that includes exporters and assortative matching
provides a good fit to the firm-specific part of the wages in Brazilian data. This study is
static and does not consider the change in wage inequality. It is also not comparable to my
paper because the model as a whole is evaluated, not its separate components. Goos et al.
(2014) provide a rare attempt to compare the effects of offshoring and SBTC. They find
that, for a number of European countries, SBTC has much larger effects on employment
and presumably also on wages. Card et al. (2013) analyze the German matching pattern
but focus on the impact of unobservables captured by worker and firm fixed effects. The
dispersion captured by both dummies rises and their assortative matching with each other
also contributes to wage inequality.
5 In a related study, Blien et al. (2009) analyze the German rural-urban wage gap using a regression
approach. However, they rely on imputed regional price indices, for which they report a much larger
explanatory power.
6 Although Baum-Snow and Pavan (2013) observe that inequality growth is correlated with the size
of the city, sorting of workers with high observable and unobservable skills into large cities does not
attenuate, in line with my findings. Lindley and Machin (2014) stress that the inequality growth between
regions is demand-induced and that it is not particularly concentrated in large cities but in regions where
computerization and R&D is higher. These are regions that were high-skill abundant before.
A breakdown of residual wage inequality in Germany 63
The remainder of the paper is composed of three parts. Section 2 describes the data.
Section 3 discusses various different decomposition methods, their application and results.
I begin with the estimation of the basic wage regression, then discuss simple aggregate
inequality decompositions and finally analyze changes along the wage distribution. Section
4 concludes the paper.
3.2 Data
This study uses the SIAB (Sample of Integrated Labour Market Biographies) provided by
the Research Data Center of the German Federal Employment Agency. The SIAB is a 2%
random sample of all employees subject to social security in Germany. It is an administra-
tive dataset which is based on mandatory annual reports to the social security agencies,
thus the sample is representative, large and highly reliable. Another advantage is that it
provides comprehensive information about the workers as well as some characteristics of
the employer, such as its size, the sector and the location of the plant. For a detailed
description of this data set, see vom Berge et al. (2013). A prior version of this data is
used in the well-known study on wage inequality by Dustmann et al. (2009).
I constrain the sample on full-time employment relations of men at a specific day in each
year between 1993 and 2010. Beginning in 1993 allows the inclusion of workers in East and
West Germany. I focus on June 30𝑡ℎ because the firm-level information is valid only for
this day. This also avoids problems associated with wage calculations if a person does not
have the same job throughout the year. Unfortunately, top-coding of wages is a common
problem with the German administrative data. Such top-coded wages are imputed using
the predictions of a censored regression model, similar to Dustmann et al. (2009) and Card
et al. (2013). These imputed daily wages are then deflated by the national CPI. For details
about the imputation procedure, sample selection, the description of further variables and
summary statistics, see the data Appendix.
Additional information about local prices and employment densities from the Institute for
Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Development (BBSR) is used. The BBSR
distinguishes nine different county types according to the county’s population density, size
and centrality. I aggregate these county types into six categories to control for different
wage levels and returns in counties of different size and density. The classification also
considers whether counties are close to agglomerations, to account for the spatial diffusion
of agglomeration economies beyond administrative borders. An overview of these county
types and their distribution is provided in the following figure.
The BBSR surveyed a total of 7.3 million single commodity and housing prices at the level
of counties between 2006 and 2008 to compute comprehensive and representative local
price indices. Its computation uses the weighting scheme and basket as the national CPI,
cf. Kawka et al. (2009) for the details. Housing costs account for 20% of the price index
and comprise rents as well as the rental value of owned housing. The inclusion of housing
costs is important for the accuracy of the approach and both measures are preferable over
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Figure 3.2: County types in a map of Germany
Notes: The figure is taken from the BBSR and has been modified slightly to aggregate the counties to
six different types. Agglomerations have more than 300.000 inhabitants. Dense counties are specified
to have a density of more than 300 inhabitants per square kilometer. Core cities have between 300.000
and 100.000 inhabitants. Medium-dense counties have a density of more than 150 inhabitants per
square kilometer. Rural regions are less dense than 150 inhabitants per km2 and are not close to any
agglomeration.
housing values (Winters 2009). This is the first and only survey of regional prices that
covers all counties in Germany. Because the BBSR provides only one value of the price
index per county, which is valid for the years 2006 to 2008, an implicit assumption for
its application in the following panel regression is that price level differences are constant
throughout the entire period of this study. However, the results are not sensitive to the
inclusion of these local price indices.
3.3 Decomposition methods and their application
The aim of the empirical analysis is to evaluate the impact of separate wage determinants.
In a first step, a wage regression provides estimates for the effects of the components. A
component effect is defined by the value of the variable Xmultiplied by its coefficient 𝛽, e.g.,
𝛽X. The same way that all component effects add up to the wage in the linear regression
equation, I will decompose the value of wage inequality measures into shares that add
up exactly and reflect the importance of each component. The remainder of this section
describes different decomposition methods and their empirical results. A short overview of
the applied decomposition methods is given in subsection 3.3.2. Subsection 3.3.3 uses the
variance to measure inequality, 3.3.5 consider the Gini index, the Theil index and percentile
ratios. Subsection 3.3.4 additionally examines the share of inequality between and within
regions and how much the different wage determinants contribute to these two dimensions
of inequality. Afterward, the decomposition is performed separately for each percentile
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of the wage distribution. Subsection 3.3.7 further separates the component effects into
changes in returns and changes in the composition of workers’ characteristics. I begin by
describing the rationale for the inclusion of each of the wage determinants.
3.3.1 The basic wage regression
All decompositions in the present paper build on the separability of the wage in additive
components, that are identified from the wage regression described by
𝑤𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0+𝛽𝑥𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑧𝑍𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽𝑤𝑊𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑘𝑡 + 𝑊𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑘𝑡 · [𝛽𝑥𝑤𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑧𝑤𝑍𝑗𝑡] + 𝛽𝑠𝐷𝑠
+𝛽𝑘𝐷𝑘 + 𝛽𝑝𝑃𝑖𝑘 + 𝐷𝑘 · [𝛽𝑥𝑘𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑧𝑘𝑍𝑗𝑡] + 𝛽𝑡𝐷𝑡 + 𝜐𝑖𝐷𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (1)
where 𝑤𝑖𝑡 is the deflated imputed daily log wage of individual 𝑖 in year 𝑡. Additionally,
a worker 𝑖 is characterized by three more dimensions: sector 𝑠 and county 𝑘, where her
employer 𝑗 is located. Each capital letter in eq. (1) aggregates important determinants of
the individual wage rate which are described and justified in the following. Most obvious
and common are the personal characteristics included in 𝑋𝑖𝑡. Education, tenure and age
determine productivity and are thus the benchmark for the workers’s wage level. I distin-
guish between low, medium and high educational achievements and include the square of
both tenure and age because productivity may eventually decrease before retirement.
The remuneration of workers across firms may differ for several reasons, some of which
are linked to the firm’s productivity and production function, and others stem from orga-
nizational, institutional or working conditions (Brown and Medoff 1989). In the absence
of detailed plant-level data, size is a reasonable indicator for productivity (Idson and Oi
1999). The shares of low- and high-skilled workers provide an approximation to the firm’s
production function (Haltiwanger et al. 1999). Both shares, the employer’s size and its
square are denoted by 𝑍𝑗𝑡. Differences in wage levels and in the compensation of charac-
teristics between East and West Germany, are captured by a West indicator variable and
its interaction with 𝑋𝑖𝑡 and 𝑍𝑗𝑡. Additional dummies for having experienced a period of
unemployment or having completed an apprenticeship are also included in eq. (1).7 Those
workers are likely to have a lower productivity and accept lower wage offers to (re-)enter
the labor market (Mortensen 1987).
Sizable inter-industry wage differentials exist but can only be partly explained by different
working conditions or the sorting of skilled workers (Krueger and Summers 1988). Overall
differences between the 59 sectors and 18 years are captured by the dummies in 𝐷𝑠 and 𝐷𝑡,
respectively. Because Gibbons and Katz (1992) note that the size of the firm or the sectoral
classification alone are incapable of explaining large wage differentials, it is informative to
compare the predicting power of all these and other characteristics side-by-side.
In the spatial dimension, wages differ due to agglomeration externalities, amenities and
living costs. From a theoretical point of view, only nominal wages may differ because in a
7 These variables are only included in 𝑋𝑖𝑡 but not in the interaction terms of 𝑋𝑖𝑡 due to a low variation
of these indicators.
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spatial equilibrium without migration barriers utility levels are equal, cf. Roback (1982).
Amenities such as a beautiful surrounding area or a pleasant climate attract people but
populated regions are themselves more attractive because resident firms and workers are
more productive, and thus better remunerated.8 The balance is restored by the cost of
living, principally through the housing market, see Kosfeld and Eckey (2010) and Suedekum
(2006) for empirical and theoretical evidence. Elevated living costs raise local service prices
and wages even for workers who do not directly benefit from agglomeration advantages.
The local price and housing cost index (𝑃𝑖𝑘) captures how workers are compensated for the
cost of living. Note that I do not deflate wages directly because this paper evaluates wage
determinants instead of utility differences as in Moretti (2013).9 Remaining differences in
amenities, agglomeration benefits (that accrue to all workers) and any other constant wage
disparities in regions of different size are captured by county type dummies 𝐷𝑘, as defined
in section 3.2 and shown in figure 3.2.10 Agglomeration economies that benefit a specific
skill group or groups of firms are captured via the interaction terms 𝐷𝑘 [𝛽𝑥𝑘𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑧𝑘𝑍𝑗𝑡].
Finally, the term 𝜐𝑖𝐷𝑖 captures all time-invariant worker-specific wage differences after
controlling for all other observable characteristics in the regression. These unobservable
differences are commonly attributed to adherent skills. There is no reason to believe that
unobserved skills are uncorrelated with the individuals’ education or with the quality of
her employer and region by means of sorting. Consequently, those variables’ coefficients
and explanatory power are likely to be biased when unobservable skills are not controlled
for by 𝐷𝑖. On the other hand, these adherent differences become part of the wage residual,
on which conclusions about the SBTC have largely been based. In contrast, I exploit the
panel dimension and include worker fixed effects 𝐷𝑖. At the same time, these dummies
act as a placeholder in eq. (1), and thus other time-invariant determinants of the wage
may be extracted from them. To do so, the estimated 𝜐𝑖 are regressed on occupation and
German citizenship dummies. Occupations represent adherent abilities that distinguish
workers from each other. An engineer, for example, acquires good analytical and technical
skills through his academic studies and professional experience, and such skills are highly
demanded in a number of industries. Therefore, in this approach, occupations serve to
visualize part of the unobserved skills of workers. The share of 𝜐𝑖 in the total wage
dispersion is typically about 60%, cf. e.g. Combes et al. (2008). At least the occupational
choice explains about 36% thereof. This explained part is denoted by 𝜐𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑙 and the residual
in this second stage regression is 𝜐𝑟𝑒𝑠. Note that these occupation dummies only capture
average differences in labor market valued skills between occupations, but this is exactly the
8 A multitude of different agglomeration externalities are suggested in the literature, see e.g. the survey
in Puga (2010). Ehrl (2013) and Baldwin et al. (2010) find evidence that the positive productivity effects
are mainly transmitted via the labor market.
9 Dividing wages by the local price index is equivalent to constraining the coefficient of 𝑃𝑖𝑘 to 1 and
implies that workers are fully monetarily compensated for higher living costs. It turns out that this is far
from reality.
10 Even with county fixed effects, the total explanatory power of the wage regression improves only
slightly. Estimation with fixed effects for all counties is problematic in the presence of worker fixed
effects because the former are identified only from the within variation of individuals. Constrained by
computational power and the number of movers between counties, the interaction terms 𝐷𝑘𝑋𝑖𝑡 and 𝐷𝑘𝑍𝑗𝑡
would need to be abandoned.
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intention. Other time-variant and personal abilities acquired through on the job training,
etc., are part of the wage residual that is defined in this study as 𝜉 = 𝜐𝑟𝑒𝑠 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡.
The estimation of eq. (1) is performed separately for three different periods: 1993–1998,
1999–2004, 2005–2010. It is an arbitrary compromise because there is tradeoff between the
length and the number of periods. One the one hand, the longer the periods, the better the
identification of all coefficients, especially the fixed effects. On the other hand, the more
different estimations/periods, the more different coefficients are obtained and the better
can the changes in returns over time be traced.
It is obvious that all of the dummy variables in the wage regression (𝐷𝑠, 𝐷𝑘, 𝐷𝑡, 𝐷𝑖) need
to have an omitted reference category, otherwise the column vectors of their matrices are
linearly dependent. The categorical variables also enter the estimation as a set of dummy
variables and thus require a reference category. This necessity sometimes complicates the
interpretation of the inequality decompositions, as we shall see in the following.11
The bottom line is that not only discrimination but several economic fundamentals give
rise to wage inequality. In the first place, wages differ because there are diverse types of
skills, i.e., different labor input. Workers, firms and places possess varied productivities
that create remuneration differentials. Such fundamental factors can be and have to be
accounted for, before it is appropriate to start thinking about how inequalities can be
reduced. Likewise, these factors may provide insights why the distribution of labor income
has changed.
3.3.2 Overview of decomposition methods
This subsection briefly discusses the benefits and drawbacks of the decomposition methods
used in the following to facilitate the overview of the type of information we can derive
from the several approaches. Details of these methods can be found in the respective sub-
sections. A cornerstone in the literature on the decomposition of inequality measures into
different components is Shorrocks (1982). His paper discusses basic principles that any
non-arbitrary inequality decompositions should satisfy. For example, the inequality mea-
sure should be symmetric, continuous and should yield a value of zero if income is equally
distributed across the population. The decomposition should also be continuous, symmet-
ric, independent of the aggregation level of the components, the sum of all contributions of
income should exactly add up to the total inequality value, and the representation of the
decomposition should be unique. In Shorrock’s illustration, total income is separated into
actual flows of wage income, capital income, etc. Morduch and Sicular (2002) transfer this
concept to estimated flows from determinants of a single source of income, for example,
the wage. The values of these flows correspond to the component effects identified in the
prior wage equation eq. (1). When the components are correlated, the interaction effects of
these components pose a potential problem to the decomposition. Shorrocks (1982) argues
that the "natural" decomposition attributes one half of the interaction term to both of the
11 The reference worker in my estimation has medium education and works in the car repair industry in
a county of the lowest density.
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correlated components. The variance is one of the few inequality measures for which such
a natural decomposition is applicable that concurrently fulfills the desired properties.
In the same way, the variance of wages can first be separated into differences between and
within regions. Then, both parts may be decomposed into the detailed wage determinants.
The benefit of this exercise is to evaluate more precisely where and how the change in
inequality occurs. Regional inequality continues to be an important topic in German and
European politics, and the literature on this kind of regional wage inequality is scarce.
Yet the variance has three disadvantages. It is criticized because it does not satisfy the
transfer axiom (Foster and Ok 1999).12 Second, the variance is not scale invariant. Thus,
it makes a difference if one uses daily, hourly or monthly wages. Third, comparability to
other studies is limited because the variance is not a frequently used measure, at least
in the literature on inequality. However, not every index is exactly decomposable into
its factor components, as is the case for the variance, due to the possible interaction
between components. Shorrocks (2013) provides a different approach called Shapley value
decomposition which is applicable to any inequality measure. Its implementation is a
little more complicated because components have to be considered sequentially and thus
their contribution depends of the order in which they are considered (path dependency).
Hence, all possible sequences have to be calculated to report the average contribution
of each component. To keep the approach manageable, only a few components can be
evaluated limiting its accuracy compared to the variance decomposition. The indices I
decompose with the Shapley value approach are the Gini index, the Theil index, the
80/20 percentile ratio and the standard deviation of logs. A comparison between different
inequality indices is generally advisable because due to their definition and theoretical
grounding, the components’ contributions differ across the indices.
With the indices considered so far, the inequality is expressed as a single value. This is
clear and simple but it does not yield conclusions about how different groups in society
are affected. That is why the entire wage decomposition is considered in the remaining
part of the paper. First, I consider the change of each wage component separately in each
percentile of the distribution. The analysis is refined by distinguishing between changes
in returns (∆𝛽) and changes in the composition of characteristics (∆X), cf. eq. (3) below.
Thereby supply and demand effects may be distinguished and the causes of wage inequality
can be better understood.
To separate the coefficient from the composition effects, an additional counterfactual wage
𝑤𝑎𝑢𝑥 is required to perform the following decomposition of wage changes
𝑤𝑡=2007 − 𝑤𝑡=1995 = (𝑤𝑡=2007 − 𝑤𝑎𝑢𝑥) + (𝑤𝑎𝑢𝑥 − 𝑤𝑡=1995) (2)
= (𝛽𝑡=2007 − 𝛽𝑡=1995)⏟  ⏞  
≡Δ𝛽
X𝑡=2007 + 𝛽𝑡=1995 (X𝑡=2007 − X𝑡=1995)⏟  ⏞  
≡ΔX
(3)
where the several coefficients and wage determinants from eq. (1) are represented in stacked
12 The transfer axiom states that a transfer from a richer to a poorer individual will unambiguously
decrease inequality.
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form 𝛽X and the subscript 𝑡 refers to an arbitrary year. In this case, it denotes a year
in the middle of the first and the third period for which this regression is estimated. The
counterfactual wage corresponds to a situation in which individuals were remunerated
for their characteristics as in the year 1995, but the composition of their characteristics
remains as it was in 2007. Therefore, the first term in both equations reflects the influence
of changed returns and the second term is equal to the part of the wage change that is
attributable to shifts in the composition of workers’ characteristics. Eq. (3) follows because
of the underlying linear wage regression, but the insight of this decomposition is general
and applicable to other type of estimations.
Blinder (1973) applies this decomposition to the difference in the average wage between
males and females. To extend this idea to the entire distribution, I follow Juhn et al. (1993)
and construct the counterfactual wage 𝑤𝑎𝑢𝑥 ≡ 𝛽𝑡=1995X𝑡=2007 by multiplying the average
value of each variable in X𝑡=2007 in every percentile with the respective coefficient estimated
for the year 1995.13 According to eq. (3), the impact of every wage determinant can be
depicted along the wage distribution. DiNardo et al. (1996) develop a semi-parametric
version of this decomposition. First, they estimate the density of wages conditional on some
wage determinants. To construct the counterfactual 𝑤𝑎𝑢𝑥, the conditional distribution of
one of the wage determinants – union membership 𝑀𝑖 in their application – is replaced
by its distribution in another year (or group). This reweighting of the wage distribution
requires an estimate of the distribution of 𝑀𝑖 in both periods. The advantage of their
counterfactual simulation is that, as in the literature on Propensity Score Matching, under
certain assumptions, the change in 𝑀𝑖 may be interpreted as a causal treatment effect.
14
A combination of their method with the present fixed effects regression with numerous
interaction terms is, however, beyond the scope of this paper. For the same reason it is
not feasible to estimate eq. (3) using quantile regressions. Whereas quantile regressions
provide separate coefficients, that make the illustration of the changes more accurate, I
use coefficients that identify an average effect. The choice between these techniques and
the fixed effects model is a tradeoff between the accurateness in different aspects. My
approach yields unbiased coefficients because unobserved skills are controlled for and the
additionally identified occupational attributes provide other valuable insights that cannot
be found in other studies. Finally, it should be emphasized that the following assump-
tions are presupposed just like in the other available decompositions. General equilibrium
effects are turned off, e.g., the coefficients of the counterfactual wage function 𝑤𝑎𝑢𝑥 are
unaffected when the distribution of covariates is changed.15 Besides, detailed regression
based decompositions require the additive linearity of the wage function.
13 Juhn et al. (1993) take the wage distribution in the average of all years as their reference point and
they exchange values of X that correspond to individuals with the same rank in the distribution. They
then focus on a specific quantile ratio instead of the entire distribution. In fact, Juhn et al. (1993) require
that the rank of each individual is unchanged in order to substitute the value of X with the one from the
average distribution. Because I only focus only on percentiles, this need not necessarily be the case.
14 In the case of DiNardo et al. (1996) the main interest is in the effect of the minimum wage.
15 Other extensions of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition and a detailed discussion of their required
assumptions, advantages and limitations is given in Fortin et al. (2011).
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3.3.3 Variance decomposition
A first approximation of the importance of all components in the wage regression in eq. (1)
is achieved through a variance decomposition. To simplify the notation, I define the fol-
lowing aggregate wage component estimates
𝑤𝑖𝑡 = 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 + 𝑋 + 𝑍 + 𝑆 + 𝐾total + 𝜐expl + 𝜉 (4)
where: 𝐾total = 𝐾 + 𝑃𝑖 + 𝑋𝐾 + 𝑍𝐾 (5)
≡ 𝛽𝑘𝐷𝑘 + 𝛽𝑝𝑃𝑖𝑘 + 𝐷𝑘 ·
[︁
𝛽𝑥𝑘𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑧𝑘𝑍𝑗𝑡
]︁
𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 ≡ 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑡𝐷𝑡
𝑋 ≡ 𝛽𝑥𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑤𝑊𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑘𝑡 + 𝛽𝑥𝑤𝑊𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑘𝑡 ·𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑍 ≡ 𝛽𝑧𝑍𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽𝑧𝑤𝑊𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑘𝑡 · 𝑍𝑗𝑡
𝑆 ≡ 𝛽𝑠𝐷𝑠
The wage residual 𝜉 was defined as 𝜐𝑟𝑒𝑠+𝜖𝑖𝑡. For convenience, I denote the seven component
estimates on the RHS of eq. (4) with𝑊 𝑐 for the following derivation and suppress the lower
case index, so that
∑︀
𝑊 𝑐 is equal to the original wage 𝑤. The "natural" decomposition
rule derived by Shorrocks (1982) for the variance of wages 𝜎2(𝑤) is thus given by
𝜎2(𝑤) =
7∑︁
𝑐=1
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑊 𝑐, 𝑤) (6)
=
∑︁
𝑐
𝜎2(𝑊 𝑐) +
∑︁
?̸?=𝑑
∑︁
𝑑
𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑊 𝑐,𝑊 𝑑)𝜎(𝑊 𝑐)𝜎(𝑊 𝑑)
since the covariance can be expressed as
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑊 𝑐, 𝑤) = 𝜎2(𝑊 𝑐) +
∑︁
𝑐 ̸=𝑑
𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑊 𝑐,𝑊 𝑑)𝜎(𝑊 𝑐)𝜎(𝑊 𝑑) (7)
That is, the interaction terms in eq. (7) are assigned equally to each of the components.
Dividing eq. (6) by 𝜎2(𝑤) shows that the covariance between each component and the origi-
nal wage reflects the relative importance of the components. The magnitude of 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑊 𝑐, 𝑤)
has another intuitive interpretation. It is equal to the mean of "(A) the inequality which
would be observed if income component 𝑐 was the only source of income differences; and
(B) the amount by which inequality would fall if differences in factor 𝑐 income receipts
were eliminated" (Shorrocks 1982: 209). This is not true for other decomposition methods
of the variance and most other inequality indices (an obvious exception is the coefficient of
variation 𝜎2(𝑤)/𝜇). Gibbons et al. (2013) argue that the choice for whichever assignment
of the interaction terms is still arbitrary. Yet eq. (6) satisfies the axioms in Shorrocks
(1982), and it is straightforward in the presence of more than two components.
Columns 1 and 2 in table 3.1 illustrate the importance of the wage components in absolute
and relative terms, according to the variance decomposition in eq. (6). The values in
panels 1 to 3 refer to the mean in each of the three periods. In the first line of each panel,
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the wage dispersion indicates that there is a steady increase in inequality in Germany.
However, contrary to most of the studies, the share of the residual wage decreases from
54.9% to 46.2% indicating that the observable wage determinants in this paper account for
more than half of the inequality level. The largest fraction is explained by occupational
attributes. They dwarf the remaining wage components and even increase from 28% to
32%. The remaining worker- and firm-specific characteristics are the next largest portions.
The absolute contribution to inequality of 𝑋 doubled and of 𝑍 increased even more.
In this multivariate setting, the share of the sectoral component is below 4% and almost
constant over time. Because the total wage dispersion grows, a constant share still indi-
cates that the contribution of sectoral differences add to the rise in wage inequality. The
estimated coefficient for the log of the local price index in the wage regression is approx-
imately 0.2.16 Hence, via their labor income, workers are only compensated for 20% of
the local price level differences. This suggests that amenities compensate workers for the
largest part of higher living costs. All regional components, including the price index, are
less important than the sectoral differences. Combined, their explanatory power decreases
to even less than zero. While the contributions of 𝑋𝐾,𝐾 and the local prices to inequality
are constant, albeit positive, the regional firm-specific differences 𝑍𝐾 fall substantially
and actually reduce inequality. This merely means that the remuneration in large regions
relative to rural regions (the reference category) declines. Consequentially, the reasons
for this finding may be either increased sorting of high-wage individuals to rural regions,
higher firm-specific premiums in rural regions or lower premiums in agglomerations. An
explicit distinction of disparities between and within regions in the next subsection sheds
more light on this finding.
Fact 1. The wage determinants in this study explain more than 50% of the wage dispersion
and about 75% of its change from 1995–2007. Occupational attributes have by far the
largest explanatory power, followed by other personal characteristics and firm-specific wage
premiums.
3.3.4 Inequality between and within regions
This subsection estimates how much of the total inequality is attributable to regional dif-
ferences and how such differences themselves are composed. It is important to note that
regional differences arise for two reasons. They are either due to regional differences in
the remuneration for personal and firm-specific characteristics 𝑋𝐾 and 𝑍𝐾, respectively,
or because the composition of workers differs between regions. For example, if some re-
gions have a larger share of high-skilled workers and there is a general skill premium, 𝑋
contributes to the regional wage gap. On the other hand, 𝐾 and 𝑃𝑖 only capture regional
wage differences across-the-board and thus they do not have variation within regions. In
16 The regression output is omitted due to space constraints. Furthermore, most of the coefficients are
not readily interpretable because of the various interaction terms. Therefore it is more informative to
present the aggregated component effects.
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Table 3.1: Variance decomposition
total covariance between counties within counties
Panel 1: 1993–1998
w 0.160 100.0% 0.032 20.2% 0.128 79.8%
X 0.014 8.5% 0.008 5.0% 0.006 3.5%
Z 0.002 1.2% 0.000 -0.1% 0.002 1.3%
XK 0.001 0.7% 0.000 0.0% 0.001 0.6%
ZK 0.002 1.1% 0.001 0.9% 0.001 0.3%
K 0.001 0.7% 0.001 0.7% 0.000 0.0%
Pi 0.002 1.1% 0.002 1.1% 0.000 0.0%
T 0.000 0.2% 0.000 0.0% 0.000 0.2%
S 0.005 3.2% 0.001 0.4% 0.005 2.9%
𝜐𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑙 0.046 28.5% 0.006 3.6% 0.040 24.9%
𝜐𝑟𝑒𝑠 0.074 46.4% 0.014 8.7% 0.060 37.7%
𝜖 0.014 8.5% 0.000 0.0% 0.014 8.5%
Panel 2: 1999–2004
w 0.195 100.0% 0.030 15.6% 0.165 84.4%
X 0.034 17.4% 0.007 3.5% 0.027 13.9%
Z 0.008 4.3% 0.003 1.4% 0.006 2.9%
XK 0.001 0.3% -0.001 -0.3% 0.001 0.5%
ZK 0.001 0.5% 0.001 0.6% 0.000 0.0%
K 0.001 0.2% 0.001 0.2% 0.000 0.0%
Pi 0.002 1.0% 0.002 1.0% 0.000 0.0%
T 0.000 0.0% 0.000 0.0% 0.000 0.0%
S 0.007 3.7% 0.001 0.3% 0.007 3.4%
𝜐𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑙 0.055 28.0% 0.007 3.6% 0.048 24.5%
𝜐𝑟𝑒𝑠 0.072 36.9% 0.010 5.2% 0.062 31.7%
𝜖 0.015 7.6% 0.000 0.0% 0.015 7.6%
Panel 3: 2005–2010
w 0.238 100.0% 0.033 14.0% 0.205 86.0%
X 0.028 11.7% 0.005 2.0% 0.023 9.7%
Z 0.017 6.9% 0.006 2.6% 0.010 4.3%
XK 0.001 0.4% 0.000 -0.2% 0.001 0.6%
ZK -0.004 -1.5% -0.001 -0.5% -0.003 -1.1%
K 0.001 0.2% 0.001 0.2% 0.000 0.0%
Pi 0.002 0.7% 0.002 0.7% 0.000 0.0%
T 0.000 0.0% 0.000 0.0% 0.000 0.0%
S 0.008 3.4% 0.000 0.0% 0.008 3.4%
𝜐𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑙 0.076 32.0% 0.009 3.9% 0.067 28.2%
𝜐𝑟𝑒𝑠 0.096 40.3% 0.013 5.3% 0.084 35.1%
𝜖 0.014 5.9% 0.000 0.0% 0.014 5.8%
Notes: Each panel shows the results from a variance decomposition of the estimated compo-
nent effects identified in the wage regression in eq. (1). Component effects are defined as the
estimated coefficient multiplied by the variable. For example, the sectoral impact on the wage
is 𝑆 ≡ 𝛽𝑠𝐷𝑠. For the other definitions see eq. (4) and (5). The values in the first and second
column represent the absolute and relative amounts of components from the aggregate variance
decomposition according to eq. (6). Columns 3 to 6 display the division of these values into the
dispersion between and within counties according to eq. (8).
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accordance with the observation level of the regional price indices and the classification of
county type dummies 𝐷𝑘, I analyze the inequality within and between German counties.
First, I describe some important differences in the composition and the remuneration of the
workforce across the six different county types used in this study, cf. figure 3.2 above. The
columns in the following table 3.2 show county means in the first and the last period and
their growth rate in this time interval. Columns 4 and 6 display the ratio of county means
to the aggregate mean to readily quantify the amount of the disparities. As expected,
average wages are highest in and around agglomerations (county types no. 1 and 2), as
well as in core cities (no. 4), and are lowest in rural regions (no. 6). The difference between
log wages in agglomerations and rural regions amounts to 0.26 and is constant over time.
Thus without consideration of productive characteristics, the urban-rural wage gap is 26%.
On the one hand, the regional disparities in the share of university graduates and in firm
size are substantial as well. On the other hand, education premiums differ by less than
2% in period 1, which suggests the disparities in average wages are due to the sorting of
workers and firms. The share of high-skilled workers grows in all of the county types and
intensifies existing disparities. Nevertheless, the high-skill premium still differs by no more
than 2–3%. This raw skill premium may either be due to differences in demand or due
to other observable or unobservable worker attributes. In contrast, regional disparities in
firm size attenuate over time because firms in agglomeration shrink by 31% and firms in
rural regions grow by 10–13%. An exception are firms in core cities which are already on
average the biggest and continue to expand.
I extend the previous variance decomposition in eq. (6) and sub-divide each component
effect in its dispersion within and between regions.
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑊 𝑐, 𝑤) = 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑊 𝑐 − ?¯? 𝑐, 𝑤) + 𝑐𝑜𝑣(?¯? 𝑐, 𝑤) (8)
The first term reflects the variation of a wage component effect 𝑊 𝑐 within counties by
subtracting its county mean ?¯?𝑐. The inequality between counties is equal to the covariance
between the county means and the original wages. Again, the decomposition into these
two terms is exact.
Columns 3–6 in table 3.1 display the corresponding results. Overall inequality between
counties in Germany (measured in terms of the variance of log wages) is constant at about
0.03. Its relative share, however, is decreasing from 20% to 14%, due to the growth in
overall inequality. Hence, the increase inequality is entirely coming from the dispersion
of wages within counties. Regarding the single wage determinants, the table reveals that
their relative importance differs in both dimensions.
Between counties, the spatial distribution of occupation- and firm-specific payments, 𝜐𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑙
and 𝑍, increased inequality in absolute and relative terms. Yet the rise is offset by payments
for individual characteristics and by the regional components 𝐾,𝑃𝑖,𝑋𝐾,𝑍𝐾. The nega-
tive impact of 𝑍𝐾 on inequality in the final period suggests that firms impose lump-sum
discounts in dense regions (where wages are highest) relative to workers in the reference
category. This accords with the shrinking firm size in agglomerations displayed in table
A breakdown of residual wage inequality in Germany 74
Table 3.2: Regional summary statistics
period 1: 1993–1998 period 3: 2005–2010
county- variable mean ratio to mean ratio to change
type overall mean overall mean
1 firm size 2337 173% 1621 140% -31%
2 firm size 1427 106% 1183 102% -17%
3 firm size 339 25% 374 32% 10%
4 firm size 2975 220% 3560 307% 20%
5 firm size 530 39% 552 48% 4%
6 firm size 398 29% 448 39% 13%
1 high-skilled share 0.15 149% 0.21 152% 42%
2 high-skilled share 0.09 92% 0.15 105% 58%
3 high-skilled share 0.08 81% 0.10 70% 19%
4 high-skilled share 0.13 125% 0.17 125% 38%
5 high-skilled share 0.07 68% 0.09 68% 38%
6 high-skilled share 0.06 63% 0.08 56% 22%
1 high-skill premium 1.15 100.66% 1.19 100.85% 3.63%
2 high-skill premium 1.14 99.69% 1.18 99.60% 3.33%
3 high-skill premium 1.14 100.15% 1.17 99.32% 2.57%
4 high-skill premium 1.14 100.05% 1.20 101.55% 4.98%
5 high-skill premium 1.14 99.55% 1.17 99.28% 3.15%
6 high-skill premium 1.14 99.61% 1.18 99.48% 3.29%
1 log wage 4.60 102.43% 4.63 102.55% 0.58%
2 log wage 4.59 102.13% 4.61 102.08% 0.41%
3 log wage 4.40 97.85% 4.40 97.43% 0.03%
4 log wage 4.49 99.84% 4.54 100.42% 1.04%
5 log wage 4.46 99.19% 4.47 98.95% 0.22%
6 log wage 4.34 96.61% 4.37 96.66% 0.51%
Notes: The definition of the six different county types is made in figure 3.2. High skilled individ-
uals are defined as university graduates and the high skilled premium is calculated with respect
to workers with the lowest educational attainment.
3.2. Again, the low explanatory power of 𝑃𝑖 indicates that workers are only compensated
monetarily for higher living costs to a small degree. The largest fraction (≈ 1/3) of regional
wage disparities is due to the distribution of the unobservable skills 𝜐𝑟𝑒𝑠. Even though the
sorting of workers with the highest education category into large regions intensifies, as
shown in table 3.2, the education premium rises more or less evenly and the inequality due
to all personal characteristics in 𝑋𝑖𝑡 decreases slightly.
Within counties, the regional firm-specific payments also reduce inequality, as previously
discussed. Quite the contrary, the nationwide employer-specific pay component adds to the
increase in inequality. It will be revealed below whether this is due to low-wage workers
being paid less or because high-wage workers receive more. Finally, the returns on educa-
tion, age, tenure and occupation are identified as the main drivers of wage inequality in
Germany.
The presented extension of the variance decomposition to accommodate an additional
decomposition into subgroups (counties) is straightforward. Subgroup decompositions also
exist for other inequality indices, such as the entropy measures by Theil. However, to
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date no combination of a decomposition by subgroups and by components is available for
the Theil index. Nonetheless, to provide a more common inequality measure than the
variance, I calculate the wage inequality within and between counties using the Theil-T
index for two benchmark cases: Original wages and residual wages (?˜?𝑖𝑡), i.e., the wage in
the hypothetical situation where all workers have equivalent observable characteristics. I
use the same formula as in Shorrocks and Wan (2005: 63),
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(9)
where 𝑁 is the number of all individuals and 𝜇 is defined as their mean wage. Likewise,
𝑁𝑘 and 𝜇𝑘 apply to the individuals in county 𝑘. The first equation states the definition
of the Theil-T index. The second equation shows how the index is decomposed into the
inequality within and between regions. It is easy to see that the first term in eq. (9) is a
weighted sum of single Theil indices in each region. Analog to the variance decomposition
in eq. (6), the second term is also weighted and only refers to the relation between the
regional and the aggregate mean wages.
The compact representation of only two benchmark cases allows the development of the
inequality for every year in the sample to be presented separately. Table 3.3 confirms most
of the prior assessments. Wage inequality grows steadily and the increase stems purely
from changes within regions. In 1995, the wage inequality between counties accounted for
about 19% of total inequality, compared to 20% in terms of the variance. Extracting all
explainable wage determinants and re-calculating the Theil index with the residual wages
(?˜?𝑖𝑡) reduces the level and change over time by more than 50%. This confirms that the
unexplainable inequality share falls. Like in table 3.1, the residual wage differences between
counties are almost constant and close to zero.
Table 3.3: Theil decomposition
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
𝑤𝑖𝑡
wthn. 0.059 0.062 0.064 0.066 0.067 0.069 0.074 0.077 0.079
btw. 0.018 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015
?˜?𝑖𝑡
wthn. 0.032 0.034 0.034 0.035 0.036 0.037 0.036 0.038 0.039
btw. 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
𝑤𝑖𝑡
wthn. 0.080 0.083 0.085 0.090 0.095 0.099 0.103 0.102 0.104
btw. 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.018
?˜?𝑖𝑡
wthn. 0.039 0.039 0.040 0.039 0.041 0.043 0.044 0.045 0.046
btw. 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Notes: Theil indices decomposed into within and between county parts for the imputed wage
in levels and the residual wage (also transformed into levels) in every year between 1993 and
2010.
The finding that the dispersion of productive abilities between regions does not contribute
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much to the overall level of inequality is in line with finding in other countries. Gibbons
et al. (2013) find that even with regional fixed effects the share of inequality between
regions amounts to a maximum of 6% in Britain. The survey by Shorrocks and Wan
(2005) indicates that this share is somewhat higher in most developing and industrializing
countries.
Evidence on regional wage inequality in Germany is scarce. Recent studies focus on the
urban-rural wage gap. Blien et al. (2009) find that in data from 1993 almost 10 percentage
points of the 25% urban wage premium is explained by higher housing and consumer
prices in agglomerations. The remainder of the wage gap is explained by the dispersion
of individual characteristics. Note that the wage gap in table 3.2 shows a similar wage
premium of 26% and that this premium is on average constant until 2007. The difference
is that Blien et al. (2009) use imputed price levels and divide the raw wage directly by
the price index, whereas I identify the impact of all explanatory variables in a regression.
Consequently, they conclude that the price index accounts for a much larger share of the
wage disparities. More in line with my results is Lehmer and Möller (2010), who report
that about half of the urban-rural wage gap is accounted for by their observables, namely
firm size, the industrial composition and individual characteristics.
The relation between regional and countrywide wage inequality is recently analyzed for the
US. Baum-Snow and Pavan (2013) also find that the share of high-skilled workers increases,
especially in large cities. In contrast to my findings for Germany, the wage inequality
between US regions increases and contributes 23% to the countrywide growth of wage
dispersion. Because the regional inequality grows particularly in large cities, Baum-Snow
and Pavan (2013) conjecture that agglomeration economies and demand for high-skilled
workers are responsible for the regional wage differences. In instances when wages grow
most where living costs are highest, and wages are deflated by regional living costs as in
Moretti (2013), the resulting utility differences are understandably less pronounced than
differences in nominal wages.
Fact 2. Direct wage compensations for higher costs of living are 20%. Regional remu-
neration and living cost differences only account for 13% of the wage differences between
regions.
Fact 3. The rise in wage inequality evolves steadily and comes almost completely from
changes within counties. Wage dispersion and skill premiums grow evenly in regions of
different size.
3.3.5 Decompositions based on the Shapley value
So far, I measured inequality by the variance and the Theil-T index. The advantage of
the variance is its convenient and "natural" decomposability into an arbitrary number
of components. Shorrocks (2013) provides a slightly more complicated approach that is
applicable to any inequality measure. Because of its formal equivalence to the Shapley
value in cooperative games, this procedure is termed Shapley decomposition. To evaluate
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the impact of a wage component 𝑊 𝑐, an inequality index 𝐼(·) is first computed with the
original wage 𝑤 and with 𝑤−𝑊 𝑐. The difference between the two inequality indices reflects
the contribution of the component 𝑊 𝑐 to the total inequality level. The contribution of
the next component 𝑊 𝑑 is equal to the difference between the inequality value of 𝑤−𝑊 𝑐
and 𝑤−𝑊 𝑐−𝑊 𝑑. That is, the contributions 𝑆𝑐, 𝑆𝑑 of both components are measured as
𝑆𝑐 = 𝐼(𝑤)− 𝐼(𝑤 −𝑊 𝑐) (10)
𝑆𝑑 = 𝐼(𝑤 −𝑊 𝑐)− 𝐼(𝑤 −𝑊 𝑐 −𝑊 𝑑)
This process continues until all components are sequentially eliminated. In this consider-
ation, the decomposition is not symmetric because the value of 𝑆𝑐 from eq. (10) differs
if 𝑊 𝑑 is eliminated prior to 𝑊 𝑐. Hence the main disadvantage of this method compared
to the decomposition in section 3.3.3 is that the order of elimination influences the result.
The solution requires that all possible elimination sequences are considered. Finally, the
contribution of each component is equal to its average contribution in all of the elimina-
tion sequences. To keep the expositional clarity high and the computational burden low, I
combine the wage components into three aggregate components: (a) individual-, firm- and
sector-specific variables, (b) occupational attributes (as the single most important factor)
and (c) regional variables.
There are two reasons why the identified contribution of components differ between in-
equality measures and why it is therefore advisable to compare several indices side-by-side.
The Shapley decomposition yields the expected marginal impact of components on in-
equality. In the variance decomposition, the contribution of the components reflect their
variability, cf. Kimhi (2011). The difference is that in the latter case, the contribution to
inequality of an equally distributed component or a constant transfer is zero. The Gini also
shares this property, but the other indices I calculate here do not, see table 3.4. Another
explanation rests on the fact that "different measures are underlined by different social
welfare functions and are sensitive to different segments of the Lorenz curve" (Wan and
Zhou 2005: 115).
It also makes a difference whether the inequality measures are calculated with the target
variable in logs or in levels. The transformation into levels has the advantage that the
regression constant becomes a multiplicative factor. Due to the scale invariance proposition
of the inequality indices, the constant term has no effect on the inequality level, regardless
of whether the inequality measure is invariant to constant transfers or not. The calculation
in levels thus reduces the variability in the results across inequality indices and facilitates
the comparison to other studies that also usually use income values in levels, compare the
discussion in Morduch and Sicular (2002) and Wan (2004).
Table 3.4 presents the contribution of wage components in absolute and relative terms
from the Shapley decomposition of the Gini, the Theil-T, the 80/20 percentile ratio and
the standard deviation of logs. As expected, the explained shares of overall inequality vary
between the four measures. The Theil index and the variance (see table 3.1) attribute
higher explanatory power to the components than the remainder indices. At the other
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extreme, the 80/20 percentile ratio suggests that only between 19% and 28% of total wage
inequality is explainable.
Table 3.4: Shapley decomposition
Gini Theil p8020 sd. of logs
Panel A: 1993–1998
w 0.217 100% 0.080 100% 1.841 100% 0.400 100%
X+Z+T+S 0.017 8% 0.010 12% 0.099 5% 0.036 9%
𝜐𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑙 0.044 20% 0.028 35% 0.216 12% 0.067 17%
K+Pi+XK+ZK 0.007 3% 0.004 5% 0.033 2% 0.011 3%
Panel B: 1999–2004
w 0.238 100% 0.095 100% 1.982 100% 0.442 100%
X+Z+T+S 0.032 14% 0.021 23% 0.174 9% 0.062 14%
𝜐𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑙 0.048 20% 0.031 33% 0.265 13% 0.074 17%
K+Pi+XK+ZK 0.003 1% 0.002 2% 0.014 1% 0.005 1%
Panel C: 2005–2010
w 0.266 100% 0.116 100% 2.189 100% 0.488 100%
X+Z+T+S 0.042 16% 0.030 26% 0.270 12% 0.078 16%
𝜐𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑙 0.061 23% 0.042 36% 0.356 16% 0.095 20%
K+Pi+XK+ZK -0.001 0% -0.001 -1% -0.002 0% -0.001 0%
Notes: Shapley decompositions of the Gini index, the Theil index the 80/20 percentile ratio
and the standard deviation of log wages. The first row reports the inequality value for the raw
wage. Rows 2–4 indicate the importance of aggregate components, as defined in eq. (4). For
the calculation of these inequality measures, the original and adjusted wages are transformed
into levels.
Nevertheless, the components’ relative changes and their ranking yield conclusions similar
to the ones in section 3.3.3. Occupational attributes represent the most important explana-
tory variable and its absolute and relative contribution increases over time. Altogether,
the remaining explanatory characteristics related to employers and employees account for
less than the occupations’ contribution in the first period, but their relative importance
roughly doubles in the following years. Between 2005 and 2010, their explanatory share
ranges from 12% to 26%. Again, my estimates suggest that equating local price levels
and any returns due to agglomeration advantages would reduce wage inequality by only
2–5%. In the last years of the sample, their contribution even drops to zero. In sum, wage
inequality increases over time but the explanatory share of observables also does. Consid-
ering the inequality indices in table 3.4, the observable variables are capable of explaining
between 66% and 80% of the rise in wage inequality.17 Hence the variables in this study
are capable of explaining more than half of the change in raw wages.
Wan (2004) and Wan and Zhou (2005) were the first to combine the regression-based in-
equality decomposition with the Shapley value framework in Shorrocks (2013). Both papers
examine income inequality in China and are thus not directly comparable. Nevertheless,
their results also differ considerably across several decomposed inequality measures. De-
vicienti (2010) demonstrates the importance of the Shapley approach vis-à-vis the results
17 For the Gini coefficient, for example, residual wage inequality in period 1 is 0.217 - 0.065 = 0.152,
in period 2 it is 0.155 and in period 3 the residual wage inequality equals 0.164. The difference of 0.012
accounts for no more than 25% of the total increase of the Gini index of original wages.
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from a decomposition as in Juhn et al. (1993), who calculate percentile ratios, but do not
account for the path-dependency. Dustmann et al. (2009: 850) report the standard devia-
tion of log wages in West Germany for the years 1975 to 2004. The authors use raw wages
and wages adjusted for education and age. The dispersion of the former is almost equal to
the one in table 3.4, opposed to the share of residual wages that increases from 84.2% to
87% in the period 1993–2004.
Fact 4. Different inequality indices produce strongly deviating results. The variance and
the Theil index show that the wage determinants explain more than 50% of total wage
inequality, whereas the 80/20 percentile ratio and the standard deviation of logs indicate
that this share is about 30%. However, across all indices, between 66% and 80% of the
rise in wage inequality are explainable and the relative importance of wage determinants
is constant.
3.3.6 Changes in the wage distribution
So far, the considered inequality indicators shed light on which factors contribute to the
rise in inequality. The next question is how different parts of the population are affected,
i.e., where in the wage distribution the changes occur? Three issues will be explored in this
subsection. To begin, I characterize the observed changes in original wages. I then depict
the impact that each wage component has on the curvature of the wage distribution in a
single year. Finally, I consider the changes in the components and how these changes add
up to the total change in raw wages displayed in figure 3.1.
The 85/50 and the 50/15 percentile ratio of original wages in figure 3.3 show that workers
at the top of the distribution gain relative to those in the middle, and the middle of the
distribution gains relative to the bottom. Both ratios have almost the same value in 1993
but the wage gap wides by an additional 10%. The 85/50 percentile gap grows steadily
by 1.5% per year until 2007 and then flattens out. Conversely, the 50/15 gap begins to
rise slowly in 1998 and accelerates its growth in 2004. During the economic and financial
crisis of 2007 to 2009, inequality remains relatively stable at all parts of the distribution.
Concerning the residual wages ?˜?𝑖𝑡, both percentile ratios are lower and show a slow but
continuous increase over time. Again, this suggests that apart from this small increase
in residual wage inequality, the main drivers of the wage dispersion are captured by the
factors in eq. (1). Note that for the observations in figure 3.3 it does not make a qualitative
difference whether the 85𝑡ℎ or the 80𝑡ℎ percentile is used. This supports the assessment
that the wage imputation, which particularly applies to wages above the 80𝑡ℎ percentile,
does not yield distorted findings.
The illustration in figure 3.3 makes clear that the rise of inequality is a continuous process.
In the following, I will illustrate the changes between 1995 and 2007, which are the reference
years in the middle of the first and third period for which the wage regression is estimated.
Yet there is a difference between the first and the second half of the sample period, as
previewed in figure 3.1: Between 1995 and 2001, the first 20 percentiles suffer real wage
decreases, while workers in higher percentiles experience monotonically increasing wage
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Figure 3.3: Percentile ratios of original and residual wages
Notes: The figure shows the evolution of the 85/50 and 50/15 percentile ratio of the raw wage and
the residual wage, each calculated with level values. The residual wage results after the subtraction of
all estimated components of the wage regression, i.e., it corresponds to 𝜐𝑟𝑒𝑠 + 𝜖, cf. the description of
table 3.1.
gains. This period is covered in Dustmann et al. (2009) and Antonczyk et al. (2010), who
make the same observation. A new insight is that over the further course of the 2000s,
there are considerable losses for all workers up to the 60𝑡ℎ percentile. Even with an updated
database, there is still no sign of a polarization of wages, as observed by Autor et al. (2008)
in the US. Some reasons for the different development are identified further below.
To evaluate the impact of wage components on the curvature of the wage distribution in
a single year, the additivity of the baseline regression is again exploited. I subsequently
subtract component effects (as defined in eq. (4)) from the original wage and then compare
the distributions with each other. The difference between the distributions of the resulting
adjusted wages and the original wages provides insight regarding about the importance of
the eliminated components. Because the wage regression is linear additive, there is no path
dependency regarding these differentials, as opposed to the calculation of inequality indices
in the preceding section. The adjusted wage distribution of, e.g. 𝑤 − 𝑋, corresponds to
a counterfactual situation in which there were no differences in unemployment and ap-
prenticeship records prior to the current job, education, tenure, and age in the population.
Since the subtraction of 𝑋 is equal to setting the coefficients contained in 𝑋 to zero, the
counterfactual may also be interpreted as a situation in which all individuals are paid like
the workers in the reference category regarding the characteristics in 𝑋.
Drawing on the prior results from aggregate inequality indices, I keep the graphical analy-
sis of wage distributions simple and construct only three different counterfactuals. Labor
income without differences in personal characteristics (red line), after additional removal
of firm, regional and sectoral characteristics (green line), and after the removal of the ex-
plained part of the worker adherent skills 𝜐𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑙 (yellow line). The latter counterfactual
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wage is equal to the fluctuation of residual wages around the remuneration of the refer-
ence workers (i.e. the regression constant). The two graphs in figure 3.4 illustrate the
distribution of these (adjusted) wages exemplarily for the years 1995 and 2007.18
Figure 3.4: (Adjusted) wage distributions
Notes: Both graphs show the distribution of daily wage levels in Germany in the years 1995 and
2007. In each of the graphs, the blue line represents the raw imputed wages as given in the data.
The following hypothetical adjusted wages are constructed as follows. I simply subtract the effect of
components from the log wage according to eq. (1) and re-transform this into a level value. Thus the
red line is given by 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑤𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽𝑥𝑋𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽𝑤𝑊𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑘𝑡 − 𝛽𝑥𝑤𝑊𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑘𝑡 · 𝑋𝑖𝑡), and so on, as indicated in the
legend. The yellow line appears, once all explainable components are subtracted.
Focus first on the comparison of the distribution in a single year. It is eye-catching that the
18 Note that in this and in the following figures only the 4𝑡ℎ until the 96𝑡ℎ percentiles are displayed to
make the distribution less vulnerable to outliers. Some wages at the top are quite high and would thus
distort the scale of the axis. In figure 3.4, the curvature of the wage distributions is very smooth, except
for the spike in the upper part of the distribution which, in any case, has to be taken with care due to the
censoring of wages.
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largest part of the wage dispersion is accounted for by occupational attributes. Their share
of labor income is especially large at the top of the distribution. The explanatory power
of 𝑋 and of 𝑍 +𝐾𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 +𝑆 are mentionable, but both lag far behind. Although, the yellow
curve of the fully adjusted wages is much flatter, it is still far from being horizontal. This is
in line with the prior assessment that about 50% of the total inequality level are explainable.
The distribution expresses this observation in a more illustrative way. Original wages range
from 40e to 210e per day in 2007, while in a world where all observable characteristics
are remunerated equally, this range shrinks to 60–120e. Comparing the change between
both years, the steeper slope of the raw wage distribution in 2007 shows - from a different
point of view - how inequality increases over the years.
After considering the impact of component effects in separate years, the following graphs
directly show how the total wage change is composed of these components. Analyzing
the distribution of these changes reveals in which direction, how strong and where exactly
each of the components affects the wage dispersion in the course of time. The basic idea
is as described in subsection 3.3.2. The change between wages is decomposed according to
eq. (4) and computed separately with the average values in every percentile of the wage
distribution.
𝑤𝑡=2007 − 𝑤𝑡=1995 ≡ ∆𝑤 = ∆𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 + ∆𝑋 + ∆𝑍 + ∆𝑆 + ∆𝐾total + ∆𝜐expl + ∆𝜉 (11)
In contrast to the decomposition of inequality indices, the regression constant complicates
the breakdown into components. The difficulty arises because 𝑤𝑡=2007 and 𝑤𝑡=1995 are
estimated in two different regressions that have two different regression constants and
because the coefficients of all categorical variables need to be interpreted relative to their
respective regression constant. 𝑆, for example, reports the average payment differential in
sectors relative to the reference sector. Likewise, ∆𝑆, reports the wage change in every
sector relative to the change in the reference sector, which is embodied in ∆𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙. The
point is that the regression constant (𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙) represents the reference for all categorical
variables, but cannot be apportioned to the different categorical components. Fortin et al.
(2011: 45) discuss this issue in depth but the conclusion is that "there is no quick fix",
especially in the present case with a multitude of categorical variables and interactions
between them. The good news is that the interest here is not in a single coefficient but
on the overall effect of aggregate components. And even if the exact level of component
effects is meaningless, its contribution to the overall change in inequality can be inferred
from figure 3.5. Departing from ∆𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙, I subsequently add changes of component effects
until the total change of raw wages is obtained. The direction of the induced shift of the
curve gives a clear statement about the contribution of the added component.
The wage change of the reference worker is about +8.5%, depicted by the horizontal line
in figure 3.5. Note that the order in which components are added does not influence the
result and is only chosen for expositional purpose. Adding the change in firm-specific
payments shifts the lower end of the distribution about 5 percentage points down and
helps to explain some of the gains of the top 40% of earners. Thus, these factors clearly
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contribute to the rise in wage inequality. Once the change in sectoral characteristics is
added, the curve is shifted down but more so at the left end. This means that all workers,
on average, gain less than those workers in the reference sector (car repairing). A closer
inspection of individual sectors reveals that the negative change is particularly due to the
public sector and the service sector. Adding the change in 𝑋 does not influence workers in
the fourth quartile much, whereas wages of workers further left in the distribution develop
more and more unfavorably. The interpretation for this finding is intuitive. The reference
worker has medium education (which applies to more than 70% of the population, cf.
table C.1), and most likely shares some of 8.5% wage increase in ∆𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙. Since the changes
in the upper part of the distribution are close to zero, the average payments to highly
educated workers are minor. On the other side, the payment to the low-skilled shrinks.
This group is spread across the entire wage distribution, but is naturally more concentrated
at the bottom, which explains the unequal downward shift after adding 𝑋. Region-specific
payments altogether show a negative effect in the upper half of the distribution but show
virtually no effect at the bottom half. This issue is discussed at length in subsection
3.3.4 where we identified that the average size of firms in agglomerations shrinks and that
firm-specific wage premiums in agglomerations decreases relative to the payments in rural
regions (the reference category). Thus, figure 3.5 shows that evidently employees of large
firms in agglomerations are mainly found in the upper half of the wage distribution.
In the lower graph in figure 3.5, the black line is generated by augmenting the prior change
with the change attributed to the workers’ occupational attributes. Like in the exercises
above, this explained part of the fixed effect turns out to be the most important wage
component. In contrast to the remaining characteristics, it accounts for substantial gains
of high-wage workers. Finally, it is remarkable that the remaining unexplained parts of
the wage regression deviate around zero, i.e., the black line is already very close to the
overall wage change. Therefore, the wage residual does not have a significant impact on the
increase of the wage dispersion. Altogether, these observations naturally agree with the
prior, albeit less detailed, conclusions from the aggregate inequality measures. I identify
the sources of changes in those wage components more in-depth in the next subsection.
Fact 5. Changes related to occupations have a particularly large impact on the top of the
wage distribution. Changes in the service sector contribute to wage decreases of low-wage
workers. None of the considered wage determinants contribute to a polarization of wages.
Except for region-specific factors, all determinants add to the decrease the lower end of
the wage distribution.
3.3.7 Composition and price effects
In the previous subsection, I divide the total wage change into the impact of its compo-
nents in every percentile of the distribution. Although this decomposition reveals in which
part of the distribution inequality decreases or increases, it does not provide a particular
reason why. For example, 𝜐𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑙 may shift the wage distribution upwards because more
workers have high-wage occupation and/or because high-wage occupations have a better
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Figure 3.5: Change in wage components 1995-2007
Notes: Both graphs show the distribution of composite changes in wage components between 1995 and
2007. Starting point is the change in levels (𝛽0+𝛽𝑡𝐷𝑡), to which I subsequently add the change in the
firm-specific component effect 𝑍, the change in 𝑆, 𝑋 and so on, as indicated in the graphs’ legends.
remuneration. In the following, I subdivide the impacts of components into fractions at-
tributed to their composition and coefficients. This is the basic idea in the seminal papers
by Blinder (1973) and Juhn et al. (1993) that is described in section 3.3.2. I now apply
the decomposition in eq. (3) to the separate components in eq. (11). Thereby, the total
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wage change may be re-arranged so that
∆𝑤𝑖 ≡ 𝑤𝑖,𝑡=2007 − 𝑤𝑖,𝑡=1995 (12)
= ∆𝛽0 + ∆𝛽𝑥𝑋𝑖,𝑡=2007 + ∆𝛽𝑧𝑍𝑗,𝑡=2007 + ... + ... ... coefficient effect
+ 𝛽𝑥,𝑡=1995∆𝑋𝑖 + 𝛽𝑧,𝑡=1995∆𝑍𝑗 + ... + ... ... composition effect
+ ∆𝜐𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑙 + ∆𝜖𝑖 ... residual effect
As in the prior decomposition, I calculate these effects for each percentile of the wage dis-
tribution. Figure 3.6 presents the composition, coefficient and residual effect in aggregate.
As can be seen, they amount exactly to the total wage change. For a start, it is more
convenient to show aggregate changes because only for personal, employer and sectoral
attributes is the composition change, evaluated at the return to these characteristics in
1995, in some parts of the distribution larger than 1%. Note that for the qualitative shape
of the curves in figure 3.6 it is not decisive whether coefficient changes are evaluated by the
value of the characteristics in 2007 or the other way round. The same is true for the illus-
tration of the composition effect. In any case, the coefficient effect evidently dwarfs both
other effects, so that differing returns mainly account for the wage change over the past 20
years.19 This findings suggest that not supply but rather demand or performance-based
explanations are responsible for the pronounced increase in wage inequality.
Figure 3.6: Wage changes 1995–2007 – composition vs. coefficients
Notes: This figure shows how the total log wage change between 1995 and 2007 is separated into
composition and coefficient effects of all explanatory variables according to eq. (12). The change of
the residual component is also displayed.
By drawing on the number and remuneration of high-skilled workers in different regions in
table 3.2, we have already understood the reasons for the change in regional characteristics
sufficiently well. Next, I break down the shifts of 𝑋, 𝑍 and 𝜐 both into their separate
19 It should again be noted that this decomposition method assumes that workers in all parts of the
wage distribution receive the same return to their characteristics. Because the remaining wage residual is
close to zero, this assumption does not seem to be unduly wrong.
A breakdown of residual wage inequality in Germany 86
variables that these components combine, and into the detailed effects according to eq. (12).
Regarding 𝑍, the main effect can be traced back to the size of the plant. Table 3.1 shows
that the covariance between 𝑍 and the wage is positive and increases strongly between 1995
and 2007. In line, the coefficients in the wage regression indicate that there is a positive
firm size premium. The right graph in figure 3.7 reveals a pronounced assortative matching
of high-skilled workers and large firms and matching between low-wage workers and small
firms. Because the average firm size shrinks for workers below the 75𝑡ℎ percentile during the
considered period, the sorting of workers becomes even more pronounced. Nevertheless, the
left graph of figure 3.7 shows that this composition change is minor compared to the change
in returns to firm size.20 Obviously, the compensation differential between small and large
firms grows, so that low-wage workers in small firms earn even less and the other way
round. Comparing the range of -4% to +2% of this change to the total component effect
of 𝑍 in figure 3.5 confirms that the firm size effect is the main driver of this development.
Figure 3.7: Employer size – composition vs. coefficient changes
Notes: The left graph is analog to figure 3.6 but displays only the part of the aggregate change that is
due to the employer size. The right graph shows the average employer size of workers along the wage
distribution using a kernel-weighted local polynomial smoother.
In the same way, ∆𝑋 can be partitioned into its variables. Three of them are principally
responsible for the change related to individual characteristics: age, unemployment prior
to the current job and the lump-sum payment differences between workers in East and
West Germany. According to Eurostat data, in the period between 1995 and 2005 the
20 The consideration of the component and the coefficient effect already incorporates the diverging
returns in East and West Germany and how both of them changed.
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German unemployment rate increases from about 8% to 11%. Summary Statistics in table
C.1 confirm that 8% of the workers in the sample have an unemployment record. The
identified wage cut that these workers face when re-entering the labor market changes
from -5.5% to -7.4%. Because this variable is either 0 or 1, the coefficient effect in figure
3.8 clearly reflects the monotonic decreasing probability of becoming unemployed along the
wage distribution. The composition effect shows that the average change for high-wage
workers is close to zero, whereas workers in the lower half of the wage distribution are
more likely to have an unemployment record. In this case, both the coefficient and the
composition effect contribute to the rising wage inequality.
The right graph in figure 3.8 displays the same breakdown for the workers’ age structure.
It is important to note that the return to age is positive and basically increasing. The
average age among high-wage workers hardly changes and thus the composition effect is
only slightly positive. However, between the 15𝑡ℎ and the 60𝑡ℎ percentile the age structure
induces wage gains of 2–3%. Nevertheless, a separate consideration of the average age
(analog to plant size in figure 3.7) shows a steady increase along the wage distribution and
an age gap of 10 years in both 1995 and 2007. The coefficient effect of age in figure 3.8
shows a similar slope and thus reflects the fact that the returns to experience in terms of
age rise. Finally, the coefficients of the West dummy in the first and last period indicate
that the average wage gap falls by 4 percentage points. Yet, controlling for observable
characteristics and their diverging returns in East and West, the East German workers
still receive 6.7% less than their West German counterparts.
The largest share of the aggregate composition and coefficient change is explained by oc-
cupation specific attributes. These are already noteworthy in themselves because they are
rarely the focus of studies about income inequality. Occupations are either not considered
at all, or their pivotal impact is missed because they are not related to workers’ unobserved
or adherent skills. Recall that the estimated worker fixed effects from the wage regression
are used in a second step and are regressed against 3-digit occupation dummies. The ex-
plained part in the latter regression thus represents the portion of the countrywide wage
dispersion, which may be traced back to specific requirements and abilities in occupations.
As before, it can be seen in figure 3.9 that the change in returns is much larger and that
it benefits workers in the upper half of the wage distribution but disadvantages the lower
half. Furthermore, there are some noteworthy gains due to a higher stock of high-skilled
occupations.
To subdivide and depict changes of these 341 different occupations, a combination intro-
duced by Matthes et al. (2008) is used. Based on data from the Federal Employment
Agency about required skills and typical tasks in occupations, the authors calculate de-
grees of similarity and classify similar occupations into 21 "segments".21 Interestingly,
the development of segments is highly heterogeneous and exhibits different patterns. The
further consideration is restricted to 10 of the 21 segments where wage changes exceed 1%.
21 The information in their data is applied by the Employment Agencies to propose similar jobs to
unemployed workers and suitable job candidates to firms who failed to match with their current occupation
specification. Therefore, Matthes et al. (2008) argue that their combination into segments aligns similar
occupations better than the official 1- or 2-digit classification.
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Figure 3.8: Unemployment and age – composition vs. coefficient changes
Notes: Both graphs are analog to figure 3.6. The left displays only the part of the aggregate change
that is due to an unemployment spell prior to the current employment. The right graph shows the
composition and coefficient effects of the workers’ age.
Figure 3.9: All occupations – composition vs. coefficient changes
Notes: The occupation-specific part of the wage regression is divided as in figure 3.6 and 3.7.
For convenience, either two or three segments, where the patterns resemble each other,
are pooled in figure 3.10. Still, the arrangement along the wage distribution allows for
differentiation between occupations in the same segment.
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Consider the pattern of jobs related to metal processing and construction in panel (d). In
the right part of the distribution, engineers, architects, etc. are located. Unskilled and
blue collar workers are represented at the other end. The latter’s supply clearly increases
over time while the supply of high-skilled workers diminishes. The price for these types
of labor moves in the opposite direction of the employment change. Consequentially, the
development seems to be driven by the labor supply. This is not the case in the other
segments in panels (a) to (c). Jobs disappear and at the same time are paid less in
the gastronomy, logistics and the residual segment (mainly comprising laborers without a
detailed job description). On the other hand, jobs in the electronics industry, as well as
managers, economists, lawyers, doctors and engineers (to give some example of prosperous
occupations in the segments shown in panels (b) and (c)) exhibit a higher employment
share and higher remuneration.
What could be the reason for these developments, given that observable differences in
personal, sectoral and firm-specific attributes between occupations are already taken into
account in the wage regression? One possible explanation is that relative productivity
growth and resulting payment increases are disproportionately distributed across occupa-
tions. Another explanation is that the rise in demand for some occupations and skills
exceeds the available supply. Both possibilities are consistent with the skill-biased techni-
cal change that is accompanied by the computerization of the economy (Autor et al. 2003).
This development overly increases the demand for analytical and interactive skills. Spitz-
Oener (2006) confirms that these skills are used intensively by employees with a high level
of education, i.e., by individuals at the upper end of the wage distribution. Autor et al.
(2008) also find that the rise of the wage inequality in the US features higher employment
and higher wages of the most skilled workers; however, they do not link these changes to
occupations and skills as in the present approach. The US also experience a wage growth
at the left end of the wage distribution relative to its middle, where jobs involve many
routine tasks which are negatively affected by SBTC. This development is much weaker
in Europe, as already noted by Acemoglu and Autor (2011) and Antonczyk et al. (2010),
because of the increased supply of low-skilled workers and deunionization.
Fact 6. Differing returns mainly account for the wage change over the past 20 years. Low-
wage workers are more likely to be young, work in small firms and become unemployed.
The relative returns to these characteristics even decrease. Higher supply and higher
remuneration in occupations related to management and engineering are responsible for a
large part of the widening gap at the top of the wage distribution.
3.4 Conclusion
The present study complements the knowledge about the rise in wage inequality over the
last 20 years in Germany. Inequality increases more in the 2000s than in the 1990s, whereby
workers below the 60𝑡ℎ percentile see their real wage decline. The overall change in the
wage distribution is monotonically increasing from -15% at the left end to +20% at the
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Figure 3.10: Separate occupation segments – composition vs. coefficient changes
Notes: The 341 different occupations are classified into 21 segments according to Matthes et al. (2008).
The four panels in the figure show the combined composition and coefficient effects in the 10 occupation
segments with the largest changes over time.
right end. As most of the preceding studies conclude, an ever smaller share of the rising
wage inequality is explained by education, experience and and industry-specific variables.
I dismantle this residual wage further by additionally considering workers’ occupations,
characteristics of their employers, the local price level as well as regional productivity and
payment differences. Altogether, more than 50% of the wage dispersion and more than
75% of the increase in wage inequality are explained by this approach.
I apply regression-based decomposition methods that allow the quantification of the sepa-
rate impact of these wage determinants on aggregate inequality indices and on the entire
wage distribution. It turns out that occupational attributes are the most important wage
determinants. Highly paid technical, administrative and business occupations in particular
have higher returns, even though the supply in these occupations increased. In general,
the data show that the changes in the composition workers’ characteristics play a minor
role compared to changes in returns. Both findings may be explained by skill-biased tech-
nical change. Many prior studies argue that SBTC is the main driver for the rise in wage
inequality, however, the conclusion in this paper is not merely based on the residual wage.
In the lower percentiles of the wage distribution, particularly workers in the service, con-
struction and logistics sectors suffer real wage losses. This finding is in line with the higher
supply of low-skilled workers which explains why Germany does not experience a wage
polarization.
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Another reason for gains in the upper part of the wage distribution and declines in its lower
part is the assortative matching between skilled workers and large firms, and particularly
the increase in the firm size premium. In addition, workers in the lower part of the
distribution are on average younger and thus do not benefit from increased returns to
experience. They are also more likely to have an unemployment record for which wage
discounts are magnified. Even though high-skilled workers and large firms tend to be
concentrated in large regions and even though there is a skill premium in larger regions,
these differentials do not intensify over time. Therefore, the rise in wage inequality is
distributed equally across regions and consequently coming from changes within counties.
All in all, regional price levels, wage premiums and diverging returns in regions of different
size have a low explanatory power of wages that even decreases over time.
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Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Data Appendix
Around 12% of wages are top-coded in the SIAB data due to a upper limit of the contri-
bution to the pension fund. Because wages are quite different in East and West Germany,
this limit is also different in each year between both parts. In the joint wage distribution,
the East German upper bound lies at the 71𝑡ℎ percentile in 1993, at the 78𝑡ℎ percentile in
1994 and oscillates afterward between the 81𝑡ℎ and the 85𝑡ℎ percentile. For some of the
inequality measures such as the 80/20 percentile ratio, it is possible to avoid the depen-
dence on imputed wages. However, in the figures with (adjusted) wage distributions, the
part above the 81𝑡ℎ percentile show some discontinuities and thus need not be taken at
face value. Nevertheless, it is necessary and common to rehabilitate the entire wage distri-
bution by employing an imputation procedure for the top-coded wages based on censored
regressions proposed by Gartner (2005). This imputation is also applied in the analysis of
wage inequality by Dustmann et al. (2009) and Card et al. (2013). I estimate a Tobit model
and compute the censored wages as the sum of two components: The predicted wage plus
a random draw from a truncated normal distribution (the distribution of log wages). The
Tobit estimation includes third order polynomials of age and tenure, the plant’s size and
shares of high- and low-skilled workers, and dummies for education, occupation groups,
industries, years, location in West Germany, German citizenship and unemployment prior
to the current job. A different imputation procedure where education groups, years and
East and West Germany are estimated separately using occupation segment dummies,
the plant’s size and shares of high and low-skilled workers and second order polynomials
of tenure and age basically yields the same results.1 Afterward, the imputed wages are
deflated with the national consumer price index (CPI), where 2005 is the base year.
Another imputation is necessary for the education variable because it exhibits about 10%
missing values and 0.4% temporal inconsistencies, see also Dustmann et al. (2009) and
Fitzenberger et al. (2006). These values are replaced using the panel dimension of the data
set. For example, if an individual has a medium or high education level in all but one year,
and this year is not equal to the first observation, this inconsistent education ’downgrade’
is replaced by the prior value. If the person exhibits more than one missing value, the
imputation is only applied if the valid values before and after the missing are the same,
or if the gap is in the beginning or the end of the period. Other cases are not encoded to
avoid overconfident predictions. Altogether, three education categories are distinguished:
low (high-school equivalent), medium (college equivalent and/or vocational training) and
high (university graduates).
For the construction of the final sample, observations with missing values in any variable
are disregarded. This study only considers full-time employment relations where the wage
is above the official marginal part-time income threshold. A data-driven justification for
1 Both Dustmann et al. (2009) and Card et al. (2013) also conduct several robustness checks regarding
the imputation procedure and obtain very similar results regarding the residual wage inequality.
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this restriction is that the SIAB does only provide the daily wage but not the hours worked.
Therefore, it is not possible to infer a hourly or full-time equivalent wage for part time
workers. In rare cases where the data indicates that workers have multiple (full-time)
jobs, merely the one with the highest wage is regarded. Remuneration in so-called "mini-
jobs" is determined by politics and several exceptions regarding the social security and
tax contribution imply that the wage determination cannot be compared to regular jobs.
Due to these restrictions the overall extent of inequality is underestimated. The sample
is further reduced to male workers between the age of 17 and 64. Finally, all individuals
with less than 2 observations in each of the six-year periods are dropped because of the
panel estimations. The following table C.1 provides the mean and the standard deviation
of wages before and after imputation as well as other variables used in the estimation of
the wage regression in each of the three periods.
Table C.1: Summary statistics
1993–1998 1999–2004 2005–2010
mean std.dev. mean std.dev. mean std.dev.
log wage 4.48 0.37 4.51 0.40 4.49 0.44
imputed log wage 4.50 0.40 4.53 0.44 4.52 0.49
tenure (days) 2778 2456 2935 2699 3212 2908
age 39.8 10.7 40.6 10.1 41.8 10.2
prior apprenticeship dummy 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.27
prior unemployment dummy 0.22 0.41 0.27 0.44 0.30 0.46
plant size 1352 5024 1227 4833 1160 4597
plant low-qual. share 0.18 0.19 0.16 0.18 0.13 0.16
plant high-qual. share 0.08 0.14 0.09 0.15 0.10 0.16
log price index -0.07 0.07 -0.07 0.07 -0.07 0.07
West dummy 0.80 0.40 0.82 0.39 0.83 0.38
low-education (share) 0.14 0.35 0.13 0.34 0.12 0.32
medium-education (share) 0.76 0.43 0.75 0.43 0.75 0.44
high-education (share) 0.10 0.30 0.12 0.33 0.14 0.35
county type 1 (share) 0.29 0.45 0.28 0.45 0.28 0.45
county type 2 (share) 0.16 0.37 0.17 0.37 0.17 0.37
county type 3 (share) 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.29
county type 4 (share) 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.27
county type 5 (share) 0.17 0.38 0.18 0.38 0.18 0.38
county type 6 (share) 0.21 0.41 0.20 0.40 0.21 0.40
observations 1,618,650 1,472,890 1,372,059
Notes: Mean and standard errors for the variables necessary to estimate the wage regression in
eq. (1). The summary statistics and the entire sample is divided into the three periods for which
the regression is estimated. The last column shows the number of observations in each period.
Log wage is the top-coded wage as given in the data. Education and county type are categorical
variables for which the share in each category is reported. These and the remainder variables are
as described in the main text.
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4.1 Introduction
The most distinctive feature between trade some 40 years ago and current trade is the frag-
mentation of the value chain.1 Fostered by falling trade costs, lower tariffs and progress in
computer and communication technology, intermediate inputs and services are increasingly
exchanged across borders.2 It turned out that whether a job is offshorable or not, is best
characterized by the tasks a worker is actually performing. Tasks with low coordination
requirement, high codifiability and a high degree of routinization are performed remotely
at low cost and are thus are most easily relocated abroad (Autor et al. 2003; Grossman and
Rossi-Hansberg 2012).3 Ultimately, the question of the impact of offshoring on domestic
jobs has received much attention in the scientific and political debate.4
Research about vertical specialization has some shortcomings that this paper addresses.
With a few exceptions, e.g., Feenstra and Hanson (1997), the focus lies on high-wage coun-
tries where offshoring originates. In most models, a firm’s decision is about the profitability
of offshoring, but not about where exactly to locate the production. Because Brazil is a
middle-income country, its firms may offshore to low-income countries or may onshore,
i.e., receive offshored production steps from other countries. So in this study, imported
intermediate inputs can represent offshoring from two perspectives. To distinguish between
both possibilities, I examine the immediate consequences on the employment pattern in
plants that receive new intermediate inputs from abroad. From this observation I deduce
that firms mainly onshore medium-complex routine manual tasks in industrial production
steps. Corresponding to the prediction from an extended Feenstra and Hanson (1996)
model, the Brazilian economy is located in the middle of the global value-added chain.
Cross-border flows of intermediate inputs are a result of relocations and international
production networks. However, in their presence, the empirical analysis of trade is more
complex than "plain old trade in physical goods" (Krugman 2008: 135). Evaluating the
factor content and value added of trade in each country requires information about the prior
stages of processing. Otherwise, double-counting obscures the individual contribution and
comparative advantages can not be verified. Using country-specific Input-Output matrices,
Johnson and Noguera (2012) find that the ratio of value added to the gross value in exported
manufactures is higher in more affluent countries. This suggests that those skill-abundant
countries conduct production steps that involve more skilled labor in accordance with
the classic Heckscher-Ohlin logic. To circumvent those accounting problems, my approach
focuses directly on the type of labor employed in the production process. With confidential
but not exclusive data on the universe of Brazilian firms, workers and trade transactions, I
1 This phenomenon is also labeled, among others, as vertical specialization or multi-stage production.
Offshoring refers to the import of intermediate inputs from the point of view of the home country. It is
thereby irrelevant whether the input was primarily produced domestically or whether the supplier is part
of the firm.
2 See Hummels et al. (2001), Yi (2003) and Amiti and Wei (2005). Hanson et al. (2005) examine further
determinants of the volume of intermediate good trade flows, such as taxes and factor prices.
3 Blinder (2009) stresses personal delivery as the most important determinant and argues that skill is
entirely irrelevant.
4 See Crinò (2009) or Feenstra (2010) for an ample review of the literature.
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examine which type of workers are hired or substituted after expanding intermediate input
imports.
In this paper, offshoring and onshoring are viewed as discrete events, as are the closing
or relocation of a production line. Muendler and Becker (2010) indeed find evidence that
employment changes in multinationals are, above all, transmitted at the extensive margin.
My identification strategy relies mainly on Propensity Score Matching (PSM) which has
been a useful tool to detect the effects of offshoring or FDI (Barba Navaretti et al. 2010;
Hijzen et al. 2007). The majority of related papers report positive employment effects for
the industrialized source countries. Moser et al. (2010) manage to disentangle the negative
effect due to the restructuring inside the plant from an even larger positive productivity
effect, which leads to an overall increase in plant size.5 One reason why PSM is frequently
used is that firms involved in international trade perform differently than the average
domestic producer, see Bernard et al. (2007); Laplane and De Negri (2004). Hence, the
identification of offshoring effects does not involve the entire population of plants but only
those that perform similarly to the top-tier international companies. I use non-importers
and importers without an increase in intermediates imports as control groups. With both
groups and the usual comparison in levels as well as a difference-in-difference estimator, I
find that plants grow by about 12 employees after an increase of their intermediate input
imports.
Even from a theoretical point of view, it is difficult to make a proposition about the flow
of intermediate inputs in a global perspective. In Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008)
vertical specialization is profitable if the offshoring cost is lower than the labor cost saving in
the foreign location. Because most models are based on two countries, they do not discern if
and which tasks will be performed in, e.g., China or Brazil. Empirical studies often merely
make a distinction between high and low-income destinations to separate between vertical
specialization (vertical FDI) and a duplication of production (horizontal FDI). Middle-
income countries are not included separately in these considerations. These countries
are an important object of study, given that their GDPs have been growing steadily and
the ’South-South’ and ’North-South’ are beginning to overtake the trade flows between
the industrial nations (Hanson 2012). An exception is Costinot et al. (2013) who study
a continuum of countries that differ in their technical capabilities. Because production
is sequential and subject to mistakes, countries with more advanced technology perform
more complex and later production stages in their model.
Hanson (2012) emphasizes that the explanation of the surging North-South trade calls for
theories with factor endowment differences. Brazil is well endowed with low-skilled labor,
but still has a higher share of skilled labor than China or India.6 While the automotive,
aircraft and chemical industries have recently been expanded, the core of Brazil’s economy
remains the production of goods that require manual labor (De Negri 2005b). To have a
solid theoretical guidline, I extend the model in Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1997) to three
5 This productivity effect is discovered in the model by Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008).
6 According to data from the Barro and Lee (2013), the share of people with tertiary education is 6%
Brazil compared to 31% in the US, 14% in Germany, 10% in France and 3% in China and India.
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countries. It is a Heckscher-Ohlin version where a final good is produced from a contin-
uum of inputs. Its proposition is simple and suggests that a country should specialize in
production stages whose complexity corresponds to the country’s relative skill endowment.
In fact, I see support for this prediction in the Brazilian data.
The question arises how does this pattern of vertical specialization emerge? Do Brazil-
ian firms offshore unskilled jobs to low-wage countries, or do firms in high-wage countries
offshore to Brazil? De Negri (2005a) identifies a number of innovative, highly productive
and large domestic firms, which might be originators of offshoring. I rely on prior theoret-
ical and empirical findings to distinguish both possibilities in the data. (1) As mentioned
above, offshoring generates ambiguous employment effects, whereas onshoring should be
clearly positive for suppliers in the target country. (2) According to my model, offshoring
should decrease tasks at the lower end of the skill distribution, whereas onshoring implies
gains in its middle. (3) Jobs that mainly involve routine tasks are most tradable.7 Using
a shift-share analysis and regressions on the wage bill share, Becker et al. (2013) confirm
that offshoring increases the proportion of non-routine and interactive tasks in German
multinationals.8 According to these three predictions, I obtain evidence that Brazilian
firms do indeed onshore tasks. The PSM shows that plants with an intermediates import
expansion grow in size, conduct more routine manual tasks and export a higher share of
intermediate inputs than plants in the control group. In particular, the employment gains
are located in the middle of the skill distribution.
Another interesting firm-level study by Amiti and Cameron (2012) finds that the import
of intermediate inputs decreases the demand for non-production relative to production
workers in low-skill abundant Indonesia. They interpret this demand shift as being due
to a substitution of in-house produced high-skill intensive inputs. In light of my results,
their findings is also consistent with the notion that Indonesian firms perform onshored
low-skill intensive production processes. I analyze created and destructed jobs separately
and rule out that, in my case, the increase in plant’s average routine manual task intensity
is caused by a substitution of high-skilled workers.
Moreover, I distinguish plants by the origin of their intermediates imports because the
origin may disclose different purposes and overlapped effects. On the one hand, inputs
from high-wage countries are more likely to induce substitution effects. On the other hand,
offshoring of Brazilian plants may only be visible in imports from low-wage countries. A
number of studies find more negative employment effects when offshoring to low-wage
destinations is considered separately (Barba Navaretti et al. 2010; Becker et al. 2013;
Biscourp and Kramarz 2007; Moser et al. 2010). Notwithstanding, I observe the same
pattern as before for both type of import sources. A reasonable explanation for this
finding is that the origin of imports is only indicative of the production mode. In sequential
7 Autor et al. (2003: 1280) define routine tasks as "a limited and well-defined set of cognitive and
manual activities". These tasks are easily substituted by computers but also cause low coordination and
monitoring costs.
8 Goos et al. (2014) relate offshoring to employment changes within the entire country, whereas Fortin
et al. (2011) and Baumgarten et al. (2013) study the associated wage changes. All three papers confirm
the firm-level results.
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production, the same input may first be processed in low-wage countries, then in Brazil,
and then in other locations, while the complexity of the tasks and the value added in each
stage rises, as in described in Costinot et al. (2013) and detected in Johnson and Noguera
(2012). Moreover, independent components may be offshored, processed in Brazil and
immediately returned to the originating high-wage country.9
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section analyzes Brazil’s trade
pattern of intermediate inputs from an empirical and theoretical point of view. Section 3
presents the data and the task classifications used. Section 4 describes the PSM approach.
Section 5 contains the results and section 6 concludes the paper.
4.2 Brazil’s trade pattern of intermediate inputs
This section presents aggregate trade statistics that document the growing importance of
intermediate goods for Brazil. I then sketch a model that predicts which type of production
steps should be conducted in middle-, high- and low-wage countries.
4.2.1 Stylized facts
The steady increase in world trade over the last decades is well known. Driving forces
for this development are the fragmentation of production and the intra-industry trade be-
tween industrial nations (Hummels et al. 2001; Yi 2003). A more recent aspect is that low-
and middle-income countries are also increasingly involved in world trade (Hanson 2012).
Figure 4.1 shows that Brazil’s intermediate goods imports amount to US$ 41 billion and
intermediates exports $ 56 billion in 2006. Since the 1990s both have grown by more than
350%.10 Aggregate imports and exports show a very similar development. Hanson (2012)
documents that Brazil is not the only developing country experiencing such a process. He
also stresses that the gravity logic fails in these cases because the trade boost is dispro-
portionate to the growth in GDP (which is nevertheless also remarkable). The growing
importance of offshoring and the integration of developing countries in international pro-
duction chains seem to offer a plausible explanation for this phenomenon. The right graph
in figure 4.1 illustrates that Brazil’s share of intermediates imports relative to GDP rises
from 2% to 4% between 1990 and 2006. In one of these years, intermediates even accounted
for more than half of total imports. Important triggers for Brazil’s integration are, beyond
doubt, its trade reform and the creation of the Mercosur in the early 1990s (Gonzaga et al.
2006).
Figure 4.2 displays how Brazil’s intermediate goods trade is distributed over its major
trading partners and how these shares change over time. Even though their stake declines,
9 See Baldwin and Venables (2013) for a theoretical analysis of trade patterns associated with these
two production modes.
10 The weak performance between 1995 and 2000 may be explained by the economic challenges after
the monetary reform of 1994. Growth was low or negative, and prices for domestic products increased
strongly, which harmed exporters and the trade balance (Ferreira and Tullio 2002).
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Figure 4.1: The growing importance of intermediate input imports
Source: UN Comtrade.
more than half of the intermediates exports and imports still concentrate on a few high-
wage countries, namely the EU, the US, Canada and Japan. Unsurprisingly, after the
creation of the Mercosur, trade with other Latin American countries increased. However,
these countries are more important as destinations for exports than as suppliers for in-
termediate inputs. The importance of China and India as trade partners also grows over
time, whereas these countries are rather important as suppliers.
Figure 4.2: The distribution of Brazil’s intermediate inputs trade across countries
Source: UN Comtrade.
Notes: The EU-15 comprises Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, and the United Kingdom. Latin American
countries comprise Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guiana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname,
Uruguay and Venezuela.
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4.2.2 A model
To derive a theoretical prediction about the location of intermediate inputs when the
production of the final good is fragmented and mobile, I slightly modify the model in
Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1997) and extend it to a three-country framework. Note that
the purpose of this model is a purely static description of the location of intermediate
production stages.11 There is a final good 𝑌 which is manufactured (free of cost) from a
continuum of 𝑧 ∈ [0, 1] differentiated inputs 𝑥(𝑧) subject to
ln𝑌 =
∫︁ 1
0
𝛼 (𝑧) ln𝑥 (𝑧) 𝑑𝑧 and
∫︁ 1
0
𝛼 (𝑧) 𝑑𝑧 = 1 (1)
Producing one unit of 𝑥(𝑧) requires 𝑎𝐿(𝑧) of unskilled and 𝑎𝐻(𝑧) of skilled labor. The
intermediate goods are ordered according to their complexity so that 𝑎𝐻(𝑧)/𝑎𝐿(𝑧) is strictly
increasing in 𝑧. Assume that the relative skill endowments of the countries 𝐴,𝐵 and 𝐶
are given by
𝐻𝐴
𝐿𝐴
>
𝐻𝐵
𝐿𝐵
>
𝐻𝐶
𝐿𝐶
(2)
These factor endowments are sufficiently different that factor prices are not equalized.
Moreover, the countries differ in the factor neutral production efficiency. It follows that
the skill-abundant country 𝐴 has the lowest skilled wage ratio, i.e., 𝑞𝐴𝑤𝐴 >
𝑞𝐵
𝑤𝐵
> 𝑞𝐶𝑤𝐶 . The
minimum cost function for the production of intermediate 𝑧 in country 𝑖 is given by
𝑐𝑖(𝑤𝑖, 𝑞𝑖, 𝑧) = Ω𝑖 [𝑤𝑖𝑎𝐿(𝑧) + 𝑞𝑖𝑎𝐻(𝑧)] (3)
where Ω𝑖 is an inverse measure of the country’s overall productivity. The relative slopes
are determined for the three minimum cost curves and each pair of lines crosses at most
once, when I assume that intermediate inputs are produced in all three countries (Feenstra
and Hanson 1996). Given the assumptions about relative factor endowments in eq. (2), the
minimum cost curve 𝑐𝐵 intersects 𝑐𝐶 from above and 𝑐𝐴 from below, cf. figure 4.3. These
intersections define two marginal intermediates 𝑧𝐶𝐵 and 𝑧𝐵𝐴 for which the production
cost is equal in the two countries. The production of each intermediate is located where
its cost is minimized. Consequently, country 𝐶 is the supplier of intermediates 𝑧 in the
range [0, 𝑧𝐶𝐵], country 𝐵 supplies all 𝑧 ∈ [𝑧𝐶𝐵, 𝑧𝐵𝐴], and country 𝐴 the remaining inputs
in the interval [𝑧𝐵𝐴, 1]. This pattern of fragmentation is shown in figure 4.3.
Due to eq. (1), the share 𝛼(𝑧) of world expenditure 𝐸 is allocated to the production of
each intermediate 𝑥(𝑧). Thus, the demand for 𝑥(𝑧) from country 𝑖 is given by
𝑥𝑖(𝑧) =
𝛼(𝑧)𝐸
𝑐𝑖(𝑧)
(4)
Factor demands in country 𝑖 are derived from the derivative of the cost function with
respect to the factor price and integrated over the production range of this country. For
11 For this reason, including only two production factors into the model is sufficient.
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example, using equation eq. (4) and eq. (3) the low-skilled labor demand in 𝐵 is given by
𝐿𝐵 =
∫︁ 𝑧𝐵𝐴
𝑧𝐶𝐵
(︂
𝑎𝐿(𝑧)𝛼(𝑧)𝐸
𝑤𝐵𝑎𝐿(𝑧) + 𝑞𝐵𝑎𝐻(𝑧)
)︂
𝑑𝑧
Finally, the remaining five full employment conditions, the two equations that define the
marginal intermediates and the definition of world expenditure 𝐸 =
∑︀
(𝐿𝑖𝑤𝑖 + 𝐻𝑖𝑞𝑖), pin
down the equilibrium of the nine endogenous variables in the model.
The ranking of relative endowments in eq. (2) corresponds to the empirical facts if 𝐴 is
a high-wage country, such as the U.S., 𝐵 represents Brazil and country 𝐶 is a low wage
country such as China.12 According to figure 4.3, Brazil has a comparative advantage in
producing intermediates of medium complexity. This is the main prediction that I will test
in this paper.
Figure 4.3: International division of intermediate input production
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4.3 Data
4.3.1 Employer-employee data
The backbone of this analysis is the linked employer-employee data set RAIS (Relação
Anual de Informações Sociais) which comprises the universe of the formal Brazilian labor
market.13 On a yearly basis, all establishments are required to report to the Ministry of
Labor about every worker registered throughout the calender year. The data is employment
12 For example, according to data from Barro and Lee (2013), the ratio of persons with completed
tertiary education relative to those with primary schooling or lower in 2005 amounts to 12 in the U.S.,
0.13 in Brazil, 0.09 in China and 0.06 in India.
13 Access to this data is confidential and was granted while the author visited the IPEA Institute in
Brasília.
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spell-specific and also contains basic information about the establishments activities. Since
the information is extracted from official records, its quality is excellent. Furthermore,
plants are fined for late- or non-submission and very few entries have missing values.
Workers as well as plants are characterized by a unique identifier, so each can be tracked
over the years. I extract the information yearly on December 31 and keep all plants with
at least five employees. Multiple spells for workers, even in the same establishment, are
distinguished and kept for the following analysis. Data constraints restrict the period of
this investigation to the years 2003 to 2006. I focus on privately owned plants from the
manufacturing industry, because international trade models are more relevant here. Still,
there are around 6 million spells per year.
Throughout the paper I weight spell-specific information by the number of hours worked
per week. Likewise, employment size is calculated as the total of hours worked in that
plant relative to the grand mean of hours per job in the data. In addition, the annual
mean wage, education and occupation of each worker are known. The latter is taken at
the 5-digit level, where more than 2500 different jobs are recorded. Since occupations and
their mapping to tasks are key variables in this paper, this most disaggregated level is kept
throughout the analysis. Unfortunately, a severe break in the classification impedes the
mapping before 2003 and thus limits the observation period in this study. Education is
reported in 10 categories which I aggregate to four, corresponding to: (1) less than high
school, (2) high school, (3) college and (4) higher education.
At the plant level I use the region14, industry (IBGE subsectors 1-13)15, legal form and an
indicator, whether the plant is considered small from a fiscal point of view, i.e., its annual
revenue is less than 1.2 million Reais. Because the affiliation of establishments is known,
controlling for the overall firm size is possible. Apart from the disaggregated labor input,
no more information about the production side is given. Nevertheless, I am confident that
due to the way the outcome and offshoring variables are defined, this paper is able to
provide robust and valuable insights about the effects of importing intermediates.
4.3.2 Trade data
This subsection describes the data on trade transactions and the construction of the off-
shoring/onshoring indicator. I also identify which variables are adequate controls for firms’
performance in the absence of output and productivity.
For each establishment, the Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade (MDIC)
records all commodity transactions at the level of product and countries.16 This amounts
to around 0.5 million observations per year. Via the unique plant identifier this information
is merged into the RAIS.
14 I found in the PSM procedure that the five Brazilian regions (North, North-East, Central-West,
South-East and South) already capture most of the interstate heterogeneity, which obviously exists.
15 Industries are aggregated to the 2-digit level. This IBGE (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statis-
tics) classification conforms roughly to the 2-digit ISIC (International Standard Industrial Classification)
industries (Helpman et al. 2012). Those sectors are listed in figure 4.5, but I found no relevant differences
between sectors, so a further discussion is of less importance.
16 MDIC data was available until 2006, which has set the upper time bound in this study.
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It is by now well known that firms involved in international trade are very distinct from
purely domestic ones. Melitz (2003) and subsequent literature have placed exporters in the
center of attention. In this paper, I only need to draw on the import dimension. Bernard
et al. (2007) illuminate that importers are even more scarce than exporters. While both
outperform plants that only serve the domestic market, importers have almost twice the
total factor productivity of exporters.
A variety of papers show that indicators for the success on world markets are reasonable
proxies for the productivity of the firm. Silva et al. (2012) report a positive relation
between import volume and the hourly labor productivity in the Brazilian economy by
employing Granger causality tests and a vector autoregressive model. Even in a model
with plant fixed effects, Laplane and De Negri (2004) find positive relations between labor
productivity and export and import volume. Bernard et al. (2010, 2011) demonstrate
theoretically and empirically that the extensive margin of exporters is a good indicator for
productivity. Using data from India, Goldberg et al. (2010) document that multi-product
firms have superior performance in the developing world, as well.
In line with these studies, I employ the number of products, destinations and the total value
for establishments’ yearly imports and exports to control for the different performance of
plants in the following propensity score matching. Summary statistics are displayed in table
4.1, where the the first four columns distinguish between importers and non-importers.
Note that all the trade variables exhibit a huge heterogeneity across establishments. The
data support the previous findings on trade and performance. Importers are much larger
and use a higher share of skilled labor in production than the average non-importer. Even
the subgroup of only-exporters have a much smaller scope of products and destinations
than firms which export and import. Finally, the latter’s export value per product is higher
by 156.000 Reais.
De Negri (2005a) divides Brazilian imports according to their technological content and
country of origin. She finds that products from the EU or North America have a higher
technological content, whereas the majority of imports from Asia and Latin America are
labor and resource intensive. Furthermore, foreign firms are on average more productive
than Brazilian firms, and they are more likely to import from the EU or North America.
This gives reason to believe that the purpose of imported intermediate goods is different
depending on their country of origin. I pick up this differentiation for a detailed analysis
after the pooled baseline results. Brazil’s most important high-wage trading partners
are the EU 15, the U.S., Canada and Japan. Their low-wage counterparts are Russia,
India, China (RIC) and the countries in Latin America (LA). Imports from these countries
account for more than 85% of all import transactions. For convenience, I denote the high
income countries by ’EU’ and the second trade bloc simply by ’LA’.
The final four columns in table 4.1 contain summary statistics according to whether more
than 50% of a plant’s total value of intermediates imports is from one of the two trading
blocs. The findings from De Negri (2005a) are reflected in my data. EU-importers seem
more productive as their export and import volumes are much higher. Even though they
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics pooled for 2004 and 2005
national international EU importers LA importers
mean std mean std mean std mean std
production
size 22.9 87.3 208.6 371.0 207.1 348.1 209.9 412.1
∆size 1.04 28.24 15.37 95.58 12.29 82.33 16.01 84.26
firm size 115 1028 672 2485 729 2670 552 1975
educ.sh.[1] 0.148 0.235 0.079 0.119 0.070 0.107 0.097 0.132
educ.sh.[2] 0.428 0.302 0.254 0.194 0.234 0.184 0.298 0.201
educ.sh.[3] 0.380 0.305 0.490 0.217 0.498 0.208 0.474 0.221
educ.sh.[4] 0.044 0.120 0.176 0.187 0.197 0.193 0.130 0.151
low revenue dummy 0.723 0.448 0.027 0.162 0.024 0.152 0.030 0.171
trade
imp.countries - - 27.9 55.3 31.4 58.6 16.5 34.8
imp.products - - 19.8 28.7 22.8 31.0 11.9 18.3
imp.value - - 3.225 21.90 3.421 26.30 1.830 6.620
exp.value 1.865 18.10 6.350 32.30 6.295 35.00 4.858 25.30
exp.products 3.3 5.9 8.8 18.1 8.7 18.4 8.4 18.6
exp.countries 7.6 28.5 28.8 108.3 27.9 121.1 27.7 83.9
tasks
analytical 9.301 0.363 9.489 0.346 9.534 0.340 9.406 0.340
r.cognitive 9.921 0.633 9.921 0.517 9.944 0.505 9.859 0.546
r.manual 10.37 0.662 10.32 0.538 10.32 0.539 10.36 0.530
non-r.cognitive 9.378 0.444 9.570 0.375 9.607 0.374 9.497 0.369
non-r.manual 10.19 0.603 10.11 0.440 10.11 0.441 10.14 0.446
offshorability 10.02 0.539 10.07 0.409 10.07 0.402 10.06 0.407
obs. 271427 2497 1528 599
obs. (exporters) 8826 1678 1077 383
Notes: The production and task specific variables (except for the low revenue dummy) are weighted
by the number of hours worked by each employee. Column 1 and 2 refer to purely national firms,
column 3 and 4 to all importers. The last 4 columns sub-divide importers into those that acquire
more than 50% of the value of their imports from the EU, US, Canada or Japan (EU) and those
plant which mainly import from Russia, India, China or Latin America (LA). Export and import
values are in million Reais.
are not larger in terms of employment, their number of import products and destinations
is more extensive. Finally, EU-importers are more likely to export.
As there is no direct information which states whether a plant has engaged in offshoring
or onshoring, it is nontrivial to define an adequate indicator; however, the data is detailed
enough to do so. The IBGE provides a mapping of the 5-digit product codes (NCM) in
my MDIC data to the international BEC (Broad Economic Classification) classification.
With the BEC the products can be divided according to their stage of production into:
(i) primary products, (ii) intermediate goods and (iii) final goods (Calfat et al. 2008).
The intermediate goods can be further divided into ’semi-finished goods’ and ’parts and
components’. Typically, the famous examples for offshoring from the automotive, aircraft
or toy industry deal with the assembly of parts and components. Semi-finished goods are
admittedly less dazzling, but I see no reason to restrict the definition of offshoring to the
latter category. Most related studies either use all imports or do not discuss this distinction
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of intermediate goods at all. All following steps of my analysis were conducted for the entire
intermediate goods classification and only for ’parts and components’. The results for the
latter category were largely similar. Following Feenstra and Hanson (1999), I also check
whether a restriction to imports within the same 2-digit sector (narrow offshoring) alters
the results. Both cases are reported in the robustness checks section.
I now define the indicator for an increase in imports, which is of central importance for
this paper. The indicator takes the value 1, when a plant imports a new intermediate
good in a period 𝑡, subject to the following constraints. New products are products which
the establishment has not purchased over the last two years and the product is at least
purchased for three consecutive years or rather two years in case the import only begins in
2005. I thereby separate stable offshoring relations from one-off investments, fluctuations
in productions, etc. However, the indicator for increased imports is not restricted to the
number of products. Thus if a plant starts to import two or more new products in a given
year, it would still be classified as an offshorer. Imports with an annual volume of less
than 2000 Reais are regarded as being irrelevant and unlikely to cause any labor substitu-
tion. Finally, plants with an increase in two consecutive years and import newcomers are
excluded from the analysis in order to obtain clean effects.17
Most prior studies have struggled with the definition of offshoring. In the absence of
managers’ direct responses, it is almost impossible to unequivocally determine from data
whether or not a firm conducts offshoring. In the public perception, offshoring corresponds
to a discrete event, like the closure and the relocation of a plant (or parts of it). My
indicator captures those events where a new and stable relationship to a foreign supplier
begins. It also captures cases where the scope of production expands by using foreign
intermediates, which would otherwise be produced or purchased domestically. Therefore,
this variable is suitable to report offshoring as well as onshoring. In any case, the definition
of such an indicator is novel. One of its advantages is that I can use it for the propensity
score matching strategy, as in Moser et al. (2010). Comparing plants before and after
the intermediate imports increase will show the immediate effect of the reorganization.
Furthermore, purchases like machine parts or other capital assets are not included because
I only consider parts that are repeatedly required for production. On the other hand, unlike
working with the value of imported intermediates, my indicator does not address every
plant with offshore relations. However, employment in offshore plants, as in Becker et al.
(2013), or the share of imported intermediates in production, as in Hakkala and Huttunen
(2010), bear another problematic aspect. A higher import volume from existing supplier
relations is different from relocations and consequently only complementary workers and
work processes are affected. In essence, my indicator is unaffected by undesired quantitative
upward or downward fluctuations.
17 For more than 90% of observations the increase in the number of products is synonymous with an
increase in the total value of imports or the number of products. However, I prefer not to restrict the
indicator to these cases, because the overall level of inputs could drop simultaneously. That is, a decrease
in the total value of (intermediate) imports is not inconsistent with offshoring.
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4.3.3 Tasks in Brazil
In the following I introduce six task measures by which I characterize employment changes.
Unfortunately, there is no Brazilian workforce survey of tasks for a detailed classification
of occupations but it is possible to rely on U.S. data from the O*NET (Occupational Infor-
mation Network). Maciente (2013) conducted a mapping between the U.S. and Brazilian
occupations at the 5-digit level.18 The existence of different synonyms for many Brazilian
and U.S. occupations (so called lay titles) facilitates the mapping. Moreover, Maciente
(2013) compared the score distribution of the O*NET measures for matched occupations.
In some cases where the mapping was ambiguous, the occupation is disregarded. The same
is true for some occupations in which the O*NET categories appeared obviously inappro-
priate for the Brazilian job. Therefore, not all occupations could be matched with task
measures.19
The O*NET survey asks workers to state the importance of various ability requirements
and activities performed in their job. The advantage of using this data is that I may use the
well known task measures introduced in the seminal article by Autor et al. (2003). Their
definition is based on the DOT, the predecessor of O*NET, but Acemoglu and Autor (2011)
reproduce the five task categories O*NET measures. These categories are: analytical, rou-
tine cognitive, routine manual, non-routine cognitive and non-routine manual. Acemoglu
and Autor (2011) add one more category that should capture the offshorability of jobs.20
Goos et al. (2010) provide different task definitions based on the O*NET, distinguishing
only analytical, routine and service tasks. I performed the analysis with both definitions
and found the categories used by David Autor to be more selective. One problem with the
definition in Goos et al. (2010) is that in combination with the Brazilian occupations, ser-
vice and abstract tasks are quite similar. Nevertheless, their routine category corresponds
well with both routine categories in Acemoglu and Autor (2011) and I obtained similar
results throughout.
To construct the task variables for each occupation, I first take the mean of the relevant
O*NET measures and then standardize it to a mean of 10 and a standard deviation of
1. The standardization makes the six tasks measures comparable, independent of the
differently scaled O*NET work activities. Once all occupations have positively defined
task variables, it is more convenient to interpret changes in the employment pattern. To
this end, I compute average task intensities of plants and weight worker’s task values by
their hours worked.
Figure 4.4 depicts the average task content of occupations along the entire wage distribu-
tion in all sectors used in this study with a lowess smoother for the year 2003. Since the
task measures are standardized at the level of occupations, they do not have a mean of
18 The author is very grateful for the provision with this data.
19 Consequently, I have some missing values when I calculate the average task content for each establish-
ment. To avoid overly imprecise averages, all plants with more than one-third missing values are dropped.
This amounts to 2% of observations.
20 The exact same definitions are used here with one exception. The routine cognitive measure misses
two O*NET work activities: 4.C.3.b.7 and 4.C.3.b.8.
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10 anymore in this economy-wide representation. We see, for example, that only roughly
10% of workers have above average analytical or non-routine cognitive task content. Un-
surprisingly, these jobs are located at the top of the wage distribution. The majority of
the population is engaged in manual intensive occupations. Jobs in the middle of the wage
distribution obviously require a certain amount of skill and are related to industrial activ-
ities. Occupations further to the left (around the 20𝑡ℎ percentile) are mostly either in the
service sector or require less skill and more hard physical work. Accordingly, those jobs are
unlikely to be offshored. Finally, the few remaining individuals at the lower end of the wage
distribution are mainly handicraftsmen and agricultural workers. Their high offshorability
is particularly explained by low scores regarding the interaction with colleagues and the
public. The offshorability measure peaks again at the upper end due to scientists, editors
and other creative workers that are not required to perform at a particular site.
Figure 4.4: Average task content of occupations along the wage distribution
Notes: Task intensities in each Brazilian occupation are plotted against their percentile in the wage
distribution using a kernel weighted regression. The calculation of the wage distribution is based on
the employment weighted mean wage of every occupation. Brazilian 6-digit occupations are mapped
to US occupations according to the porcedure in Maciente (2013). Therefore, the task categories are
defined as in Acemoglu and Autor (2011) by using the O*NET classification.
Comparable graphs for the U.S. and the German task classification are in Autor et al.
(2008) and Dustmann et al. (2009), respectively. The main differences between these high-
income economies is that the lower end of the wage distribution is marked by service rather
than non-routine manual jobs in Brazil. Moreover, the segment of high-skilled and high-
wage jobs is much smaller in Brazil. Notwithstanding, the task measures seem to make
sense. Despite the precautionary measures with the mapping of occupations, as explained
above, there is no certainty that Brazilian and U.S. occupations actually have the same
task content. Because the U.S. is presumably the most technologically advanced nation
in the world, if anything, the Brazilian occupations are likely to require more manual and
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less analytic operations.
As will be made clear in the next section, the identification strategy requires information
from the period before and after the increase in imports. Essentially the increase can occur
either in 2004 or in 2005. Table 4.1 shows the complete summary statistics for the variables
described in this chapter pooled for the periods 2004/5. The first four columns contain the
mean and the standard deviation, depending on whether the plant is an importer or not.
The last four columns subdivide the group of importing plants into those that purchase
more than 50% from the EU, the U.S., Canada or Japan. The label ’LA importers’ refers
to those plants with more than 50% of total value of intermediates imports coming from
Latin America, Russia, India and China.
4.4 Empirical strategy
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the employment effects on establishments due
to an increase in the extensive margin of intermediate goods imports. To start, we need to
verify if offshoring or onshoring is more present in the data. Observing which tasks are in-
creasingly or less often performed, we may infer Brazil’s comparative advantage and where
these traded intermediates range in the global value added chain. Ideally, we would like
to observe the same establishment in two situations, where the only exogenous difference
is the increase in imports. Since this is impossible, the propensity score matching (PSM)
approach serves to construct a comparable counterfactual situation. If the assumptions of
the PSM are satisfied, we estimate the causal effect on the outcome 𝑌 . The role of the
researcher is to evaluate and implement these assumptions as accurately as possible. This
strategy and its advantages over a simple regression analysis are explained in the following
section.
There are two distinct groups of establishments in my sample: those that have expanded
their import product range (𝐷 = 1) in period 𝑡 and those without an expansion (𝐷 =
0), according to the indicator described above. In analogy to the program evaluation
literature, I refer to the expansion of imports as treatment. Besides its treatment status
𝐷, an establishment is characterized by observable characteristics 𝑋. Following Heckman
et al. (1998b) two conditions have to be satisfied for the matching approach to be valid.
Conditional on 𝑋, the expected outcome without treatment 𝑌 0 has to be the same for
establishments in both groups. More formally, this is
𝐸(𝑌 0|𝐷 = 1, 𝑋) = 𝐸(𝑌 0|𝐷 = 0, 𝑋) (5)
The RHS refers to the actual observation for the untreated establishments, whereas the
LHS refers to the hypothetical outcome of a treated establishment in case it would not
have increased its imports. Clearly, this requirement is impossible to verify and has to hold
by assumption. To satisfy this assumption, I require establishments in both groups to be
as similar as possible in 𝑋. This is the heart of the identification strategy: establishments
with 𝐷 = 1 are paired one at a time with untreated establishments if they are sufficiently
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similar regarding their pre-treatment characteristics 𝑋. Conditional on being matched,
the difference in the observed outcome between both groups is the treatment effect I am
interested in.21
The employment size and the average task intensities are analyzed as outcome variable
𝑌 . The response in the latter variables is straightforward and easily explained. Since all
task intensities are positively defined, an increase in their plant average means that either
workers are hired with a task intensity above average, or alternatively, that workers with a
task intensity below average are dismissed. Thus, it is irrelevant in the first place, whether
the total employment rises or falls.
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) establish that instead of comparing firms along all variables
𝑋, a single statistic 𝑃 (𝑋) suffices. 𝑃 (𝑋), the so called propensity score, is defined as the
probability of receiving the treatment conditional on 𝑋. Here, I estimate 𝑃 (𝑋) in a Probit
model, where 𝑋 are values from period 𝑡 − 1. The pre-treatment value of the outcome
variable is also included in 𝑋, to obtain similar values of 𝑌𝑡−1 in the treatment and control
group as well.
The second requirement in the procedure is that 0 < 𝑃 (𝑋) < 1. This is a practical
matter that guarantees that all establishments can theoretically be matched. Therefore,
the predicting power in the probit estimation should not be too high. Otherwise, it is
difficult to find pairs with the same 𝑃 (𝑋) from treatment and control group, which is of
course especially true for perfectly predicted treatment statuses 𝑃 (𝑋) = 1 and 𝑃 (𝑋) = 0.
We follow the previous literature and restrict the matching to a common set of 𝑃 (𝑋)-
values in both groups (Heckman et al. 1998b). In the present application, I am not worried
that this common support restriction may confine the representativeness of my findings.
Quite the contrary. It is well known that firms involved in international trade, especially
importers, are inherently different from national firms (Bernard et al. 2007). Therefore,
the largest multinationals and the smallest domestic firms do not represent comparable
matching partners and should be disregarded. One might still be worried that responses
in the outcome are influenced by the participation in international trade. For this reason,
I have excluded import newcomers in the definition of the treatment dummy and I work
with two distinct control groups. One group is composed of non-importing firms and
the group other are only importers which did not increase their imports. Matching with
the second control group allows trade related characteristics to be included into 𝑋. The
different performances between importers and non-importers are extensively discussed in
subsection 4.3.2.
Then the PSM approach proceeds to choose the pairs of firms. To satisfy eq. (5), the
assignment to treatment conditional on the propensity score must be random. Not only
the distribution of 𝑃 (𝑋) and 𝑌𝑡−1 but also of each variable in 𝑋 should now be alike
21 Matching also requires the stable unit treatment value assumption. In the setting here, it means that a
firm’s import decision has no impact on the employment pattern of other firms. Even though the matching
is performed on regions and sectors, their definition is ample. Furthermore the number of importers is
rather low, thus there is no reason to suspect that importers employment changes have an effect on local
labor markets in the short run.
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in both groups. These are conditions that can and will be tested. It turns out that
the best balance of all variables between treatment and control group is achieved with a
simple 1:1 nearest neighbor matching without replacement, where I additionally restrict the
maximum distance between observations of a possible pair. Consequently the distributions
of 𝑃 (𝑋)|𝐷 = 1 and 𝑃 (𝑋)|𝐷 = 0 are limited to the common support plus/minus this
maximum distance. Firms that remain unmatched are discarded in the following analysis,
leading to the satisfaction of the second requirement. Note that the main findings in this
paper are not critical to the matching algorithm. Using a 𝑘-nearest neighbor matching
with 𝑘 = 10 yields similar effects. However, the number of establishments in the control
group is much lower and the balance of covariates in matched sample is less exact than in
the 1:1 matching.
Once treated and untreated firms are accurately matched on the relevant characteristics,
the conditional mean independence in eq. (5) implies that the observed difference in out-
comes between treated and control group 𝐸(𝑌 1𝑡 |𝐷 = 1, 𝑃 (𝑋)) − 𝐸(𝑌 0𝑡 |𝐷 = 0, 𝑃 (𝑋))
reveals the effect of an increase in imports I am interested in.
𝐸(𝑌 1𝑡 − 𝑌 0𝑡 |𝐷 = 1, 𝑃 (𝑋)) . (6)
A potential problem for the identification are unobservable factors that affect the decision
to increase imports. In this case, eq. (5) does not hold with equality and the estimation is
biased. We additionally construct the conditional difference-in-difference (DID) estimator
proposed by Heckman et al. (1998a) that eliminates biases that are constant over time,
which implies a relaxation of the requirement in eq. (5).
𝐸(𝑌 1𝑡 − 𝑌 1𝑡−1|𝐷 = 1, 𝑃 (𝑋))− 𝐸(𝑌 0𝑡 − 𝑌 0𝑡−1|𝐷 = 0, 𝑃 (𝑋)) (7)
Alternatively, it is possible to compare changes in 𝑌 1 and 𝑌 0 between 𝑡 + 1 and 𝑡 − 1.
This would be reasonable if restructurings take more than one year to occur. We report
both 𝐷𝐼𝐷𝑡 and 𝐷𝐼𝐷𝑡+1 in the following. However, a preliminary look at the data showed
that for the treatment group the largest change in employment (in absolute values) occurs
between 𝑡 and (𝑡 − 1), in each case the firms’ characteristics are recorded at the end of a
year.
Ultimately, I want to emphasize some benefits of propensity score matching over regression
analysis. The PSM does not include all firms, but only similar candidates, for the calcula-
tion of the treatment effect. In the context of trade, this exclusion is certainly important,
as few nationals perform like international companies. Furthermore, PSM equalizes the
pre-treatment mean of the outcome variable in both groups. Thereby, differences in 𝑌 in
later periods mirror the causal effect of the treatment, contrary to a linear regression on
the treatment dummy. The downside of the PSM is that some information is lost due to
unmatched establishments. Given that I use the universe of Brazilian firms, this does not
impede obtainment of significant results.
Task trade and the employment pattern 111
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Propensity Score Matching
This section presents the estimation of the propensity scores (PS), balance properties and
finally presents the treatment effects. The PS is estimated in a Probit model, where the
dependent variable is the indicator for an increase in imported intermediates in period 𝑡.
We perform two specifications to fortify the robustness of the results. In version 1, the
control group contains plants that do not have any imports in 𝑡 and 𝑡−1. In version 2, the
control firms are importers that do not increase the extensive margin of their purchases
from abroad. The variables on which the PS is conditioned also differ in both versions.
Obviously, the number of different import products, import products multiplied by their
destinations and their value appear exclusively in version 2. As discussed in subsection
4.3.2, these variables are proxies for a plant’s productivity. Having a much higher disper-
sion in plant size in version 1, I obtain a satisfactory balance between treated and control
group, with a quadratic in log plant employment size and the overall log size of the entire
firm. In the other sample, I obtain better results with dummies for employment size ranges.
Moreover, both versions contain employment shares for workers whp have completed high
school, college and higher education. The omitted reference group is the share of workers
without a high school degree. These variables absorb differences in the production tech-
nology. Finally, both estimations contain region fixed effects, an indicator for less than 1.2
million Reais annual revenue and a quadratic in the outcome variable.
For each outcome variable a different Probit estimation and matching is conducted to
balance the latter as much as possible. Coefficients are very similar across the models,
thus to save on space, appendix table D.1 exemplarily shows the results with the routine
manual task index. All coefficients except for the trade related variables are significant
predictors for the increase in imported intermediates for both groups of plants. Only
after the estimation of the PS, I condition plants to be in the same 2-digit sector and
observations years to be equal.22 The low pseudo 𝑅2 in the Probit estimation for version
2 is not necessarily bad news. It means that, given the available variables, it is difficult to
predict which importer will increase its foreign activities. Either the data set is not rich
enough, selection into treatment is based on unobservables and the treatment effect can not
be interpreted as causal, or the low pseudo 𝑅2 is a sign that the conditional independence
assumption in eq. (5) is likely to hold. Recall that all firms are already importers, and
thus an additional increase in the next period is difficult to predict ex ante.
Because matching conditions can never be undoubtedly verified, the following checks sug-
gest that the procedure is stable and provides reliable results. In any case, this paper is
interested in the direction of task intensity changes rather than an exact number. There-
fore, even in case of small biases, PSM is informative.
22 Given the caliper matching, the forcing of exact matches is done by adding 10*year and 100000*sector
to the predicted PS, cf. Ebner (2012). The maximum distance between the PS in matched pairs is equal
to 0.005 in version 1 and 0.1 in version 2. A larger distance is allowed in the version with only importers,
because the firms are more similar and there are much less possible matching partners available.
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Balancing properties of both versions are again reported exemplarily for the case where
the outcome variable is the routine manual task intensity in appendix tables D.2 and D.3,
respectively. The matching yields reasonable bias reductions and the difference in means is
insignificant for most of the covariates. While Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) consider a bias
of 20% as large, I remain well below 5% for most of the variables. Most importantly, the
plant’s task content, i.e. the outcome variables in the pre-treatment period, are also well-
balanced in treatment and control group. Their PS distributions confirm this impression,
compare panel (𝑎) and (𝑏) in appendix figure D.1. We also observe that after conditioning
on the common support, the remaining overlap of 𝑃 (𝑋) is quite large. Finally, note that
neither the matching algorithm (as mentioned above), nor the choice of covariates is critical
to obtain the results in this paper. Matching on less variables 𝑋 deteriorates the balance
between importer and control group while most outcome effects have the same sign and
similar magnitude.
The following two tables contain the effects for all variables and also repeat the pre-
treatment differences. Table 4.2 and 4.3 are created with the non-importer and the importer
control group, respectively. The first column shows the difference in means between treated
and control plants, while the second and third column refer to the difference-in-difference
estimators. The comparable treatment effects, across estimators and across the two control
groups confirm that matching is accurate.
Table 4.2: PSM results - national control group
treatment effect pre-treatment
level 𝐷𝐼𝐷𝑡 𝐷𝐼𝐷𝑡+1 difference obs
analytical -0.005 -0.004 0.003 -0.001 2213
[0.623] [0.453] [0.634] [0.821]
r.cognitive -0.060 -0.010 -0.002 -0.050 2226
[0.000] [0.191] [0.866] [0.002]
r.manual 0.052 0.025 0.027 0.027 2183
[0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.131]
non-r.cognitive -0.004 -0.017 -0.009 0.012 2225
[0.722] [0.011] [0.267] [0.323]
non-r.manual 0.030 0.013 0.004 0.017 2189
[0.056] [0.035] [0.634] [0.249]
offshorability -0.046 -0.017 -0.013 -0.030 2185
[0.001] [0.008] [0.110] [0.038]
exp.sh.int 0.110 0.084 0.073 0.025 1971
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.075]
size 12.03 12.28 11.10 -0.24 2183
[0.056] [0.000] [0.001] [0.980]
Notes: The control group are purely national plants, and the treatment
group are plants with an increase in intermediate imports. P-values in
parenthesis are based on bootstrapped standard errors with 100 replica-
tions. The last column quotes the number of treated plants.
For the average task contents of a plant, reported in the first six rows, I obtain significant
results for routine and non-routine manual tasks. An increase in intermediate imports
raises the intensity of manual tasks in production. The associated mirror-image is the
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Table 4.3: PSM results - importer control group
treatment effect pre-treatment
level 𝐷𝐼𝐷𝑡 𝐷𝐼𝐷𝑡+1 difference obs
analytical -0.009 -0.008 0.002 -0.002 2315
[0.241] [0.108] [0.688] [0.849]
r.cognitive -0.023 -0.007 -0.012 -0.016 2310
[0.116] [0.257] [0.177] [0.280]
r.manual 0.017 0.022 0.018 -0.005 2311
[0.249] [0.002] [0.043] [0.762]
non-r.cognitive -0.013 -0.013 -0.010 -0.001 2314
[0.126] [0.014] [0.130] [0.955]
non-r.manual 0.007 0.011 0.007 -0.004 2320
[0.531] [0.061] [0.288] [0.761]
offshorability -0.002 -0.007 -0.004 0.005 2316
[0.840] [0.172] [0.615] [0.696]
exp.sh.int 0.032 0.027 0.036 0.005 2304
[0.002] [0.001] [0.000] [0.716]
size 36.32 14.66 20.2 21.65 2311
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.024]
Notes: The control group are importers with out an increase in interme-
diates imports plants, and the treatment group are plants with such an
increase. P-values in parenthesis are based on bootstrapped standard er-
rors with 100 replications. The last column quotes the number of treated
plants.
reduction of the non-routine cognitive task intensity. Moreover, routine cognitive tasks
do not seem to be much affected by trade in intermediate products. In line with Becker
et al. (2013), routine manual tasks are among the most tradable. The novelty is that non-
routine manual tasks are apparently also affected and, what is more, an increase of their
intensity is observed, instead of a reduction.23 This finding is consistent with the overall
predominance of manual tasks in the Brazilian economy (De Negri 2005b). Table 4.2 also
shows that the increase in intermediate imports implies a clear increase in employment by
about 12 workers on average, and a higher share of intermediate goods exports. This paints
the following picture: On average, establishments process the imported intermediates using
manual tasks intensively and then proceed to export them. In other words, onshoring seems
to be prevalent in the Brazilian economy. The random assignment to treatment is much
easier to sustain in the case of onshoring. In this case, the Brazilian establishment is not
necessarily the one who initiates the relocation but the one who accepts an additional order
from a foreign buyer or affiliate.
Even though the change in average task intensities may seem small given the large spread
between occupations, the shifts inside the plants must be substantial given that estab-
lishment sizes are quite large. Consider a stylized example to exemplify the size of the
treatment effects. Table D.2 shows that the average size of matched plants is 163 in pe-
23 Treated importers appear to conduct tasks with an offshorability score below average. This might be
explained by the fact that the construction of this task measure is aimed at personal or public interactions.
The onshored manufacturing activities require little of those interactions and therefore naturally decrease
the average of offshorability task measure.
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riod 𝑡 − 1. The average value of routine manual tasks is 10.32 for the treated firms and
10.29 for the control group. For simplicity, I assume that the plants’ characteristics in
the control group remain constant. Consequently, after the treatment, the task value for
the treated firms increased to 10.345. If we assume that these firms keep all previous
employees, the 12 additional workers have an average task score of 10.68. To elucidate
the routine manual scale, I select a few comprehensive examples of the 2511 occupations:
weaver (11.02), maintenance technician (10.74), machine assembler (10.57), production su-
pervisor (10.27), truck driver (10.22), automotive engineer (9.47); Therefore, the new jobs
must be considerably routine manual intensive.
As argued in section 4.3.3, in case of possible inaccuracies, the Brazilian occupations are
without much doubt more manual and less analytic than their U.S. counterparts. In this
case, I expect the additionally employed workers to attain even higher scores in the manual
task categories. So, the good news is that the PSM estimates, if anything, represent lower
bounds. One might also be worried that due to the definition of the treatment variable,
principally new innovations are captured. In this case, the increase in the size of the
plant would come about naturally. Colantone and Crinò (2012) show that new imported
intermediates foster the development of new final products. However, their definition of
new products is much more stringent because ‘new’refers to latest technological innovations.
In addition, the fact that the share of exported intermediates also rises, makes us confident
that the evidence is consistent with onshoring, rather than with the effects of adopting new
technologies from abroad.
4.5.2 Won and lost jobs
The primary goal of this subsection is to identify Brazil’s comparative advantage in the
globally fragmented production process. To this end, I characterize the jobs that are
created and destructed when establishments expand their extensive margin of foreign in-
termediate inputs. This also provides a closer examination of the results from the PSM.
So far it is not definitely evident whether average task content changes are caused by an
increase in manual tasks or whether jobs are lost which use manual labor un-intensively.
In conjunction with the prior impression, the expectation is that onshoring creates routine
manual jobs, whereas offshoring leads to a loss of routine tasks and to possible gains in
non-routine tasks due to the productivity effect.
In the following, only those plants are regarded that experienced an expansion in imports
in period 𝑡, according to the indicator.24 First, I count the number of employees (weighted
by hours worked) in each plant for each of the 5-digit occupations. Then, I calculate
the change in the stock of workers between 𝑡 and 𝑡 − 1. The left graph in figure 4.5
plots these changes aggregated by sector. It is striking that in all of the 13 industries
more jobs are created than lost. The same picture emerges from the aggregation by 1-
digit occupation groups in the right graph of figure 4.5. The vast majority of churning
24 A few plants are excluded from the analysis that report large increases or decreases in a certain
occupation, whereupon this change is almost reversed in the following period. We suppose that these
dismissals are merely intended to bypass certain consequences of labor legislation.
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occurs in industrial and technical jobs. On average, the import of intermediate goods has
positive employment effects for the involved establishments. Even occupations (like sales
or administrative services) and sectors (like textile or footwear) where offshoring would
normally be expected, do not shrink.
Figure 4.5: Distribution of won and lost jobs
(a) by sector (b) by occupational group
Notes: These aggregate employment changes by sectors and occupation groups occur in those estab-
lishments with an increase in intermediate input imports during the period of the increase.
To examine the quality and the skill content of those affected jobs, I show the net em-
ployment change in each percentile the wage distribution in figure 4.6. Some employment
gains are located at the lower end of the distribution. In accordance with the theoretical
considerations in subsection 4.2.2, a main part of the increases are located around the 50𝑡ℎ
percentile. In the highly paid jobs, only very small total gains are visible in figure 4.6.
In the next consideration, the task contents of affected jobs are analyzed. Moreover, we are
still interested in determining whether some similar jobs show systematical employment
losses that have been overlapped in the graphs considered so far. Therefore, all 5-digit oc-
cupations are now considered separately. Figure 4.7 plots the task contents of occupations
against the amount of their net employment change by using a kernel-weighted local poly-
nomial regression.25 The task contents of occupations with small employment changes are
close to their original mean of 10. Further to the edges, the manual task intensity increases
steadily, while the analytical intensity decreases. The curve for the routine cognitive inten-
sity shows no clear direction and stays close to its mean. Most astonishing is that the task
contents of occupations with the largest absolute change are almost equal. The fact that
the maximum value of employment changes is much larger for created than for destructed
occupations reflects the overall employment gains. Using the variables in the data set,
I was not able to find a meaningful distinction between those positively and negatively
affected occupations.26 In the following subsection I explore if differences between plants
25 For the ease of exposition, only four of the six task measure are depicted here. Non-routine cognitive
were quite alike the analytical tasks in this diagram, as was the case in figure 4.4. The offshorablity
measure is omitted, because its change was insignificant before.
26 We have ruled out that changes in the classifications of some occupations or similar statistical artifacts
are responsible for the nature of figure 4.7. Constructing the graph with the 4-digit or 6-digit classification
yields a very similar picture.
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Figure 4.6: Aggregate changes in the wage distribution
Notes: The figure shows the aggregate employment change between period 𝑡 and 𝑡− 1 in those estab-
lishments with an increase in intermediate input imports in period 𝑡 for each percentile of the wage
distribution.
are responsible for this finding.
Figure 4.7: Task content and the employment change by occupation
Notes: The employment change is calculated as the net change of employees in each 5-digit occupation
between 𝑡 and 𝑡 − 1 considering all establishments with an increase in intermediates imports. The
absolute value of this net change is transformed in logs. Employment losses are multiplied by −1 and
consequently displayed on the negative part of the x-axis. The vertical axis shows the average task
content in 5-digit occupations using a Kernel-weighted local polynomial regression.
In summary, an expansion in intermediate imports along the extensive margin induces the
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creation of jobs. These gains are not restricted to particular sectors but concentrate in
routine manual intensive and industry related jobs that are mainly located in the middle
of the wage distribution. Because routine manual tasks are easily traded, the picture is
consistent with the notion that Brazil is executing tasks that have been offshored from
other countries. This suggests that the description of these jobs corresponds to Brazil’s
comparative advantage in the fragmented production chain.
4.5.3 Imports from high- and low-wage countries
What could be the reason for the almost symmetric change at the level of occupations?
Notwithstanding, I am still confident that the task classification is appropriate, given that
the routine manual index shows the largest dispersion and seems to be most associated
with the tradability of jobs. One possibility is that the origin of imports reflects different
intentions and renders different effects, which are overlaid in the pooled sample. As the
basic intention of offshoring is to save labor costs, my working hypothesis is: Interme-
diates imports from high-wage countries are onshored tasks, while imports coming from
developing countries represent tasks that have been offshored by Brazilian plants.
The distinction between high- and low-wage countries is frequently made in the context of
FDI. Concerning imports, e.g., Becker et al. (2013) found that interrelations with low-wage
countries generate larger effects. We focus on Brazil’s main trading partners and classify
the EU, Canada, Japan and the U.S. (labeled EU) as high-wage countries and Russia,
India, China and Latin American countries (labeled LA) as low-wage countries. We repeat
the PSM and the analysis of created and destructed jobs, but this time I split the group
of treated plants into these two groups.
Figure 4.8 shows the task contents and the net employment change per occupation. The
bold lines refer to importers from high-wage plants. For the two categories analytical and
non-routine cognitive in panels (a) and (d), a level difference in the entire employment
change distribution emerges. This observation is consistent with the summary statistics in
table 4.1 and the view in De Negri (2005a) which states that high-wage country importers
are technologically advanced.
Regarding the routine manual, routine cognitive and offshorability task measures, we ob-
serve systematic differences in the two dimensions lost vs. won employment and EU vs. LA
imports, that support the working hypothesis. Displaced workers in LA importers show
a higher value of offshorability and routine manual intensity than destructed jobs in EU
importers. This pattern is reversed for created jobs. In essence, EU importers shift their
employment towards routine tasks, whereas the low-wage country importers reduce those
tasks. To complete the picture, LA importers seem to shift away from non-routine manual
tasks, whereas the direction for the EU importers is ambiguous, given the information in
the graph.
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Figure 4.8: Task content and the employment change by occupation - EU and LA imports
(a) analytical (b) routine cognitive
(c) routine manual (d) non-routine cognitive
(e) non-routine manual (f) offshorability
Notes: The construction of these graphs is as in figure 4.7, except that employment changes in plants
with intermediate input imports from high- and low-wage countries are considered separately.
My interpretation of these patters is the following: Some inherent differences between
importers are due to a technological edge. Jobs created as a result of more imported inter-
mediates from the EU, U.S., Canada and Japan are more tradable and routine intensive.
On the other hand, reduced tasks in plants with imports from low-wage countries are also
easier to offshore and more routine manual intensive than those tasks reduced by EU im-
porters. All in all, this is consistent with EU importers performing onshored work, whereas
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LA imports look more like offshored tasks.
An advantage of this graphical assessment is that one has an overview of all occupations
and of the entire employment change distribution. The downside is that I do not control for
differences other than the origin of imports. We provide some regressions at the occupation-
establishment level in appendix table D.4 to mitigate that concern. As expected, only large
differences along the entire axis of positive or negative employment changes turn out to be
significant. That is, LA importers reduce tasks which are significantly less abstract and
more routine manual intensive. EU importers increase routine cognitive intensive tasks
which may be due to their technological edge and is in line with the prior findings.
The last piece of evidence stems from Propensity Score Matching. Again, I separate the
treated importers according to the origin of their foreign intermediates and compare both
groups to non-importers.27 Table 4.4 shows those outcome variables with significant results
and an acceptably low pre-treatment difference. The effects of low-wage country imports
in panel B do not provide any evidence for the expected offshoring. We do not observe
that treated plants reduce their routine and manual intensive tasks. In fact, the results
in both panels in table 4.4 look much the same and reproduce the prior results in tables
4.2 and 4.3. Treated plants grow faster on average than their counterparts and they use
routine manual tasks more intensively. EU importers only show more significant results,
which is possibly due to the larger number of observations, and they have a larger increase
in the export share of intermediates. In both cases it seems that the imported intermediate
goods are passed on to a different production site abroad. After all, it seems to make no
difference where the imported inputs are coming from.
Baldwin and Venables (2013) argue convincingly that technical characteristics determine
the method of production and how the production may be fragmented. They provide
some examples for the presence of two different international production processes. One
involves the back and forth trade of single components to distinct locations and is thus
called "spider". The other is called "snake" because intermediates need to be processed
in a certain sequence.28 No matter if the production is sequential or not, the three-
country framework described in subsection 4.2.2 implies that Brazil performs tasks and
production stages with medium complexity, i.e., those in the middle of the value added
chain.29 The detected empirical pattern confirms this and is at the same time consistent
with the existence of both the spider and the snake production. Intermediate imports
that come from low-wage countries to Brazil thus need not necessarily represent offshoring
when the production process is sequential. On the other hand, the imports from high-wage
countries conform to a spider type production and the usual perspective of offshoring from
27 The reason why I prefer the non-importer control group is that most importers source from a variety
of different countries and, unlike the import increase, it is less clear to assign importers to either the EU or
LA group. Moreover, my baseline results showed that both control groups yield comparable results. Hence
the PSM procedure is just like before in version 1. Probit results and balancing properties are similar to
the prior ones and are thus omitted for brevity.
28 Hanson (2012) denotes the two types of production models according to the strategies of the computer
companies Dell (spider) and Intel (snake).
29 Costinot et al. (2013) provide a model with technical differences between countries and sequential
production. It yields the same prediction if Brazil’s technology is assumed to be mediocre.
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Table 4.4: PSM results - EU and LA imports
A) EU imports B) LA imports
level 𝐷𝐼𝐷𝑡 pre-tr.-diff. level 𝐷𝐼𝐷𝑡 pre-tr.-diff.
r.manual 0.070 0.033 0.038 0.030 0.032 -0.006
[0.002] [0.001] [0.088] [0.326] [0.048] [0.865]
non-r.manual 0.030 0.013 0.016 0.001 0.018 -0.025
[0.089] [0.127] [0.419] [0.960] [0.238] [0.420]
offshorability -0.040 -0.017 -0.013 -0.008 -0.023 0.019
[0.032] [0.059] [0.493] [0.792] [0.122] [0.493]
exp.sh.int 0.127 0.095 0.032 0.092 0.052 0.048
[0.000] [0.000] [0.085] [0.000] [0.000] [0.076]
size 34.09 9.867 24.23 23.32 10.42 12.91
[0.000] [0.000] [0.024] [.094] [0.011] [0.631]
Notes: The label ’EU’ pertains jobs in establishments that acquire more than 50% of the
value of their increased imports from the EU, U.S., Canada or Japan. Accordingly, ’LA’
marks jobs in plant which mainly import from Russia, India, China or Latin America. The
number of observations oscillates around 2750 in panel A and 1090 in panel B. Both have
the purely national plants as control group and matching is performed analogous to version
1 before.
developed countries. Since this paper has focused on shifts in the task compositions and
less on the actual flow of intermediates, this conclusion should be seen as a preliminary
indication. We leave these questions about the organizational structure and the affiliation
to global production networks for future research.
4.5.4 Robustness checks
The main evidence from PSM was complemented by a finer division of treated importers
and by the perspective of won and lost occupations. It was mentioned earlier that the
classification of tasks, the choice of the control group, the timing of the effects either in 𝑡
or 𝑡+ 1 and the matching algorithm do not change the conclusions obtained so far. One of
the crucial variables in the entire paper has not been examined more closely: the increase
in imported intermediates. This section briefly shows that the findings remain robust to
variations in the definition of this treatment indicator.
Recall that the definition was based on the purchase of any new intermediate good(s)
from abroad, subject to some constraints which ensure that the relation is stable and
economically important. As a first robustness check, I follow Feenstra and Hanson (1999)
and restrict the indicator to cases, where the expanded imports correspond to the importing
plant’s 2-digit industry class. This narrow definition is intended to separate imports, which
the plant could potentially produce itself, from other inputs which are less related to its
core competences. The robustness check also lends itself to onshoring, because it can reduce
the concern that the observed pattern is merely caused by so-called carry-along trade or
by supplementary material for new innovations. That is to say, maybe imported inputs
are not even processed, because they do not belong to the plant’s core business activity.
Appendix table D.5 shows that the responses with the narrow intermediates measure are a
little stronger than before. Again, only outcome variables which were most affected so far
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are displayed. While the sample size is reduced by about one half, the estimators in levels
and differences are positive and highly significant for routine manual tasks, the share of
exported intermediates and employment size.
For a second robustness check, imports of semi-finished products are disregarded and I
focus only on ‘parts and components’. Obviously, the latter category is closely linked
to industrial manufacturing activities.30 Except for a decrease in the significance of the
effect on the routine manual task intensity, the results in appendix table D.6 are similar
to the previous ones. The drop in significance indicates that even the processing of semi-
finished products requires intensive use of routine manual tasks. Therefore, both robustness
exercises confirm that Brazilian firms seem to perform stages of medium complexity in a
globally fragmented production chain.
4.6 Conclusion
Falling trade and communication costs enabled the fragmentation of the production pro-
cess. Firms respond to cost differentials and distribute parts of their production around
the globe. This paper examines changes in employment and task composition of plants
that increase the extensive margin of imported intermediate inputs. From this pattern,
I infer that this middle-income country has a comparative advantage in production steps
that require medium-complex routine manual tasks.
In contrast to high-wage countries, the import of intermediate inputs may reflect two
different activities. Either tasks were offshored to countries with lower production costs,
or to take the reversed perspective, those inputs were offshored from a high-wage country.
From the Brazilian point of view, the latter is called onshoring. To distinguish between both
activities, I examine the consequences in the aftermath of an expansion in intermediates
imports along the extensive margin. Propensity Score Matching shows that the affected
plants grow in size, perform a higher intensity of routine manual tasks and also have a
higher share of exported intermediates than their counterparts. Because routine manual
tasks are most tradable, this picture is consistent with the notion that Brazilian firms
are engaged in onshoring. Even the distinction of the origin of intermediate imports into
high and low-wage countries could not identify which plants, if at all, conduct offshoring.
This result is compatible with the existence of two distinct global production methods, as
argued by Baldwin and Venables (2013). (1) The back-and-forth trade of single components
and (2) the sequential production in a variety of countries, whereby the complexity of
production steps is gradually increasing.
Furthermore, I examine the characteristics of created and destructed jobs in plants with
an increase in intermediate imports more closely. Created jobs are principally industrial
and technical occupations that comprise routine manual tasks. The aggregate employment
30 Plotting the distribution of won and lost jobs, analogous to figure 4.5, confirms this. However, the
seven industries displayed in the lower part of the figure are considerably affected as well. Just as before,
not a single industry experiences overall employment losses due to the expansion of imports.
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change is positive, evenly distributed over all sectors and is located in the middle of the
wage distribution. This evidence suggests that those medium-complex routine manual
tasks represent Brazil’s comparative advantage within the global production chain. Brazil’s
relative factor endowments and the developed extension of the model in Feenstra and
Hanson (1996) are in line with my findings.
While the overall impact for the importing plants is positive, the generated jobs do not
promote substantial qualitative advances along the value chain. Nevertheless, the increase
of industrial employment might be one explanation for the observed reduction of wage
inequality (Cruz and Naticchioni 2012). A profound investigation of the wage effects, the
actual flow of intermediate inputs and the effects on the entire economy constitute logical
extensions of this research.
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Appendix to chapter 4
D.1 Supplementary tables and figures
Table D.1: PSM Probit estimation
all plants [1] importers only [2]
coef. std. error coef. std. error
𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐.𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒[2]𝑡−1 0.50 0.08*** 0.20 0.12*
𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐.𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒[3]𝑡−1 1.50 0.07*** 0.54 0.10***
𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐.𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒[4]𝑡−1 2.83 0.09*** 0.70 0.12***
ln(𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1) 0.28 0.03***
(ln(𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1))2 0.03 0.00***
ln(𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1) -0.13 0.01***
𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑡−1 -1.21 0.04*** -0.25 0.07***
𝑖𝑚𝑝.-𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑡−1 9.8e-04 9.9e-04
𝑖𝑚𝑝.-𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑡−1 1.9e-03 1.7e-03
𝑖𝑚𝑝.-𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑡−1 1.2e-03 9.8e-04
𝑟-𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑡−1 8.65 0.53*** 1.52 0.67***
(𝑟-𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑡−1)2 -0.41 0.03*** -0.07 0.03***
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 -48.82 2.70*** -9.47 3.42***
size dummies 7 3
region FE 3 3
observations 273780 14203
pseudo 𝑅2 0.383 0.021
Notes: The dependent variable is the indicator for an increase in im-
ports. * significance at ten, ** five, *** one percent. This table is
exemplarily and corresponds to the version where the outcome vari-
able is the mean routine manual task intensity.
Table D.2: Balance of covariates in matched sample - national control group
Mean %reduct.
Variable Sample Treated Control %bias |bias| t-value p>|t|
𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐.𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒[1]𝑡−1 Unmatched 0.090 0.158 -34.7 -13.4 0.000
Matched 0.093 0.083 5.0 85.5 2.35 0.019
𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐.𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒[2]𝑡−1 Unmatched 0.274 0.442 -64.3 -26.4 0.000
Matched 0.282 0.279 1.3 98.0 0.51 0.610
𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐.𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒[3]𝑡−1 Unmatched 0.465 0.358 40.5 17.0 0.000
Matched 0.458 0.458 0.4 99.1 0.13 0.895
𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐.𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒[4]𝑡−1 Unmatched 0.171 0.042 81.5 51.7 0.000
Matched 0.166 0.180 -9.0 88.9 -2.06 0.039
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 Unmatched 199.0 21.89 70.4 99.1 0.000
Matched 162.9 163.1 -0.1 99.9 -0.03 0.980
𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 Unmatched 641.6 107.9 30.1 27.0 0.000
Matched 527.4 633.4 -6.0 80.1 -1.56 0.118
𝑟-𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑡−1 Unmatched 10.33 10.37 -8.2 -3.61 0.000
Matched 10.32 10.29 4.4 46.1 1.51 0.131
𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−1 Unmatched 3.986 3.907 8.1 3.78 0.000
Matched 3.993 4.022 -3.0 63.2 -1.07 0.284
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Table D.3: Balance of covariates in matched sample - importer control group
Mean %reduct.
Variable Sample Treated Control %bias |bias| t-value p>|t|
𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐.𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒[1]𝑡−1 Unmatched 0.090 0.110 -14.1 -6.0 0.000
Matched 0.091 0.087 3.3 76.5 1.24 0.214
𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐.𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒[2]𝑡−1 Unmatched 0.274 0.308 -16.4 -7.1 0.000
Matched 0.278 0.279 -0.9 94.5 -0.31 0.758
𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐.𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒[3]𝑡−1 Unmatched 0.465 0.432 14.9 6.6 0.000
Matched 0.463 0.471 -3.8 74.7 -1.28 0.200
𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐.𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒[4]𝑡−1 Unmatched 0.171 0.150 11.7 5.3 0.000
Matched 0.168 0.163 3.0 74.7 0.99 0.322
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 Unmatched 199.0 157.6 12.4 5.6 0.000
Matched 192.5 170.8 6.5 47.7 2.27 0.024
𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 Unmatched 641.6 601.1 1.7 0.8 0.449
Matched 605.5 587.4 0.8 55.3 0.29 0.774
𝑟-𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑡−1 Unmatched 10.33 10.31 2.3 1.02 0.308
Matched 10.32 10.33 -0.9 61.7 -0.3 0.762
𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−1 Unmatched 3.986 4.043 -6.1 -2.76 0.006
Matched 3.996 3.985 1.2 81.0 0.4 0.693
𝑖𝑚𝑝.𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑡−1 Unmatched 20.92 13.44 20.0 10.2 0.000
Matched 17.95 16.12 4.9 75.6 1.92 0.055
𝑖𝑚𝑝.𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑡−1 Unmatched 14.86 10.23 21.9 10.6 0.000
Matched 13.31 12.08 5.8 73.4 2.09 0.037
𝑖𝑚𝑝.𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑡−1 Unmatched 2.4 1.6 4.4 1.99 0.047
Matched 2.0e+6 1.6e+6 2.7 38.2 1.19 0.234
Figure D.1: Distribution of matched propensity scores
(a) non-importer control group (b) importer control group
Notes: The balance of the propensity scores between the groups of treated and control firms is displayed
for two cases: for the control group of non-importer firms and for the control group of firms that import
but do not exhibit an increase in intermediate imports.
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Table D.4: Task content of won and lost jobs - EU and LA importers
analytical r.cognitive r.manual non-r.cognitive non-r.manual offshorability
A) won jobs
LA imports -0.043 -0.175 0.005 -0.029 -0.008 -0.004
[0.260] [0.000] [0.919] [0.354] [0.854] [0.938]
𝑅2 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.04
B) lost jobs
LA imports -0.081 0.058 0.122 -0.017 0.069 -0.012
[0.009] [0.400] [0.034] [0.720] [0.119] [0.788]
𝑅2 0.09 0.04 0.06 0.11 0.09 0.07
Notes: Each column pertains to a regression where the dependent variable is the task content of either
won or lost occupations in establishments with an increase in intermediates imports. The variable of
interest is a dummy for firms with imports from low-wage countries. Regressions control for sector,
region and size class dummies and whether the plant has annual revenue below 1.2 Mio. Reais and
are weighted by the number of workers in each occupation. Panel A has 26990 observations, panel
B has 12120. Standard errors are clustered at the establishment level and p-values are reported in
parenthesis.
Table D.5: PSM robustness - narrow intermediate imports
treatment effect pre-treatment
level 𝐷𝐼𝐷𝑡 𝐷𝐼𝐷𝑡+1 difference obs
r.manual 0.086 0.032 0.037 0.053 1164
[0.000] [0.003] [0.007] [0.037]
non-r.manual 0.026 0.013 0.019 0.012 1161
[0.194] [0.129] [0.087] [0.534]
exp.sh.int 0.123 0.102 0.115 0.021 1048
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.299]
size 42.03 16.63 11.21 33.55 1204
[0.007] [0.000] [0.086] [0.033]
Notes: The control group are purely national plants. In contrast to
table 4.2, the indicator variable has the value 1 if the increased imported
intermediate inputs correspond to the 2-digit sector of the importing
plant.
Table D.6: PSM robustness - parts and components imports
treatment effect pre-treatment
level 𝐷𝐼𝐷𝑡 𝐷𝐼𝐷𝑡+1 difference obs
r.manual 0.043 0.020 0.006 0.022 1015
[0.087] [0.062] [0.698] [0.401]
non-r.manual 0.013 0.004 0.013 0.009 1007
[0.521] [0.677] [0.315] [0.670]
exp.sh.int 0.130 0.088 0.082 0.042 898
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.051]
size 39.18 15.26 19.47 23.92 1015
[0.007] [0.000] [0.002] [0.069]
Notes: The control group are purely national plants. In contrast to
table 4.2, the indicator variable has the value 1 if the increased im-
ported intermediate inputs correspond to the sub-group ’parts and com-
ponents’.
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